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Abstract: Historians of the early space age have established a norm whereby 
President Eisenhower's actions are judged solely as a response to the launch of 
the Sputnik satellite, and are indicative of a passive, negative presidency. His 
low-key actions are seen merely as a prelude to the US triumph in space in the 
1960s. This study presents an alternative view showing that Eisenhower’s space 
policy was not a reaction to the heavily-propagandised Soviet satellite launches, 
or even the effect they caused in the US political and military elites, but the 
continuation of a strategic track. In so doing, it also contributes to the 
reassessment of the wider Eisenhower presidency. Having assessed the 
development of three intersecting discourses: Eisenhower as president; the 
genesis of the US space programme; and developments in Cold War US 
reconnaissance, this thesis charts Eisenhower’s influence both on the ICBM and 
reconnaissance programmes and his support for a non-military approach to the 
International Geophysical Year. These actions provided the basis for his space 
policy for the remainder of his presidency. The following chapters show that 
Sputnik had no impact on the policies already in place and highlight 
Eisenhower’s pragmatic activism in enabling the implementation of these 
policies by a carefully-chosen group of expert ‘helping hands’. This study 
delivers a new interpretation of Eisenhower’s actions. It argues that he was 
operating on a parallel track that started with the Castle H-bomb tests; 
developed through the CIA's reconnaissance efforts and was distilled in the 
Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. This set a policy for US involvement in outer 
space that matched Eisenhower’s desire for a balanced budget and fundamental 
belief in maintaining peace. By challenging the orthodox view, this paper shows 
that President Eisenhower’s space policy actions were strategic steps that 
provided a logical next step for both civilian and military space programmes at 
the completion of the International Geophysical Year. 
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Introduction: Nature of the thesis 
Are we correct in our reading of the Eisenhower presidency? 
Ike was a mid-western middle-of-the-road patriot, a common man 
with a winning smile who read little, was uninformed about 
trends in intellectual and artistic life, and was prone to giving 
folksy advice. A diplomat labelled him “the nation’s number one 
Boy Scout.” But those who were closer to Ike have presented 
another side. When provoked, the genial general could show a 
fiery temper and release a stream of scalding profanity.1 
 
This is how George Tindall and David Shi sum up President Dwight D 
Eisenhower in their undergraduate textbook, America, A Narrative History. In 
the same paragraph, however, they note that “Eisenhower was, in fact, an 
effective leader…One student of Eisenhower’s leadership techniques has spoken 
of “a hidden-hand presidency” in which Ike deliberately cultivated a public 
image of passivity to hide his active involvement in policy decisions.”2 It is 
rather a mixed message – and they give no indication of their judgement on the 
veracity of the argument of that “One student”.  
 As scholars, do we make assumptions about Eisenhower? Are we correct 
in the way we read his presidency not just through his character, but through 
his actions, and in particular, his actions in the wake of the launch of Sputnik? 
Hugh Brogan, in The Penguin History of the USA, still a standard work for 
students, neatly expressed the orthodox view:  
The Eisenhower years were, in general, ones of comfortable 
lethargy. When the Soviet Union put the first satellite into space 
in 1957, the shock to American vanity was almost unbearable; the 
cry went up that something was badly wrong with American 
society, American science, American education; it would take 
several years for the speed with which the lapse was made good to 
wipe out this impression.3 
 
                                                          
1 G Tindall and D Shi, America, A Narrative History, 7
th
 edition, volume 2 (New York, 2007), p. 1199. 
2 Ibid 
3 H Brogan, The Penguin History of the United States of America (London, 1999), p. 612. 
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Eisenhower’s presidency is skated over in just a few pages while the supposed 
Sputnik crisis is dismissed in a third of a paragraph. It is true that Brogan’s 
work was first written in 1985, but this assessment of “The Eisenhower Years” 
remained unchanged through two editions and a number of reprints. David 
Reynolds, in another more recent narrative history regularly used by students, 
is rather less pejorative in his assessment of Eisenhower and Sputnik, but still 
deals with the issue very briefly. In America, Empire of Liberty, he wrote about 
the wake of the two Sputnik satellite launches.  
 
Criticism of Eisenhower had already been mounting: there were 
reports of heart trouble, and he seemed to be spending too much 
time on the golf course. Now, America’s leader looked dangerously 
out of touch…Sputnik was a huge shock to America’s national 
pride: Eisenhower immediately established the National 
Aeronautics and Space Agency [sic – it should be Administration] 
to coordinate America’s space race.4   
 
Reynolds now repeats the traditional scholarly narrative for Eisenhower and 
Sputnik: the weak president reacts to a Soviet triumph. It is a narrative that 
has been accepted since the first generation of scholars began to study the 
Eisenhower presidency and it has become a totem both for Eisenhower scholars 
and for scholars of early space exploration. Even those directly involved in those 
early US endeavours present an unquestioning adherence to the expected 
narrative. Neil Armstrong summed this up: 
 
Sputnik did change our world…President Eisenhower was saying 
something like: ‘What’s the worry? It’s just one small ball.’ But 
I’m sure that was a façade behind which he had substantial 
concerns, because if they put something into orbit, they could put 
a nuclear weapon on a target in the United States.5  
 
                                                          
4 D Reynolds, America, Empire of Liberty (London. 2010), p. 404. 
5 Neil Armstrong in JR Hansen, First Man, the Life of Neil Armstrong (London and New York, 2005) 
pp. 168-169. 
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This thesis questions that narrative, re-interpreting the orthodox view of 
Eisenhower’s actions on space policy and in so doing, re-interpreting the 
view held by many scholars that Eisenhower’s second term in particular 
was one of lame-duck inaction.  
The time is ripe for reassessing Eisenhower’s Presidency. In 
recent years, major biographies by Evan Thomas, Jim Newton and Jean 
Edward Smith have all added to the rehabilitation of a President who, 
for too long, was regarded as a passive political player. He had been seen 
as content to inhabit the golf course rather than the White House; 
happier on the farm in the company of his Kansas friends than on the 
international stage battling for the pre-eminence of the free world. But 
while there has been a renaissance in interest in Eisenhower among 
presidential biographers, there has been too little scholarly advance on 
the revisionist stance set by Fred Greenstein – Tindall and Shi’s “One 
student” - in his 1982 book, The Hidden-Hand Presidency 6. That picture 
is changing somewhat, not least through the work of David Nichols, 
whose detailed studies of Eisenhower’s actions around civil rights and 
Suez are throwing a new light on Eisenhower as president – not quite 
the all-knowing political master as envisioned by Greenstein, but also far 
from the benign, grinning, indecisive and ineffective non-leader 
portrayed by the first generation of scholars to pass judgement once he 
had left political office in 1961. This research builds on the work of 
scholars such as Nichols and provides new insight into one particular 
aspect of Eisenhower’s presidency: his development of a comprehensive 
policy for the United States’ first endeavours in outer space. 
                                                          
6 F Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency (Baltimore, 1982). 
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Today’s emerging view of ‘Ike’ as he was commonly known, is of a long-
term strategist; a smart thinker who, unlike previous interpretations, was a 
decisive decision maker. But this view needs more extensive and scholarly 
drawing-out. While biographers from Stephen Ambrose to Jean Edward Smith 
engage lightly on Eisenhower’s talents through a broad sweep approach and a 
determination to tell a good story well, there is insufficient space in a single 
volume to delve deeply into the detail of a two-term presidency, not least when 
the ‘back story’ of Eisenhower’s military career either dominates proceedings or 
at least casts a long shadow over his presidency. Speaking at the ‘Ike 
Reconsidered’ Conference in New York in 2013, Nichols summed up the current 
scholarly debate as ‘midstream’ and provided a pithy summary of Eisenhower as 
President: “The real Dwight Eisenhower was a crafty, complicated man.  Agree 
with him or not, he was formidable.”7 To understand just how formidable he 
was, it is necessary to unpick specific areas for deeper study – as Nichols has 
done with Suez and civil rights.  
This study adds to the detailed investigation of specific facets of the 
Eisenhower presidency and provides an original contribution to the knowledge 
of his presidency by using the development of the United States’ first space 
policy as a case study. It addresses both the academic discussion of 
Eisenhower’s presidency and historical narrative of early space exploration.  
Without exception, the current literature in both fields depicts Eisenhower’s 
actions as an unwilling response to the Soviet Sputnik satellites. This study 
offers another interpretation, posing the question: Have historians read Sputnik 
wrong?  Indeed, should it be argued that Eisenhower did not react to Sputnik? 
                                                          
7 D Nichols, closing address at ‘Ike Reconsidered – Lessons from the Eisenhower legacy for the 21
st
 
century’ conference held at Hunter College CUNY in association with The Eisenhower Foundation. 
Sourced from http://roosevelthouse.hunter.cuny.edu/ike/. Accessed April 4, 2013. 
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In so doing, it raises further questions seemingly at odds with the dominant 
interpretation. For instance, it asks: To what extent was Eisenhower actually an 
‘active’ president in his second term and how did he demonstrate his activism, 
particularly in dealing with Congress in the wake of the Sputnik launches? In 
seeking to answer this, the study asks whether historians should revisit 
Greenstein’s revisionism. By using these questions to lead an investigation into 
archive materials – especially primary source documentation, supported by 
memoir and oral histories - and by reinterpreting existing secondary sources, 
this study shows that far from being the passive, indecisive figure depicted by 
historians such as Schlesinger and Neustadt, Eisenhower already had plans for 
both military uses of space and for scientific satellites and thus had no need to 
panic over Sputnik.8 He was operating on a parallel track to the knee-jerk 
political calls for ever greater weaponry in the wake of the Sputnik launches. 
Rather than react to Soviet action, he was driven by the need to balance his 
overriding concern to ensure national security with his ingrained economic 
conservatism.  By an in-depth analysis of the development of Eisenhower’s 
space policy from 1953, the paper also challenges the prevailing scholarly view 
of the path of the National Aeronautics and Space Act, traditionally seen as a 
Congressional achievement, led by Senate Majority Leader, Lyndon Johnson. 
This study reinterprets the evidence, looking particularly at the role of the 
Executive, and questioning who was using whom (and who benefited most) from 
the Executive/Legislative interaction. 
This paper additionally asks what role ‘operational officers’ occupied in 
Eisenhower’s decision making; identifying who they were and analysing their 
influence on the policy process – either as definers or appliers of policy. It will 
                                                          
8 A Schlesinger Jr, The Imperial Presidency (New York, 2004 edition) and R Neustadt’s Presidential 
Power (New York, 1960). 
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discuss what kind of personalities Eisenhower looked for, and how he was able 
to achieve policy goals – often at odds with either a hostile Congress, Pentagon 
or both – by giving the support his advisers needed to reach key decisions, and 
then backing them in applying those decisions. This is not a specific study of 
Eisenhower’s military missile policy or of his intelligence community’s strategy 
and tactics in dealing with the Soviet threat. It does, however show both of 
these important aspects of his presidential control, if only where they had 
significant influence on key elements of the development of Eisenhower’s space 
policy.  
In choosing to dissect Eisenhower’s decision making by reviewing the 
development of his space policy, this study will revisit ground first covered in 
the 1990s by Robert Divine in his monograph The Sputnik Challenge, and the 
more journalistic chronicle Sputnik: the Shock of the Century, written in 2000 by 
Paul Dickson.9  However, Divine, Dickson and even Yanek Mieczkowski’s 2013 
work, Eisenhower’s Sputnik Moment all follow the orthodox line that 
Eisenhower’s actions in regard to outer space are a reaction to Sputnik.10  
Meanwhile, much of the wider early space discourse focuses on President 
Kennedy’s 1961 pledge “to send a man to the moon and return him safely to the 
earth before this decade is out.” This views the early space programme through 
a distorting lens; one that throws undue focus on the ‘triumph’ of the moon 
landing. Eisenhower’s initiative in the creation of the infrastructure for the 
USA’s space activities is overlooked. His motives and the process that created a 
‘white’ space programme for the United States alongside a highly-effective 
‘black’ programme focused on reconnaissance tend to be discussed only as a 
                                                          
9 R Divine, The Sputnik Challenge (Oxford, 1993), P Dickson, Sputnik, The Shock of the Century (New 
York, 2001). 
10 Y Mieczkowski, Eisenhower’s Sputnik Moment (Ithaca and London, 2013). 
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prelude to the Kennedy/Johnson programme that delivered the first moon 
landing. Yet this undervalues considerably Eisenhower’s contribution to the 
United States’ achievements in space in the first decades of space exploration.  
One of the key questions the study engages with is the value to the US of 
its space-related efforts. Traditionally, the success of US space endeavours is 
seen in the prestige gained from the Apollo Moon landings. Kennedy gained 
Congressional support for the race to the moon which has been presented by 
scholars as a proxy battle in the Cold War.11 However, there has been little 
critical engagement with the period before Kennedy, other than to present 
Eisenhower as delivering a weak response to Sputnik. This thesis will engage 
with that pre-Kennedy period and, by drawing together Eisenhower’s actions 
around missiles, satellites and the separation of military and scientific space 
activities, present a revised account of the United States’ success in space based 
not on Kennedy’s pledge to send a man to the moon, but on the immense amount 
of groundwork achieved under Eisenhower. Prestige and credibility mattered as 
much to Eisenhower as to any other President, and in a time when new nations 
were emerging from colonial rule to independence across Asia and Africa, the 
prestige of the United States was vital. Eisenhower was no different from any 
other American in wanting these new nations to opt for the ‘free world’ path 
offered by the United States rather than the opposing ideology led by 
Khrushchev’s Soviet Union.12 But the thesis questions the degree to which he 
was interested in making a space into an ideological race. This study adds to the 
discourse on the politics of the early years of space endeavour by distilling 
                                                          
11 M Beschloss, ‘Kennedy and the Decision go to  the Moon’, in R Launius and H McCurdy, eds. 
Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership (Urbana, 1997), pp. 51-53  
12 This is well stated by Walter La Feber in America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-1996, 8
th
 Edition 
(New York, 1997) pp 192-193 when he says: “The newly emerging nations could view Russia as a 
people who in 1917 had been generations behind other industrialized nations but who, through 
harsh regimentation, had assumed first place in the race for control of outer space. They could also 
interpret the launching as a dramatic swing in the balance of military power towards Moscow.” 
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Eisenhower’s process of moving to a civilian space agency reporting directly to 
the President. Prior to, but connected to, this process, it analyses his response to 
nuclear missile testing and his decisions on the U-2 and Corona ‘black’ 
reconnaissance programmes. It explains how all these factored into his decision 
not to seek Cold War confrontation over space exploration. It explores the effect 
of Eisenhower’s preference for unmanned space missions; and desire to separate 
scientific and military uses of space. In so doing, it demonstrates a significant 
policy difference from the direct challenge to Khrushchev made by Kennedy 
which coalesced all NASA’s focus into the race for the moon.  
While this study is primarily focused on the development of the first US 
space policy, it has wider importance in contributing to the overall revaluation 
of Eisenhower underway at present. In touching upon Eisenhower’s relationship 
with Johnson in the Senate, for instance, it provides new insight into the 
strength of the Executive, when the orthodox reading of Eisenhower’s second 
terms tends to stress the dominance of the Legislative branch. Through the very 
specific lens of space policy making, this paper will add to the weight of evidence 
emerging to support the claim that Eisenhower was an activist president and 
drive out the misleading stereotype that has previously been the academic 
norm. 
  In summary, this thesis presents a new perspective on Eisenhower’s 
contribution to the United States’ early space policy development. It will prove 
that Eisenhower did not react to Sputnik in the way scholars have traditionally 
said he did. Understanding how he acted and why, has significant implications 
for the broader understanding both of the US exploration of space and for 
Eisenhower’s presidency.   
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Methodology 
This is an interpretive historical investigation and as such is focused on the 
actions of President Eisenhower and a group of people close to him who created, 
managed and reacted to situations around them. The sources both directly 
concerning Eisenhower and on the development of early space exploration are 
many and varied, although Eisenhower is less ‘storied’ than predecessors such 
as Roosevelt, or his successors in the 1960s, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon.  The 
genesis for this study is the existing secondary literature covering three 
intersecting strands: Eisenhower presidential studies; scholarly works on the 
US in space, and studies on missile and satellite development. Taken 
separately, they offer a critique of Eisenhower in part, and one that fails to 
appreciate fully the breadth and depth of his contribution to US space policy, 
and what that contribution tells us about his wider presidency.  
 Presidential history, which can be further broken down into biography 
and political action sub-strands, thrived in the 1960s after the completion of 
Eisenhower’s second term, and while government pursued large, interventionist 
policy. This liberal climate set a tone for much Eisenhower criticism, leading to 
the development of an orthodoxy that has largely dismissed the value of 
Eisenhower’s moderate conservatism.13 Yet in considering the work of such 
scholars as Arthur Schlesinger and Richard Neustadt, one is forced to consider 
how he achieved policy success - especially around space policy - if he was a ‘do-
nothing’ president, content merely to maintain the status quo. This, passive, 
reactive Eisenhower was further damned after November 1956 when, though re-
                                                          
13 Eisenhower has been caught between two generations of GOP study, neither of which has 
favoured his moderation in style and policy. In addition to the first generation scholars such as 
Schlesinger and Neustadt discussed in this thesis, Eisenhower was also largely dismissed in studies of 
Republicanism as scholars focused first on Nixon and then increasingly on the move towards 
conservatism and, in particular, on the rise of Neo-Conservatism. Even Fred Greenstein delivered 
The Reagan Presidency: an early assessment (Baltimore, 1983) within a year of his work on 
Eisenhower, The Hidden Hand Presidency (Baltimore, 1982). 
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elected with a massive majority, he was operating against a hostile Congress 
which further limited his strategic and policy ambitions, and conferred ‘lame 
duck’ status on his presidency. What emerges from this literature is a president 
beset by health issues, filling in time until his term is complete. It is an 
unsettling picture, since it does not square with the evidence of his policies in 
action. But it is more unsettling as, even after a wave of revisionism, the 
complacent Eisenhower, the avuncular president, still features in narrative 
histories such as that of Reynolds, but also in modern textbooks used across 
higher education today.  
Thus one turns to revisionist literature. As the following section on 
historiography shows, this has been dominated by the ‘Hidden Hand’ theory of 
Fred Greenstein. This is now over 30 years old, but, other than specific subject 
studies by academics such as David Nichols and Yanek Mieczkowski, scholars 
have not moved on significantly from the Greenstein revision which sought to 
redress the criticisms of orthodox scholars. Yet the Greenstein revision is still 
troubling. The Eisenhower that emerges is a political studies model, not a real 
man. He is too knowing; too involved in all aspects of government. His 
interpretation is not wrong, but as a challenge of Neustadt et al, it is rather two-
dimensional, lacking the nuance of the real man.  
The interpretation of Eisenhower that emerged from academic studies of 
the early years of US space exploration had its basis firmly in the liberal 
orthodoxy of 1960s presidential scholarship. Sputnik caused a national and 
international furore and the president was slow to react. What little and late 
action does take place (primarily the formation of NASA) was driven by 
Congress, and the United States did not achieve parity, never mind draw ahead 
of the Soviet Union until Kennedy galvanised the nation in his ‘second state of 
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the Union’ in May 1961.14 This picture, though widespread and long-lasting, is 
not universal. In the 1990s, William Burrows for instance drew a more nuanced 
picture of the reaction in the US to Sputnik, though even Burrows painted a 
negative picture of Eisenhower: 
A shrill cacophony spread across the land like a prairie fire. And 
it didn’t take long to lick at Dwight Eisenhower. The Democratic 
Advisory Council…accused the Administration of “unilateral 
disarmament…the all-out effort of the Soviets to establish 
themselves as master of [the] space around us must be met by all-
out efforts of our own.”15     
 
This nuancing is continued by Mieczkowski but still appears to accept the 
orthodox assumption that everything Eisenhower did in terms of space was a 
reaction to the Sputnik satellites. Here is the nub of the issue in reading the 
Eisenhower space narrative. Scholars have continued to accept the 
unchallenged assumption that Eisenhower reacted directly to Sputnik. This is 
accepted as a given but the evidence is not tested. But does this assumption 
stand up if one follows the implications of Eisenhower revisionism and looks at 
how he dealt with Sputnik in that light? In order to create an alternative ‘active’ 
hypothesis, one has also to consider a much smaller but equally relevant 
literature thread, that of the development of missiles and satellite 
reconnaissance under Eisenhower. Again, Burrows is to the forefront here with 
Deep Black.16 Here Burrows described the development, under Eisenhower, of 
the United States’ first aerial and then orbital reconnaissance. Complementing 
this, Neil Sheehan has provided a comprehensive overview of early US missile 
development, again, under Eisenhower.17 Both provide a strong case that 
Eisenhower had a defined missile and satellite policy in place as early as 1954. 
                                                          
14 JF Kennedy, ‘Urgent National Needs’, speech to a Joint session of Congress, May 25, 1961, Speech 
File, Presidential Files, Papers as President, JFK Library. 
15 WE Burrows, This New Ocean (New York, 1999), p189.  
16 WE Burrows, Deep Black (London and New York, 1988). 
17 N Sheehan, A Fiery Peace in a Cold War (New York, 2009). 
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If that was the case, why should he react so poorly to the orbiting of Soviet 
satellites? Indeed, should he react at all? 
 Very few scholars, with the partial exception of Burrows and 
Mieczkowski have made any kind of link between policy on missile development 
and reconnaissance, and policy directly related to the exploration of space. Yet 
one must surely follow the other. However, these strands have not been drawn 
fully together, and the secondary literature, without exception, discussed 
Eisenhower’s space policy solely as a reaction to Sputnik. Bringing the two 
strands together calls the orthodoxy into question and one has to be sure that 
Eisenhower is credible as a rational actor capable of driving policy rather than 
merely responding to it. Thus, to test the hypothesis of Eisenhower’s space 
policy as an outcome of decisions made in 1954-1955, it has been useful to apply 
Graham Allison’s rational actor approach to understand the decisions the 
president made and how he made them, especially in the year from the launch 
of Sputnik 1.18  Allison’s study was on a different topic, but both his 
bureaucratic politics model and, to an extent, Amy Zegart’s new institutionalist 
approach (in relation to the development of the CIA) offer interesting 
methodologies that can be applied to Eisenhower’s particular circumstances.19 
Remaining on political science ground, it has also been interesting to consider 
the post-Sputnik actions in terms of Irving Janis’ concept of Groupthink.20  
 But to apply any political science model and ultimately to put forward an 
alternative hypothesis, one needs to examine the evidence of action – and rather 
than theoretical modelling, this is a study of people, their actions and 
interactions. The heart of this study is a reappraisal of the primary evidence left 
                                                          
18 G Allinson, Essence of Decision (Glenview IL, 1971) 
19 AB Zegart, Flawed by Design (Stanford CA, 1999). 
20 IL Janis, Groupthink, 2
nd
 edition (Boston, MA, 1972). 
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as documentation by Eisenhower and his closest advisers on space policy issues. 
This evidence gathering involved significant archival research in two key areas: 
media research to collect and analyse newspaper, magazine and TV material 
contemporaneous with the hinge points in Eisenhower’s space policy 
development; and detailed archive searches both in collections directly related to 
Eisenhower and in those focused on his supporting team. The former removes 
one layer of interpretation by presenting the information and opinion that the 
American people saw in the ‘Sputnik Autumn’ and beyond. The evidence that 
emerges from them in terms of the timeframe of reaction to Sputnik is 
interesting, since it suggests that any panic that gripped America was very 
short-lived. Tracking newspaper and news magazine coverage also challenges 
the traditional interpretation that ‘panic’ was a universal phenomenon. 
Evidence cited in the thesis on coverage of everything from mayoral elections in 
New York to the World Series baseball in Milwaukee suggest that Sputnik was 
a very big story in political circles, but was of rather lesser interest beyond the 
first reaction to the American population as a whole  The latter research, built 
on papers from a number of separate, and largely unlinked collections within 
the Dwight D Eisenhower Presidential Library, which is the largest and most 
comprehensive primary source collection for his Presidency and also holds the 
collections of such key allies as James Hagerty, Richard Bissell and Keith 
Glennan, was supported by complementary research in the NASA Historical 
Reference Collection in Washington DC, and the MIT Library which holds the 
Killian collection. Additional research was carried out through the CIA’s 
Historical Archive; the National Security Archive and the Department of State 
papers on Foreign Relations of the United States of America, as well as the 
Congressional Records of the United States National Archives. Many of these 
14 
 
sources have been used before, and feature either in works on Eisenhower as 
President – notably Greenstein’s work – or in specific subject studies, most 
recently in the work of Mieczkowski. However, no writer has sought to use them 
to answer the question: what if Eisenhower did not react to Sputnik? This study 
has sought to ask different questions of what scholars may see as familiar 
materials.  
 The archive papers are challenging. For one thing, they were not written 
in order to make it easy for historians to apply retrospective interpretations to 
Eisenhower’s actions! These are working papers, recording meetings and their 
outcomes, and formally presenting options and opinions from actors around the 
White House and Executive departments on a daily basis. Thus much of the 
method in building and testing the hypothesis in this work has been to 
reconstruct meetings and conversations from the evidence available and on file. 
In some instances, that has been made easier by the comprehensive memoranda 
for the record written by Eisenhower’s Staff Secretary, General Andrew 
Goodpaster, and the less formal notes taken by the president’s personal 
secretary, Ann Whitman. Eisenhower himself does not help the researcher 
greatly. While his thoughts and opinions are captured in formerly ‘top secret’ 
National Security papers, his tendency was not to go on the written record in 
any other forums on national security matters. Thus, the evidence of the 
parallel track from the nuclear testing at Bikini Atoll, to the creation of NASA 
and beyond is often incomplete in the Eisenhower files and needs to be 
triangulated with other sources. On occasion, that has been challenging. For 
example, the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft is still operational. Therefore, much of 
the governmental material relating to the decision to develop it and how that 
decision was implemented, remains classified. Even unclassified material is 
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heavily redacted. Thus, where there have been gaps in the formal record, the 
research has brought in other source material including diaries, memoirs and 
letters that fill some of the evidentiary gaps. However, such material must be 
treated carefully. While diaries may have been written immediately after the 
day or month in question, what is now in the public domain could easily have 
been edited and refined to justify an action after the event. As it happens, 
Eisenhower was not a prolific diarist, and his diary provides only limited 
insights. His second Presidential Scientific Adviser, George Kistiakowsky and 
NASA’s first Administrator, Keith Glennan both wrote lengthy diaries covering 
their respective periods as the President’s special Adviser on Science and 
Technology and as NASA’s Administrator. Both have been edited into books, but 
the initial unedited drafts of each are accessible to researchers via the 
Eisenhower Library.  
 Memoirs, equally, need to be treated with care. In some instances, the 
best evidence, perhaps the only evidence of what was discussed in meetings – 
such as when CIA Assistant Director Richard Bissell met Eisenhower to discuss 
the Corona spy satellite programme – exists only in Bissell’s memoir. Yet, 
written years after the event, and knowing how the spy satellite programme 
eventually developed, it is questionable just how accurate this recollection is.21 
This is even more the case with the president’s own memoirs. Written after 
leaving office, with a committee of researchers, these are not untrue, but put the 
most positive interpretation onto the actions of the administration. Mandate for 
Change, in particular, has formed part of the research, but has been treated, 
essentially, as a secondary source. Wherever possible, when memoirs have been 
used, it has been in association with corroboration from another source. 
                                                          
21 RM Bissell with JE Lewis and FT Pudlo, Reflections of a Cold Warrior (New Haven CT and London, 
1996).  
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However, on a few occasions, this has simply not been possible. Such single 
source evidencing has been used only when the veracity of that source has been 
judged to be strong, not least to it featuring in other published scholarly works.         
 What has emerged from the research is a rather different view of 
President Eisenhower that calls the orthodoxy into question in relation to the 
development of space policy. Tracing his schedule through Whitman and 
Goodpaster, for instance, brings to light his style of influencing people through 
1:1 meetings before chairing NSC sessions for example. Staff memoranda 
compiled by Eisenhower’s staff secretary as an ‘off the record, record’ detail the 
lengths the President went to in order to build support for his decisions. 22  
Indeed, on occasion, the key insights to be drawn from the archived documents 
come not from the final, published, on-the-record, material – that which has 
been written for history - but from the drafts of speeches put together by 
Hagerty and the speech writers (and Eisenhower’s notes in their margins) such 
as with Eisenhower’s Farewell Address; the hand-written notes taken by 
Goodpaster in meetings of who was there and the topics discussed; or Ann 
Whitman’s extensive diary notes recording who the President wanted to speak 
to and why. Thus, the unpublished draft manuscript of an engineer on the staff 
of the USAF’s Special Assistant for Research and Development throws new light 
on the decision to give missile development the highest priority in 1955 – 
especially when one realises that the ‘engineer’ Vincent Ford, was a Washington 
policy insider who served on the staff of the Department of the Air Force, Office 
of the Special Assistant for Research and Development throughout the Truman 
                                                          
22 General Andrew Goodpaster compiled a near-complete record of the President’s meetings post-
Sputnik with his science advisers, cabinet members and Pentagon officials which largely feature in 
the White House Memoranda Series, in the Organization and early history of NASA, 1957-61 
Collection, DDE Papers as President, DDE Library.  
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and Eisenhower Administrations.23 President Eisenhower’s slightly intemperate 
letter exchanges with his brothers reinforce his intransigent stance on not 
deviating from what was fiscal austerity with regard to defence programmes.24 
Glennan’s somewhat peeved diary entries and internal memos on his battle with 
General Medaris over the fate of the ABMA, provide a direct lead into the 
reasoning why he lobbied Eisenhower to intervene to break the log-jam in 
transferring this military group to the civilian NASA.25 These ‘raw’ documents, 
never meant for external publication, or indeed in the case of Ford’s manuscript, 
actually prevented from being published, provide an insight into an interested, 
opinionated conviction politician: far from the traditional portrait of Eisenhower 
as President.  The material discussed presents Eisenhower as an astute thinker 
who, though a planner by nature, was prepared to act pragmatically and against 
type if the occasion demanded it.  
 There are documents discussed that have not been used by scholars 
before. But many have been used in other academic studies. Where this study 
differs is in the questions it uses them to answer. This is not about how 
Eisenhower reacted to Sputnik, but how Sputnik did not make him deviate from 
his intended path. On re-reading, they show a leader with strong convictions 
and an unwavering intent to ‘wage peace’. Of course, Eisenhower is not perfect, 
and the thesis also presents evidence to show his mis-steps, particularly around 
coping with public opinion and the media in the immediate aftermath of the 
first Sputnik launch. However, these are discussed in the wider context of a 
strategy that is unaffected by propagandist action by the Soviet Union.    
                                                          
23 VT Ford manuscript papers, boxes 1 & 2, Organization and Early History of NASA 1957-61 
Collection, DDE Papers as President, DDE Library.  
24 Organization and Early History of NASA, 1957-1961 Collection, DDE Papers as President, DDE 
Library. 
25 T. Keith Glennan: Diary & NASA Historical collections Office Record Number 12917, Robert 
Sherrod Apollo Collection, Organization and early history of NASA, 1957-61 Collection, DDE Library. 
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  Taken together, the methodology delivers an evidence-rich interpretation 
of Eisenhower’s decision making prior to and over the course of the Sputnik 
Autumn to the end of his presidency. It joins the separate missile and 
reconnaissance development narratives to those of the development of a civilian 
space programme as a means of properly contextualising and explaining 
Eisenhower’s actions on space, especially in his second presidential term. Its 
chief contribution to knowledge comes from interpreting Eisenhower’s actions as 
a long-term strategic development, not as a knee-jerk reaction to events.
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Chapter 1: Defining a Presidential Style  
The purpose of this section is to set the context for Eisenhower’s actions in 
relation to space policy, first through assessing his personality as an executive 
leader, and then in chapter two, in relating this to the events that shaped his 
view both of missile and reconnaissance development in his first term in the 
White House. 
 In particular, this chapter outlines his style as a Presidential leader, 
drawing on the discourse to date, charting the path from Schlesinger, Neustadt 
and the other first-generation scholars of Eisenhower through the revisionists 
both in presidential studies terms such as Ambrose, to Greenstein’s political 
science ‘Hidden Hand’ interpretation. The historiography reflects the slow 
advance of Eisenhower revisionism through the likes of Robert Burk, Richard 
Immerman and Robert Griffith. It also touches on the ‘insiders’ such as Stephen 
Hess and William Ewald whose work has done much to enlighten historians on 
the daily working practices, style and tone of Eisenhower’s White House. 
However, this section notes the dearth of critical advance on Eisenhower in the 
90s and into the 2000s as moderate Republicanism fell out of favour and there 
was a re-evaluation of Eisenhower, not least through political science models 
such as Barber’s critical four-box model.  Following this, the chapter assesses 
more recent studies reflecting the GOP’s search for a new basis on which to 
rebuild a less aggressively right wing strand of Republicanism. Biographers 
such as Newton, Thomas and Smith, together with single-subject scholarly 
works from Nichols and Mieczkowski are re-building the case for Eisenhower 
activism and, more importantly, making the first moves to nuance the rather 
two dimensional political science model  for Eisenhower as stated by Greenstein.  
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What follows is an assessment of the historiography of Eisenhower’s space 
policy, assessing the current state of the literature which, despite the gathering 
speed of Eisenhower revisionism, remains tied to the norm of Eisenhower 
reacting to Sputnik and only advancing the space programme reluctantly and in 
a miserly manner.  
Having mapped the state of the historiography, this chapter draws out the 
characteristics in Eisenhower that underpinned his core political tenets. It 
addresses what drove Eisenhower’s abiding desire for peace through national 
security and finally, the chapter asks whether Eisenhower was the consensus 
builder who emerges from much of the scholarly writing about him. However, on 
researching into the day to day White House working papers, this research 
shows that he was rather more adept at bending people to his will.  
There is a statement, sometimes attributed to Seneca the Younger that says: 
“Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity.”26 Eisenhower is 
often regarded as a lucky general who was lucky to be president.27 But he 
epitomises this sentiment.  Throughout his life, from West Point to the White 
House, he worked hard to make the most of his abilities; to cultivate the right 
people and to ensure he was in the best position to benefit when opportunities 
arose. It served him well through most of his military career as he aligned 
himself alongside the great figures of the Army’s general staff. It served him 
well at war as he surrounded himself with the best operational military talent 
who ensured he never had to enter a battle without the knowledge that he had 
                                                          
26 G K. Ericksen, Women entrepreneurs only: 12 women entrepreneurs tell the stories of their success, 
( New York, 1999) p. ix. Although Eriksen attributes the quote to Seneca, it may be Seneca quoting 
Demetrius the Cynic.  
27 It would appear that his wartime Chief of Staff – General Walter Bedell Smith was the first to 
attribute the ‘lucky’ tag to Eisenhower, probably in 1945 when the pair visited London and 
Eisenhower was made an Honorary Freeman of the City of London. In Eisenhower between the 
Wars, (New York, 2001) p. 38, Matthew Holland notes Bedell Smith’s remark, but does not reference 
it further.  
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the blend of forces, collateral and planning to enable him to win. And it served 
him well when as a ‘non-politician’ he emerged to take the presidency in the 
1952 election.  Jean Edward Smith defines Eisenhower’s presidential style well 
in his study Eisenhower In War and Peace.28 However, he does so not 
particularly when looking at the presidency, but by discussing Eisenhower’s 
attributes first as a US Army Staff Officer, and then as Supreme Commander, 
in charge of Allied forces in the European Theatre in World War 2. As a Staff 
Officer, Eisenhower had learned the art of strategic command from the very best 
leaders in the Army. Over 20 years, he had served under Fox Conner and 
George Mosely, described by Smith as the “intellectual kingpins of the interwar 
army.”29 He had worked for General John Pershing, Commander in Chief of the 
World War 1 American Expeditionary Force and later US Army Chief of Staff, 
and Douglas MacArthur, who was Eisenhower’s Commanding Officer for a 
further seven years. Finally, he reported to General George Marshall who set 
him to planning how the US was to hold on to the Philippines, before 
despatching Eisenhower to Europe.  
Eisenhower was not a fighting general. He had none of the innate battle 
skills of a Patton or Montgomery, but was peerless in getting the right 
operational officers around him; getting strong personalities with very different 
outlooks to work together, and commanding the total theatre, not just the 
individual thrusts of front-line forces. He became exceptionally skilled at 
planning and regarded the necessity to plan as paramount. Eisenhower, as 
exemplified by this time in Washington early in World War Two was a 
                                                          
28 JE Smith, Eisenhower in War and Peace (New York 2012).  
29 Ibid, p177. 
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meticulous planner himself.30 Indeed, in Six Crises, his former Vice President, 
Richard Nixon quoted Eisenhower as saying: “In preparing for battle, I have 
always found that plans are useless but planning is indispensable.”31 
Essentially, this meant that the art of planning and the insight and 
understanding it would deliver about any situation was invaluable. But 
Eisenhower was perfectly aware that no scenario discussed in a planning 
meeting would ever appear in quite the imagined way in the reality of battle. 
Plans enabled everyone to prepare to the same level, but what really mattered 
was the ability to use the insight gained to meet the realities on the 
battleground. This was the style of leadership he took into the White House. 
Once there, he operated a more flexible decision making process than the strict 
chain of command of the military in so far as he was willing to be challenged by 
experts, but he was always the final decision maker.  
From each of his mentors, and Marshall in particular, Eisenhower had 
learned the value of the big picture.  He set the grand plan, and expected his 
subordinates to deliver the necessary outcomes. General Bedell Smith said of 
Marshall and Eisenhower: “Both knew how to delegate. When they assigned a 
task, they stepped aside. Subordinates were free to follow whatever course they 
wished to get the job done, it was the old Army at its best.”32 Eisenhower carried 
his military experience into the presidency, continually assessing the strategic 
situation, setting tasks for his White House staff and Executive appointees and 
expecting them to fulfil his wishes. Unlike his public persona which could 
obfuscate when necessary rather than clarify, his White House instructions to 
                                                          
30 Following the Louisiana Manoeuvres US Army battle preparation exercises of 1941, Eisenhower 
was transferred to the War plans Division in Washington DC under Army Chief of Staff, General 
George Marshall. His attention to detail in planning led to his promotion to Major General in March 
1942 (a year previously he had been a Colonel) and his command of the European theatre two 
months later. 
31 RM Nixon, ‘Khrushchev’ in Six Crises, (New York, 1962), p. 363.  
32 Smith, War and Peace, p. 180. 
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subordinates were generally clear and unambiguous.33 Lucius Clay, who had 
served under Eisenhower in World War 2, described his former commander’s 
style: a style that was relentlessly demanding. “General Eisenhower was not the 
easiest person in the world to work for. He would give you a job, and when you 
completed it, he would give you another. The more you did, the more he asked. 
And if you did not measure up, you were gone. He had no tolerance for failure.”34 
In essence, it is arguable that Eisenhower was the first modern president, one 
who treated his role as being the nation’s Chief Executive Officer.35 It meant 
setting the tone and direction of policy, but expecting others to do the ‘heavy 
lifting’ of operational implementation. However, Eisenhower was always 
accountable to the American public, so set a very clear expectation of what he 
required. It is a view of his presidency that recurs increasingly across the 
revisionist narrative, but is very different from the early critiques of his 
presidency, largely from 1960s and 70s.  
 
Scholarly views of Eisenhower’s presidential style  
Eisenhower’s style of Presidential decision making has been studied since he 
was in the White House, beginning with the affectionate but often patronising 
coverage he received from leading press columnists while still in office – James 
‘Scotty’ Reston of the New York Times won a Pullitzer prize for his reporting of 
                                                          
33 Greenstein notes that while clear expression was natural for Eisenhower, he was not averse to 
turning to language that was ‘purposely ambiguous’ if it suited his needs – especially to ‘create 
smokescreens’ to cover actions he had no intention of making public. See Hidden Hand Presidency, 
pp. 66-67 
34 Lucius Clay, Oral History Collection, DDE Library 
35 Niall Palmer, author of The Twenties in America (Oxford, 2006), suggests that Harding and 
Coolidge both took Ike’s CEO approach, but that the real difference was the ‘command structure’ in 
the White House, which was more bureaucratic and formalised under Eisenhower with Sherman 
Adams at the top, but much less hierarchical in the days of Harding and Coolidge. 
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the president’s heart attack and its implications for government in 195736 - and 
continuing into the first academic studies that emerged during the presidencies 
of Kennedy and Johnson. Eisenhower was operating in a hostile political 
environment, with political control of the House of Representatives in the era 
held by the Republican Party only between 1947 and 1949 and during 
Eisenhower’s first term, between 1953 and 1955, while the Senate was in 
Democratic hands throughout. Having to work with a Democrat Congress 
undoubtedly affected Eisenhower’s choices in policy making and the strategies 
to implement them, but also had a significant impact on those who chose to 
critique those policies. Such critics as Arthur Schlesinger and Richard Neustadt 
were at the fulcrum of a history and political science scene that shared many of 
the traits of the liberal political environment. At the time they were writing, 
expansive, interventionist presidencies, the very antithesis of Eisenhower’s 
political philosophy, were in vogue. Thus their writing is very much a product of 
the environment they were operating within. A ‘Whiggish’ conservative such as 
Eisenhower, was simply insufficiently dramatic to reap the praise of this first 
generation of post-Eisenhower scholarship.37  
Of course, Neustadt and Schlesinger were not the first writers to hasten 
Eisenhower’s reputational decline in the 1960s. The orthodox view was 
established by Emmet Hughes, whose scathing review of Eisenhower, written in 
1962, deemed him unsuitable for Executive office, preferring golf and bridge to 
reforming the 1950s Republican Party and driving forward policy around civil 
                                                          
36 Pulitzer Prize for National Reporting, 1957, James Reston of The New York Times for his 
distinguished national correspondence, including both news dispatches and interpretive reporting, 
an outstanding example of which was his five-part analysis of the effect of President Eisenhower's 
illness on the functioning of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. 
http://www.pulitzer.org/awards/1957. Accessed July 22, 2014. 
37 Schlesinger, Imperial Presidency, p. 159. 
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rights and social reform.38 This set the tone for a number of writers of whom 
Neustadt and Schlesinger’s work remain the most prominent and influential.  
Richard Neustadt wrote off Eisenhower as a do-nothing President in 
Presidential Power39. Originally a bureaucrat in Truman’s Bureau of the 
Budget, Neustadt lost his role when the Democrats lost out to Eisenhower in 
1952 and he switched to academia. However, he reappeared in the political 
front-line in 1960 as part of Kennedy’s transition team, helping to formulate 
policy and suggest appointments to the new Administration. That role came in 
the wake of the highly-partisan Presidential Power, The Politics of Leadership, a 
work he revised several times in bring succeeding Presidents to account. 
Neustadt’s original thesis rated three mid-century Presidents: Roosevelt, 
Truman and Eisenhower against three attributes: the formal powers of the 
President, professional reputation and popularity. While Eisenhower is seen as 
popular, and a “hero seeking national unity”, Neustadt heaped him with faint 
praise as a political operator: “Through Eisenhower’s first six years his power 
sense was blunt in almost the degree that FDR’s was sharp.”40 Despite the fact 
that the Whitman files were opened in the 1970s, offering scholars primary 
source evidence to reassess their view of Eisenhower, it is notable that Neustadt 
chose not to revise his appraisal of Eisenhower in any of the further editions 
before his death. But Neustadt did make one important point that is certainly 
true of Eisenhower. He noted that Eisenhower removed many of what Neustadt 
called “Rooseveltian assignments” – what he regarded as political ‘yes men’ - 
from the White House, preferring to surround himself with like-minded advisers 
                                                          
38 E Hughes, The Ordeal of Power, (New York, 1962). 
39 R Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern President, (New York, 1991). This builds on 
Neustadt’s original work: Presidential Power, The Politics of Leadership (New York, 1960). 
40 Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 139. 
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from beyond partisan political elites, run almost on military lines. 41 Indeed, 
Eisenhower’s White House staff was small and close knit. Stephen Hess 
observed that it comprised just 56 posts, with just 88 staff filling these roles 
across the eight years of Eisenhower’s presidency.42 Perhaps the key insight is 
Neustadt’s suggestion of “like minded” advisers. Eisenhower’s instinct was not 
radical. It was to appoint advisers who, by conviction, shared his social and 
economic instincts. They may have proved effective in translating big ideas into 
workable solutions that did push at Eisenhower’s boundaries, but these rarely, 
if ever, pushed the President into completely new concepts.  
 One historian close to Neustadt’s opinion on Eisenhower was another 
former Kennedy staffer, Arthur Schlesinger jnr. In The Imperial Presidency, 
Schlesinger defined Eisenhower as an “aggrandising” president, whose assertion 
of Executive Privilege “ushered in the greatest orgy of executive denial in 
American history.”43 Schlesinger asserted that Eisenhower upset the balance of 
power in US constitutional politics, with the Executive branch accumulating 
power at the expense of Congress.44 However, this absorption of power was 
undercut by Eisenhower’s unwillingness to use the power effectively. But The 
Imperial Presidency pivots around Nixon rather than Eisenhower, and 
Schlesinger was more prone to vent his criticism of Eisenhower through his 
reviews of the writing of others. In 1983, in The Ike Age Revisited, his tone was 
acid as he reviewed the first wave of Eisenhower revisionism.45 The review was 
dismissive of a slew of authors who had the temerity to challenge the orthodoxy. 
Taken with similarly orthodox views from Sherman Adams (removed from his 
                                                          
41 Neustadt, Presidential Power, p. 222. 
42 S Hess, conference address at Ike Reconsidered, Roosevelt House, CUNY, March 7, 2013.  
43 Schlesinger, Imperial Presidency, p. 158.  
44 Ibid, p. 163.  
45 A Schlesinger, ‘The Ike Age Revisited’, Reviews in American History, Vol 11, No. 1, March 1983,  
pp. 1-11. 
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role as Chief of Staff by Eisenhower – albeit reluctantly – in 1958 for having 
received gifts in return for influence) and Arthur Larson, briefly a speechwriter 
for Eisenhower for a year from 1957-58, and something of a big-government 
Republican, Schlesinger presented Eisenhower as: “a man of force, dignity and 
restraint who did not always understand and control what was going on, was 
buffeted by events, and was capable of misjudgement and error.” But while 
damning Eisenhower with faint praise here, he reserved his stiletto for the final 
sentence: “Yet we were wrong to have underestimated Eisenhower’s astuteness 
in self-presentation – the best evidence of which perhaps lies in his capacity to 
take in even intelligent historians.”46  
Yet Schlesinger largely railed against the prevailing mood. Robert Ferrell’s 
Eisenhower Diaries, sought to unlock the private thoughts behind the public 
actions of Eisenhower. This was clearly difficult for Ferrell as Eisenhower was 
not a prolific diarist, particularly in his Presidential years. Schlesinger’s chief 
criticism was that Ferrell’s work is incomplete.47 William Bragg Ewald, a 
speechwriter under Bryce Harlow in the White House from 1954-1956 wrote a 
sympathetic portrayal of Eisenhower in Crucial Days. But this was dismissed by 
Schlesinger as betrayed by “admiration for his hero [that] is sometimes 
effusive.” Nonetheless, Schlesinger keenly picked up on passages within the 
book that were less complimentary to Eisenhower. “Ewald does not hesitate to 
document Eisenhower’s instinct for self-preservation, his capacity for grudges, 
his fondness for the rich, his discomfort with intellectuals...”48 Meanwhile, 
Ambrose and Immerman’s Ike’s Spies is dismissed as “lacking rigour” and 
                                                          
46 Ibid, p. 11. 
47 RH Ferrell editor, The Eisenhower Diaries (New York 1981). 
48 Ike Age Revisited, p. 3, Schlesinger commenting on WB Ewald, Eisenhower the President: Crucial 
Days, 1951-1960, (Englewood Cliffs, 1981). 
28 
 
“incomplete”. The Declassified Eisenhower, by Blanche Wiesen Cook is “ill-
organized” while the argument is “slapdash and diffuse”.49  
There were other influential voices commenting on Eisenhower as president, 
even while he was in office. Written towards the end of Eisenhower’s first 
Presidential term, C Wright Mills’ The Power Elite50 offered a broad and 
systemic sociological insight into the organisation of mid-20th Century US 
society. It stated that a single ‘elite’ comprising the hierarchies of state, major 
corporations and the military effectively ran America. Mills had been on the 
faculty of Columbia University in New York when Eisenhower was the 
institution’s President in 1948, and shows some insight into the man he knew as 
‘president’ in two senses.  Pertinent to this study in particular is Mills’ depiction 
of The Political Directorate.51 Political decision makers and influencers are 
discussed in the context of celebrities, the ‘big rich’, admirals, generals and 
corporate executives.  
  Mills saw the political establishment under Eisenhower as being “tightly 
knit” and “enlarged in scope” with increased power and with a far greater focus 
in decision making at federal level than ever before. 52 It is notable that Mills 
regarded Eisenhower as a political outsider: “Occupationally framed by non-
political experience.”53 He saw him as closer in style and modus operandi to the 
military than to the political players and bureaucrats who both served him and 
sought to advise him, although it was probably not a huge leap of the 
imagination for Wright-Mills to land on such a definition when discussing a 
president who had spent all but two years of his adult life in the Army. 
                                                          
49 SE Ambrose and RH Immerman, Ike’s Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (New 
York, 1981); Ike Age Revisited, p4; B Wiesen Cook, The Declassified Eisenhower (New York, 1984). 
50 C Wright Mills, The Power Elite (Oxford, 1956). 
51 Ibid, pp. 225-241. 
52 Ibid, p. 227. 
53 Ibid, p. 228. 
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Eisenhower’s successor, John F Kennedy, by contrast, fitted Mills’ definition of a 
‘Party Politician’ – with private means and at home with synthetic celebrity. 
 Mills regarded the Executive branch at the centre of initiatives and political 
decision making – taking the three-pronged US political system out of balance 
(towards the Executive) more than ever before. He saw Eisenhower making 
decisions through “expert counsel and advice”54 primarily from other political 
outsiders. He wrote:  
The administration, in fact, is largely an inner circle of political 
outsiders who have taken over the key executive posts of 
administrative command; it is composed by members and agents 
of the corporate rich and the high military in an uneasy alliance 
with selected professional party politicians, seated primarily in 
the Congress, whose interests and associations are spread out 
across a variety of local societies. 
 
To a degree, what Wright Mills wrote was true. Certainly in developing 
space policy – the concern of this study – Eisenhower’s most compelling advice 
came not from his core political cohort or even his military advisers, but from 
his scientific adviser, James Killian, and the small group of trusted scientists 
within the President’s Science Advisory Committee that Killian headed. It was a 
significant sign of his pragmatism: a belief in listening to true experts rather 
than those with their own specific personal agenda. Yet his actions in 
interpreting this advice and making decisions for others to carry forward on his 
behalf were not taken in isolation from his advisers. Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles, and Press Secretary Jim Hagerty in particular were always close 
to the current debate, while all key policy areas were granted full and free 
debate within National Security Council sessions – though Eisenhower had 
usually headed off any potential trouble through discrete one-to-one meetings 
with key actors well before the open sessions took place. Some years after 
                                                          
54 Ibid p. 229. 
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leaving office, Eisenhower commented on a paper written by his National 
Security Adviser, Bobby Cutler entitled Use of the NSC Mechanism. He wrote: 
“members of the NSC became familiar not only with each other, but with the 
basic factors of problems that might, on some future date, face the President.”55 
Essentially, he used the NSC to share and socialise issues that might become 
problems. The normal format was for Eisenhower to request, via the NSC’s 
Executive Secretary, James Lay, a plan or report on issues of national security 
interest. These were generally discussed by all parties in the NSC so that if any 
of the issues ever became real security problems, there would be plans in place 
to deal with them but, more importantly, the key NSC actors would be well-
versed in the issue and confident to deal with it as the need required.56   In her 
essay: The ‘Top of Policy Hill’: President Eisenhower and the National Security 
Council, Anna Kasten Nelson captured the spirit of Eisenhower’s engagement 
with the NSC.57 “It is clear that the president actively engaged in the meetings 
and often turned the discussion towards those questions that personally 
interested him.”58 He clearly found the sounding board useful, but contrary to 
his early scholarly critics, he did not allow the NSC members to dictate his 
national security policies. Indeed, she also noted that the NSC and PACGO 
meetings that followed it was more a means of sharing issues than making 
crucial national security decisions. “The Eisenhower style was a continuing mix 
of formal procedure with informal meetings or conversation. The president 
would meet formally with the members of PACGO (the President’s Advisory 
                                                          
55 DDE comments on R Cutler, Use of the NSC Mechanism, March 1968, Box 1, Gordon Gray Papers, 
DDE Library. 
56 Cutler, ‘Use of the NSC Mechanism’, pp. 2-4 
57 A Kasten Nelson, ‘’The ‘Top of Policy Hill’: President Eisenhower and the National Security 
Council’, in Diplomatic History, Volume 7, issue 4, 1983, pp. 307-326. 
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Committee on Government Organization)59, but he would precede such a 
meeting with conversations over breakfast with his brother Milton or with 
Nelson Rockefeller, both members of the committee.”60   
One of the areas Mills considers is presidential innovation and notes that to 
be an innovator the President required an inner circle of non-political advisers 
who mediated between the President, the Legislative branch and other outside 
groups. Clearly space policy came under this theme of innovation – but the book 
was published a year before the Sputnik mission, and Wright Mills made no 
specific reference to Eisenhower’s actions on space policy.    
Perhaps the best-known treatise on Eisenhower’s decision making in the 
White House is Princeton political scientist Fred Greenstein’s Hidden-Hand 
Presidency61. Written just before Kasten Nelson’s work, and with access to 
Eisenhower’s Presidential papers for the first time, Greenstein set out to revise 
the prevailing view of Eisenhower as a political amateur.62 Instead, Greenstein 
concluded that Eisenhower was a sophisticated political decision maker who 
combined the skills of mediation and leadership he had learned in the army 
with the shrewd demeanour of a seasoned poker player. Indeed, Greenstein 
suggested he played politics much like he played poker: with a ‘hidden hand’ 
that was much better than his opponents assumed. Perhaps though, Greenstein 
stretched the analogy too far. Truman was the great political poker player. 
Eisenhower’s preference was for Bridge – a strategic card game where 
Eisenhower’s success relied on effective teamwork with his partner.   
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Greenstein set out five facets of Eisenhower’s political decision making. 
First, while he was actually a skilful politician, he chose not to let others realise 
the fact. While he was frequently partisan in his actions, he disguised this by 
delegating responsibility to others at Cabinet, agency, advisory or, on rare 
occasions, Congressional level to implement decisions on his behalf.63 By 
deflecting the political element in his decision making, he was able to rise above 
party politics and both preside and govern as the ‘President of all the people’. 
Second, Eisenhower was prone to speak in an evasive, convoluted and often 
confusing manner. Critics saw this as indicative of a political strategy that 
enabled Eisenhower to distance himself from unpopular positions on 
controversial issues – again, it was a means to ‘fool’ his opponents into 
underestimating him.64 Third, Eisenhower’s man management was built around 
avoiding personality clashes. He did not make enemies, and even when he 
disagreed vehemently with a person, he masked his true feelings and got on 
with the job. This had the additional positive spin-off of helping to maintain his 
mass popularity.65 Next, Eisenhower understood how see issues from his 
opponents’ standpoint and worked on moves and tactics that would win them 
round to his perspective.66 Finally, he was a master in the art of delegation. 
Eisenhower would place important assignments in the hands of subordinates, 
but never fully loosen the reins of strategic control. If the assignments proved 
successful, Eisenhower was the first to share the success with those who 
contributed towards it. But when things went wrong, he tended to disassociate 
himself from the failure.67  Greenstein does not tackle space policy directly, but 
provides a framework for assessing and judging Eisenhower’s manoeuvring as 
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he set out to distinguish civilian space exploration from missile and surveillance 
endeavours.  Speaking to Greenstein in New York in March 2013, I asked him 
why he had not written specifically about the Sputnik – NASA period in his 
study since it appeared to be a prime candidate for a case study illustrating each 
of the five criteria he had identified in his ‘Hidden Hand’ study. “This was a 
political science work, not a study of all the issues and aspects of Eisenhower’s 
presidency,” he responded.68 
However, Greenstein’s revisionist approach to Eisenhower is incomplete. It 
created an almost benignly Machiavellian figure, abreast of everything that 
matters and continually one step ahead of not just political opponents but also 
his colleagues and advisors.69  Greenstein provides the political science 
framework for this research, but this research provides an interpretation of 
Eisenhower that is rather more human than the model president defined by 
Greenstein. 
 Writing with his PhD student David Callahan in 1993, Greenstein did 
finally tackle Eisenhower’s relationship with space policy in The Reluctant 
Racer, their essay within Roger Launius and Howard McCurdy’s Spaceflight 
and the Myth of Presidential Leadership.70 They concluded that Eisenhower’s 
reluctance to enter a space race with the Soviets reflected his overall conception 
of how to fight the Cold War – engaging only from positions of strength. 
Matching Soviet space efforts might increase US prestige, but would only do so 
at massive cost and with no material value to either the US economy or national 
security. The piece contrasted Eisenhower with the seemingly more active 
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Kennedy and follows the traditional line that Sputnik was the catalyst for 
action and, indeed, that NASA was a creation Eisenhower did not want. But, in 
allying space policy with Greenstein’s view of Eisenhower as a strategic player 
in presidential decision-making, the piece began to cement the idea both that 
Eisenhower’s decision making after Sputnik was important and, probably for 
the first time, that it was justifiable. However, in taking the traditional path of 
Eisenhower reacting to Sputnik, Greenstein has left a significant gap for 
alternative interpretation.  
It is clear from the number of Eisenhower-inspired titles arriving in the 
1980s, that the work of Greenstein and to an extent Kasten Nelson were a 
significant challenge to the orthodoxy.  Eisenhower, A Reputation in Transition, 
written by David MacIsaac, covered much of the same ground as Schlesinger, 
but differed significantly in that MacIsaac highlighted two personality traits of 
Eisenhower that colour views of his presidency even today.  He noted those 
traits as: “One was his preference never to be seen in what he did; the other, his 
lifelong rule to refuse to discuss personalities, to focus all discussion on the 
issues rather than the people involved.” 71 This is a very different interpretation 
of Eisenhower from the orthodox model. Here is not the benign bumbler, but a 
much more controlled and disciplined character who would not be drawn into 
personality politics. Six years later, Robert Burk produced a useful synopsis of 
the rehabilitation of the Eisenhower reputation in Eisenhower Revisionism 
Revisited, yet even by 1988, Greenstein’s “hidden hand” perspective had become 
dominant. Others offered cautiously different interpretations: Robert Griffith, 
for instance portrayed Eisenhower as “the manager of a ‘corporate 
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commonwealth’”.72 This was a position close to William Leuchtenberg’s 
appraisal of Eisenhower as skilled in the arts of bureaucratic management and 
dedicated to conservative goals.73  
Both MacIsaac and Burk chart the rise of revisionism, but such revisionism 
has not gone unchallenged. From its first publication in 1972, through revisions 
in the 1980s and 1990s, James David Barber’s The Presidential Character 
continued to rank Eisenhower as a negative/passive president in his four-box 
rating. Barber characterised Eisenhower as sullen and withdrawn, viewing the 
office as a burden. Eisenhower, who was grouped with Washington and 
Coolidge, became President only through duty, and described by Barber as 
having low esteem based on a sense of uselessness.74 It is notable that despite a 
wealth of new source information on Eisenhower through the declassification of 
material about him in the 1980s, Barber chose not to amend his classification, 
though even by the 1980s, it was very out of kilter with emerging views of the 
Eisenhower presidency based on studies of his papers. Amusingly, Barber was 
positive about Eisenhower’s rhetorical style, saying: Eisenhower’s "remarkable 
rhetorical success seems to have happened without either great skill or great 
energy on his part."75 He added:  
This man, who had little use for inspirational blather, whose 
speeches would not be long remembered for their eloquence, and 
who continually resisted demands that he lecture his fellow 
citizens, revitalized national confidence almost in spite of 
himself.  He is a puzzling case.  His political habits never stressed 
rhetoric, yet that is where he excelled.76 
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 Remaining in the field of political science, three connected approaches 
offer insight into Eisenhower’s presidential style without him actually being the 
subject of discussion. While he used a different case study and a different 
president to articulate his models, it is impossible not to consider Graham 
Allison’s Essence of Decision77 as offering an illuminating and potentially 
applicable model for Eisenhower’s behaviour. Indeed, one suspects that Allison 
could have written a companion book covering the Sputnik crisis of 1957 to his 
work on the Cuban Missile Crisis.  It would be enlightening to consider his view 
on Eisenhower’s low-key response to what was largely a psychological threat. 
Tantalisingly, Allison never refers to Sputnik and there is only the briefest 
mention of the 1960 U-2 incident78 where Khrushchev and not Eisenhower is 
the focus of his argument. But it is worth considering Eisenhower’s actions 
within the three models Allison describes.  
This study shows that his Governmental Policy model can, in part, be 
applied to Eisenhower’s actions in devising and anchoring the first United 
States’ Space policy – if one is prepared to consider the period 1954-1958 as the 
timeframe for the policy creation, rather than the commonly-viewed period of 
Sputnik 1 (October 1957) to the Space and Aeronautics Act (July 1958). The 
chief descriptors of this model are that: a nation's actions are best understood as 
the result of politicking and negotiation by its top leaders; that even if they 
share a goal, leaders differ in how to achieve this because of external factors 
including personal interests and background; that even the President of the US 
must gain consensus with his underlings or risk having his order misunderstood 
or, in some cases, ignored; that consequently, a leader's entourage will have a 
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large effect on the final decision (i.e., an entourage of ‘yes men’ will create a 
different outcome from a group of challenging advisors – as Eisenhower had 
during the period post-Sputnik). The model defines leaders as having different 
levels of power based on charisma, personality, skills of persuasion, and 
personal ties to decision-makers. It amplifies this by stating that if a leader is 
certain enough, he will not seek input from his advisors, but rather, approval. 
Likewise, if a leader has already implicitly decided on a particular course of 
action, an advisor wishing to have influence must work within the framework of 
the decision the leader has already made. Next: if a leader fails to reach a 
consensus with his inner circle (or, at least, the appearance of a consensus), 
opponents may take advantage of these disagreements. Therefore, effective 
leaders must create a consensus. And finally, because of the possibilities of 
miscommunication, misunderstandings, and downright disagreements, different 
leaders may take actions that the group as a whole would not approve.79 
Eisenhower has been characterised by Greenstein and others as a consensus 
builder: but one who built agreement based on his own terms and framework for 
reference. The thrust of this study is that Eisenhower was focused on a course of 
action built on learned experience following the H-Bomb nuclear tests, the 
development of the U-2 and latterly the Corona space satellite programme that 
would have led to a civilian space agency irrespective of Khrushchev’s Sputnik 
power play. How that action manifested itself was influenced by actors outside 
the main thrust of government – notably Killian, Bissell and, to a lesser extent, 
Hagerty and Glennan. Yet these were all hand-picked advisors operating within 
the presidential mandate. They were a skilled entourage delivering both a 
framework and detail that Eisenhower was happy to endorse, but the 
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overarching driver was the wish to enhance national security, and that came 
from the President himself. Equally, one could argue that Allison’s 
Organisational Process Model does not fit Eisenhower’s space policy making 
since he simply would not allow himself or his trusted advisors to be drawn into 
viewing the launches of the Sputnik satellites as a crisis to which he must 
respond.  
Yet if one looks at Eisenhower, rather than the Government as a whole 
within Allison’s models, one could make a case that Eisenhower is a ‘Rational 
Actor’. Briefly, Allison proposed that the fundamentals of the Rational Actor 
model were that governments are treated as the primary actor; and that the 
government examines a set of goals, evaluates them according to their utility, 
then picks the one with the highest payoff. Substitute Eisenhower for 
‘Government’ and one might view his course from 1954-58 as defining national 
security as his ‘goal’ in space; seeing enhanced reconnaissance as the means to 
deliver this and focusing on enabling that to happen to secure the ‘payoff’. This 
appears to reduce the ‘white’ civilian International Geophysical Year scientific 
space programme and later NASA unmanned and manned programmes solely to 
diversionary status – and, to a certain degree, that is true. But they fulfilled 
secondary goals of scientific advance and national prestige that probably meant 
more outside Eisenhower’s science advisory circle than within it.    
Amy Zegart built on Allison’s Organisational model. Her analysis of 
Eisenhower’s failure to effectively reform the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Flawed by 
Design80 is instructive in understanding why the President chose to bypass the 
armed service route when it came to establishing NASA in 1958. The ease with 
which covert activities flourished with minimal control is also discussed at 
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length by Zegart, and an argument can be made that Eisenhower entrusted his 
key reconnaissance projects to the CIA specifically because they would be 
subject to almost no Congressional scrutiny. Zegart’s new institutionalist theory 
focused on the fact that national security agencies – including the CIA which 
was her specific focus – were very different from domestic agencies that were 
characterised by weak interest groups, secrecy, Executive Domain, and 
connected bureaucracies. Consequently, they developed differently from other 
bureaucracies, and were much harder to reform, not least because they 
remained in the Executive Domain, largely outside the reach of the other 
branches of government. Eisenhower failed to reform the JCS effectively. Thus 
in aiming to achieve his goals for a national security-led space programme, he 
simply chose to side-step the still-powerful armed services chiefs.  
The other model to consider is that put forward by Irving Janis in 
Groupthink.81 Janis had described the key principle of Groupthink as: 
The more amiability and esprit de corps there is among the 
members of a policy-making ingroup the greater the danger that 
independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink, 
which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions 
directed against outgroups.82   
Eisenhower is not a case-study subject in Janis’ work, although he is obliquely 
referenced in discussions around the Bay of Pigs in relation to the decision to 
the 1960 U-2 incident.83 But was he a victim (or perpetrator) of groupthink in 
relation to Sputnik? The essence of groupthink is that the desire for conformity 
delivers irrational actions.84 In taking the position of the first Eisenhower 
scholars, it would be possible to paint this picture for Eisenhower and his key 
advisers. When the logical response to Sputnik would have been a powerful 
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military reaction (at least in terms of boosting spending on US military forces) 
and a battle for prestige through the media, Eisenhower chose a different 
course. However, the essence of this study is to offer an alternative 
interpretation of his actions, and will certainly challenge any thought that 
Eisenhower was a perpetrator of groupthink over Sputnik. However, there is 
also a case to judge as to whether his advisers operated in groupthink 
conformity in their actions in creating NASA. Did they deliver a solution that 
was not fit for purpose? This thesis argues otherwise. In his book, Janis argued 
that Kennedy’s advisers were sufficiently robust and single-minded to help the 
President develop effective strategies, particularly in relation to the Cuban 
Missile crisis. Johnson’s advisers, on the other hand succumbed to groupthink, 
most especially and disastrously over the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam. 
Eisenhower would appear to be closer as a subject to Kennedy than to Johnson 
in his means of decision making over Sputnik.  
John Logsdon is arguably the only scholar who spans the small segment 
of academic literature covering both space and US political decision making. 
However, his work is almost solely focused on Kennedy and while his access to 
primary research material is exemplary, there is a sense throughout his work 
that Kennedy’s decision making was right and is not open to challenge. His 
work spans the period where the orthodoxy dominated, through to the near-
present, where revisionists hold the upper hand. Logsdon’s 1970 work, The 
Decision to Go to the Moon85, was long seen as the definitive study of decision 
making around the manned space missions.  Echoing Allison, it presented 
Kennedy as a rational actor making the best choice from a range of space-
related options. In essence, Logsdon offered the ‘Moon Pledge’ as an instance of 
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the rational choice model of decision making: Kennedy sought to portray the US 
as superior to other nations. Entering (and winning) a space race with the 
Soviets would demonstrate that superiority. Landing a man on the moon and 
returning him to earth before the decade was out offered the highest return in 
terms of benefits judged against the likely cost in achieving the aim. 
Eisenhower’s contribution was relegated to very secondary subject matter, with 
the emphasis being that US space policy only found a purpose through 
Kennedy’s actions. Logsdon returned to the theme in 2010 with John F Kennedy 
and the Race to the Moon86.  While he added much detail to the argument, he 
largely stuck by his view that Kennedy’s action represented an example of the 
rational choice model of decision making. Logsdon’s research rarely crosses the 
divide from Kennedy into Eisenhower territory. Again, Logsdon delivers an 
example of the orthodox narrative of the US victory over adversity in the space 
race standing out against the mainstream thrust of Eisenhower revisionism. 
However, in placing Kennedy at the forefront of US space achievement, his work 
presents an argument open to be countered or, at the very least, expanded. 
Logsdon does address the issues of space and presidential decision making, but 
without properly interrogating Eisenhower’s activities, principles, drivers and 
achievements. As such, the result is incomplete.   
This research is sited in the second term of Eisenhower’s presidency and 
after Greenstein’s work. This has been the subject of irregular revisiting by 
scholars. Presidential Studies Quarterly devoted its Spring 1994 edition to the 
theme of Eisenhower and Governance.87 Greenstein, again, dominated the 
argument, with an updated appraisal of Eisenhower. It was a short article not 
aiming to offer anything new but the paper presented a neat analogy: 
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Eisenhower the Public Head of State and Private Prime Minister.88 His 
argument was again that Eisenhower was a leader not merely a figurehead 
operating to the instructions of John Foster Dulles and Sherman Adams, and 
much of the article reflected how a growing number of both scholars and the 
media were now reflecting that interpretation. The Sputnik autumn was not a 
subject of discussion in the issue, though Thomas Gaskin briefly touched on it in 
a discussion on Eisenhower’s relations with Lyndon Johnson on foreign policy. 
Gaskin’s argument focuses on how Johnson used Eisenhower to grow his 
reputation as a foreign affairs expert. Although Gaskin takes a revisionist 
stance on Eisenhower’s response to Sputnik, he places Johnson at the heart of 
subsequent policy making in the wake of the satellites. This will be challenged 
in chapter 4.  
Perhaps the most interesting observation from the 1994 Presidential 
Studies Quarterly essays was that of Ken Collier who, in his discussion of 
Eisenhower’s relationship with Congress, coined the term “Autopilot 
Presidency”.89 While Collier’s focus is on the “invisible hand” of Eisenhower in 
terms of Congressional relationships – a contrast to Greenstein, and an 
evocation of Adam Smith, he noted that Eisenhower’s method for dealing with 
Congress was: 
to create a mechanism for maintaining friendly relations with 
Congress, point it in the right direction, and let it run, taking 
personal control only during critical moments or during 
turbulence.90 
This observation is pertinent to any discussion of Eisenhower’s actions 
following the Sputnik autumn, most particularly in relation to 
implementing space policy once NASA was operational.  
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A mixture of anniversary-driven interest (2011 marked the 50th 
anniversary of Eisenhower leaving the White House); greater access to more 
material in the Eisenhower archives; and a growing dissatisfaction with the 
performance of the Neo-Conservative right in US politics has led to a new wave 
of interest in reappraising Eisenhower’s presidential performance. With the 
state of flux in the Republican party following the lack lustre performances from 
GOP candidates at the last two presidential elections, Eisenhower’s brand of 
moderate, centrist Republicanism is gaining new interest, if not yet outright 
favour, among both the academic and political communities. Much of the most 
recent writing on Eisenhower comes not from political scientists, but from 
historians and at the intersection between learned biography and historical 
analysis.  
Jean Edward Smith, with Eisenhower in War and Peace places his focus 
on Eisenhower’s military career rather than his time in the White House. His 
most apt descriptions of Eisenhower’s presidential style come when Smith is 
describing his mode of working as an army general and, indeed, as Supreme 
Commander. The context is very different from this research, since Smith was 
looking at Eisenhower as a military leader. Therefore, there is certainly room in 
the discourse for new research examining Eisenhower’s presidential activity. 
However, Smith emphasised that Eisenhower’s great skills came in managing 
difficult people - especially Churchill, DeGaulle, Patton and Montgomery – and 
in taking a high command role that left battlefield operations in the hands of his 
expert operational subordinates. Indeed, he noted that when Eisenhower 
attempted to lead at an operational level, such as in the early stages of 
Operation Torch, his skills did not match the needs of the forces on the ground. 
He was cautious in the field, and too willing to listen to the views of others. The 
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campaign didn’t achieve its aims until Eisenhower had handed over the reins of 
operational command to the fighting specialists.91  
 When he discussed Eisenhower’s presidency of Columbia University, 
Smith noted that Eisenhower regarded the deans and department chairmen as 
the most important people on campus – the equivalents of Army corps and 
division commanders. As a consequence, he devoted his time to dealing with 
them. However, this was a total mis-reading of the situation since, according to 
Smith; “it is the scholars who determine policy. They are the university.”92 This 
mis-reading, which went distinctly against the grain with such scholars as C. 
Wright Mills, a Columbia University professor, marked Eisenhower as an 
outsider in the politics of the university – a trait repeated in the White House 
where he chose to mix socially with, and take the advice of, ‘The Gang’, rather 
than operate at close quarters with the more overtly partisan politicians of the 
Republican party, including his Vice President, Richard Nixon. ‘The Gang’, as 
described by Smith were a group of men who were: “Rich, Republican and 
devoted to golf and bridge.” The group, who became life-long friends to 
Eisenhower, included William Robinson, publisher of the Herald Tribune, 
investment banker (and founder of the Augusta National Golf Club) Cliff 
Roberts; Coca-Cola Chairman, Bob Woodruff ; Ellis Slater, President of 
Frankfort Distilleries; and Pete Jones, another investment banker.93 In the 
1950s, they represented a particular wing of the Republican Party – the ‘Wall 
Street’ wing as opposed to the ‘Main Street’ wing inhabited by most 
Congressional Republicans.  None of ‘The Gang’ was backward in offering 
President Eisenhower policy advice, and he used them throughout his two terms 
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as a sounding board for policy creation.94 Indeed, in filling significant cabinet 
positions, Eisenhower looked to America’s corporate world rather than its 
political world for men who would bring commercial rigour and good business 
order to organising major departments. Defense Secretary Charles Wilson was 
the President of General Motors, while his successor, Neil McElroy, was 
President of Proctor and Gamble.  
 Finally, in assessing Eisenhower’s 1952 presidential campaign, Smith 
provided an insight for Eisenhower’s preferred modus operandi: one that had 
not changed since military service and would not change significantly 
throughout eight years in the White House. “Eisenhower assumed control of the 
broad outlines of the campaign but left the details to others...the chain of 
command was clear from the outset. Eisenhower was in charge. He not only set 
the tone, but made the major decisions.” This is an apt description of the 
president: strategic, logical, organised but not so much prepared to entrust 
operational duties to others, but adamant that this was necessary for the 
successful completion of the campaign process. In that respect, the presidential 
campaign paralleled his earlier military successes.  
 Evan Thomas, another recent Eisenhower biographer, looked at the 
hinge points of Eisenhower’s presidency through a rather more reductionist 
lens. Everything he wrote had to fit the theme of his title: Ike’s Bluff.95 For 
Thomas, Eisenhower was a genius at poker and bridge, and used the poker 
player’s guile to keep the US out of war with the USSR and China over a period 
when it would have been far easier to fight with weapons rather than the threat 
to use retaliatory powers that may have appeared more powerful than they 
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actually were. Thomas’ portrayal of Eisenhower is more nuanced than Jeffery 
Frank’s in his recent contribution, Ike and Dick96, but by making every foreign 
policy decision that Eisenhower considers into a matter of sleight of hand to 
wrong-foot the Soviets, the picture that emerges of Eisenhower is too often one-
dimensional, and his White House policy-making too often single-track. But his 
observation of Eisenhower’s personality is succinct: 
Eisenhower could be moody and temperamental. His was not the 
confidence of the weak, the arrogance of the vain and needy. 
Rather he had that kind of confidence that allowed him to be 
humble. He was willing to appear slower and sweeter than he 
really was in order to get other people to do his 
bidding....Eisenhower knew that he was strong and that he could 
see around corners. He did not feel the need to constantly prove 
his strength... 
 
Eisenhower was a great peacekeeper in a dangerous era...[he] 
understood the nature of war better than anyone else and...had 
the patience and wisdom, as well as the cunning and guile, to 
keep the peace.97 
 
In essence, Thomas presents a particular style of poker player: a president who 
definitely played his cards close to his chest, and acted privately very differently 
to his public face. He does not present a reckless gambler hell-bent on risk 
taking, but if anything, it is a clichéd analogy. Among presidents, Truman was 
probably the most devoted to poker as a relaxation.98 Eisenhower was primarily 
a bridge player: someone who played in partnership, though generally leading 
the pair. Indeed, in At Ease, Eisenhower recounts that in 1920, during his time 
at Fort Meade, he “decided that I had to quit playing poker. It was not because I 
didn’t enjoy the excitement of the game – I really love to play. But it had become 
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clear that this was not the game to play in the Army. Most of us lived on our 
salaries. Most losers were bound to be spending not only their own money, but 
their families’.”99 This points to Eisenhower’s innate sense of responsibility. He 
liked to relax, but not at the expense of those for whom he cared. It also 
accurately captures his fiscal conservatism. Whether personally or 
professionally, he had a strong dislike of debt. There is some truth in Thomas’ 
portrayal. However, he rather stretched the analogy too far in search of a 
winning story that is substantially different from its 2012 publication rivals 
from Jean Edward Smith and Jim Newton.  
 Eisenhower: The White House Years by Jim Newton is very much a 
journalist’s portrayal of Eisenhower’s two terms in the White House. It is 
focused on a fast-paced narrative, and fits snugly within ‘hidden hand’ 
revisionism.100 Newton, like Thomas, built his study around Eisenhower’s 
“Precarious pursuit of peace”, and begins his study by focusing on how President 
Eisenhower managed a May 1, 1958 National Security Council meeting.101 As 
Newton told it, Eisenhower was assailed by secretary of Defense McElroy, by his 
top military advisers and by Secretary of State Dulles to reorient US defence 
policy from massive retaliation to a more flexible response based on tactical, 
first strike, nuclear weapons.  Yet despite the strength of argument from around 
the table, Eisenhower was unmoved. He meticulously challenged the utility and 
plausibility of switching to flexible response, stating it would transform 
weapons of deterrence – a key aspect of his ‘New Look’ defence policy – into a 
lightning rod drawing fire onto the US. He noted too that any change – to either 
build solely tactical missiles or to build both tactical missiles and a deterrent 
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shield – would vastly increase the defence budget. According to Newton, that 
would wholly undermine the balance of national security and economic stability 
and doubtless, create a garrison state. Remaining gracious towards his 
subordinates, Eisenhower moved the debate on. Nothing said in that NSC 
meeting made the daily papers and while the meeting was a very significant 
assertion of the President’s power to prevail even over his most senior advisers, 
there was no hint of a difference of opinion in the public domain.102 This was 
how Eisenhower operated: low-key but persuasive; definitely in charge of policy 
and demonstrably on top of key issues – most especially when they related to 
economic stability, national security and, most of all, the combination of both.103 
Yet what is frustrating about Newton’s work, and indeed all of the modern 
biographers, is that they are largely re-presenting and re-enforcing old ideas 
rather than offering a new perspective. Newton’s portrayal of Eisenhower’s 
actions in relation to the NSC are very much a re-warming of Kasten Nelson’s 
1983 Top of the Hill analysis. Certainly, he merely reiterates the old Sputnik 
assumption of reacting to the Soviet catalyst.  
The Eisenhower portrayed in Frank’s Ike and Dick is rarely gracious and 
significantly more cunning than statesmanlike. He is also vain, rather selfish, 
high-handed and aloof. Unfortunately, for scholars anticipating new insight into 
the presidential character of Eisenhower, Frank’s portrayal is also two-
dimensional and a rather sketchy caricature. Despite its title, Frank’s book is 
very much a study of Nixon with Eisenhower the set-piece cipher providing the 
object for Nixon to rail against through the travails of his vice presidency. The 
Eisenhower who too rarely emerges into any attempt at a more rounded study 
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by the author is modelled on the Schlesinger/Neustadt model: spending rather 
too much time on the golf course or in thrall to ‘the gang’ than creating a legacy 
for the Republican presidency through active support of Nixon. Certainly 
Nixon’s relationship with Eisenhower was remote, and Frank puts the vast 
majority of blame for that on Eisenhower who appears rather more cruel and 
even vindictive than in other portrayals. For the most part, Frank simply does 
not provide any depth of analysis of Eisenhower’s motives, but he does provide 
occasional vignettes that provide some insight into Eisenhower’s modus 
operandi in the White House.   
 He noted for instance Eisenhower’s insistence that Nixon do his “dirty 
work” in getting Sherman Adams to resign his post as Chief of Staff over the 
Goldfine scandal.104 Eisenhower was averse to delivering bad news to his 
subordinates, and always worked to find a way to hand-off the responsibility to 
others. This was not indecision, but a means to never have to be seen to be the 
‘bad guy’. Yet the result was that actions often took longer to happen than if the 
president had simply taken the initiative in the first place. Equally, if 
Eisenhower was not entirely convinced of the ability of a subordinate to act with 
the fortitude, integrity and duty he expected, he was slow to endorse them – 
often to the point of frustration of the individual looking for approval. Frank 
detailed the lengthening list of opportunities from 1952 right through to the 
1960 election where Eisenhower could have come out in support of Nixon’s 
presidential credentials, but could never quite bring himself to fully endorse his 
vice president. Of course, Frank does dissect one of Eisenhower’s least 
supportive comments of the 1960 campaign. Asked by Charles Mohr of Time:  
We understand that the power of decision is entirely yours, Mr. 
President, I just wondered if you could give us an example of a 
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major idea of his that you had adopted in that role, as the decider 
and final... 
 
Eisenhower responded: If you give me a week, I might think of 
one. I don’t remember. 105  
 
Frank noted that this “may just have been something that came out wrong in an 
unfocused news conference”106 or may just have been a light-hearted remark at 
the very end of a press conference that Eisenhower was keen to wrap up on 
time. But it is clear the author had his doubts. Quoting William Bragg Ewald, 
he noted: “the reporter’s question about Nixon had struck a nerve: the allegation 
that Eisenhower didn’t run the government.”107 Frank uses Nixon’s voice from 
Six Crises to give his fullest assessment of Eisenhower: 
“He was a far more complex and devious man than most people 
realised, and in the best sense of those words. His mind was quick 
and facile, His thoughts far outraced his speech and this gave rise 
to his frequent ‘scrambled syntax’ which more perceptive critics 
should have recognized as the mark of a far-ranging and versatile 
mind rather than an indication in poor training in grammar.”108 
 
This appears a slightly barbed and perhaps back-handed compliment. However, 
Mohr’s question and Eisenhower’s response, intentional or not, provided 
political leverage for the Democratic Party in the Kennedy/Nixon presidential 
race. Indeed, Eisenhower’s 1956 decision to invite television cameras into his 
news conferences rather backfired on him when the Democrats chose to turn the 
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exchange into a TV campaign advert, using the “if you give me a minute” phrase 
repeatedly in the one minute slot.109  
 The historian who has taken Eisenhower revisionism to a new level of 
insight in recent years is David Nichols. First in A Matter of Justice and then in 
Eisenhower 1956110, Nichols revisited the detail of two of the most difficult 
periods in Eisenhower’s presidency to focus on how he dealt with crisis. The 
president’s character as leader emerged in far more rounded fashion than the 
stereotypes of the first wave of Eisenhower scholars, the journalese of some of 
his modern biographers or even the caricature of Frank. In Eisenhower 56, 
Nichols restated that Eisenhower maxim: “plans are worthless, but planning is 
everything.”111 It cuts to the core of the Eisenhower leadership which was 
essentially, ‘no surprises’. Nichols noted that Eisenhower had done his policy 
homework on the Middle East long before the tensions over Suez became a 
crisis. While the actuality of what happened on the ground in Egypt probably 
sat outside any of his scenario planning, he was confident to act, believing he 
understood the context both of Nasser’s actions and of those of the British, 
French and Israelis, and that he understood the consequences of forcing an 
apparent rift with those countries which, in any other circumstances, were 
America’s staunchest allies. What Nichols conveyed most was that Eisenhower 
would not be deterred from the strategic vision that he had brought to the White 
House in 1953. In terms of foreign affairs, this was an unequivocal commitment 
to the containment of the Soviet Union and Soviet-inspired communism.112 His 
action over Suez was entirely rational and in keeping with his commitment to 
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the Cold War ‘big picture’. He was prepared to be cold and prepared to be 
ruthless in dealing with his supposed allies if it was for the good of the United 
States and enabled him to keep atomic peace in an era of danger. By using 
international law to support Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal, Nichols 
suggests “Ike skilfully positioned American power to contain communism, 
presided over the demise of European colonialism, sought to preserve western 
access to scarce resources and championed some degree of justice for smaller 
nations through the United Nations.”113 It is a view that may prove rather too 
laudatory of Eisenhower’s presidential skills in implementing foreign policy, but 
is a reasonable example of the current state of Eisenhower revisionism.  
 The complexity of Eisenhower and apparent contradiction between the 
sharp strategist and occasionally ineffective leader is highlighted in Nichols’ 
study of Eisenhower and civil rights. What emerges here overall is a more 
cautious leader, one who held a somewhat paternalistic view of managing the 
country through change, and one who chose to uphold the Constitution and the 
legal interpretations of it rather than crusade for desegregation for instance. He 
was publicly ambivalent in his support for the Brown v Board of Education 
decision and slow to take action against Governor Faubus in Little Rock. But his 
strategic imperative is never in question: his declaration to Earl Warren that he 
would appoint him to the first vacancy on the Supreme Court even before he 
took office was “an extraordinary step”114, according to Nichols, while his 
appointments of known integrationists to the Supreme Court appeared at odds 
with his natural sympathy towards the South, and may indeed have played a 
part in Nixon’s failure to win the south in the 1960 presidential election.  Yet 
even in his Supreme Court appointments there is a strong sense of Eisenhower 
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being powerfully in control. While definitely a political manipulator in his 
appointments, Eisenhower did not like to be challenged on those appointments, 
even by his close friends. Following the Warren appointment, Nichols cited a 
letter written to Eisenhower’s long-time Abilene friend, Swede Hazlitt who saw 
Warren’s appointment as overtly political. “It was most emphatically not,” 
Eisenhower replied. “I could not do my duty unless I appointed a man whose 
philosophy of government was somewhat along the lines of my own.”115 In many 
ways, Warren was a startlingly left-field appointment as Chief Justice: a 
politician with little experience of practising law. Yet the insight Nichols 
provided could be applied across many presidential appointments: Eisenhower 
was most comfortable working with those where he felt there was already a 
little empathy and common ground.  
 As in James David Barber’s model of presidential capability, Nichols 
explored the sense of duty that underpinned Eisenhower’s progress through 
public life. But quoting Sherman Adams, Nichols also noted that there was 
significant self-confidence and perhaps implicitly, vanity in Eisenhower’s duty. 
On his decision to run in the 1956 presidential election, Nichols wrote:  
Eisenhower had frequently cloaked his ambition in a soldierly call 
to serve his country. Sherman Adams, years later, put it more 
bluntly. “The real reason a President wants to run again is 
because he doesn’t think that anyone else can do as good a job as 
he’s doing.” That analysis fit Dwight Eisenhower.116 
 
The Historiography of Eisenhower’s Space Policy 
It is notable that the traditional interpretation that Eisenhower reacted to 
Sputnik features in all the most recent works on Eisenhower’s presidency. It is 
also notable that space policy is relegated to minor event status in most 
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scholarly writing on Eisenhower. Jim Newton, for instance, offers just fewer 
than three pages out of a 350 page presidential biography to discussing the 
Sputnik-Mercury narrative.117 Newton sets up Sputnik 1 as just one of a 
number of troubles for Eisenhower in 1957.  Its launch came as the events in 
Little Rock, where Eisenhower was forced to use the 101st Airborne Division to 
ensure the safe passage of black students to the city’s Central High School in 
the face of vehement and aggressive protest from southern segregationists, had 
finally died down. While the heat had just about gone out of this domestic crisis, 
the Soviet action over Sputnik added to the discontent of politicians lining up to 
challenge the presidency as mid-terms, and then another presidential contest 
loomed.  Newton restated the Sputnik assumption unquestioningly: “The 
spectre of a Soviet eye peering down from the sky sent Americans into an orbit 
of their own,” he wrote. He noted that the launch drove both the latest news 
from Little Rock and Jimmy Hoffa’s election as president of the Teamsters from 
the nation’s front pages, and compared the media’s Sputnik frenzy with 
Eisenhower’s sanguine reaction to the launch. Swiftly skating over the 
intervening months, Newton presents the traditional synthesis of the Sputnik 
history: “The realization that the Soviet Union could credibly claim that it had 
surpassed the United States in an arena of strategic consequence roused 
Eisenhower to action.” But rather than investigate what that action was – and 
why it happened as it did – Newton switches focus to Von Braun and his 
lobbying of Defence Secretary McElroy.118 While drawing Von Braun’s scheming 
together with Lyndon Johnson’s congressional preening through the 
Preparedness Sub-Committee hearings, Newton paints a scenario where the 
launch of the Jupiter-C with its satellite payload at the end of January 1958 
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was a direct response to the two Sputnik launches and was driven by Von Braun 
and Johnson with Eisenhower somewhat passive in the process. The bill to 
propose the creation of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration is 
seen almost as an afterthought, as Newton says nothing about its genesis other 
than to say Eisenhower proposed it to Congress on April 2 1958 – almost six 
months on from Sputnik 1’s launch. This short-hand speed-telling of the events 
of Autumn 1957 and the first half of 1958 does little to tease out the nuances 
that are all important in understanding Eisenhower’s role in US space policy. 
Newton is simply too reductionist in his presentation of the narrative. By way of 
balance among recent interpretations of the events of 1957 and 1958, Yanek 
Mieczkowski focuses directly on Eisenhower’s response to Sputnik but, as the 
sub-title to his book ‘Eisenhower’s Sputnik Moment’ makes apparent, does so in 
a way that regards events as ‘The race for Space and World prestige’. 
Mieczkowski’s Eisenhower’s Sputnik Moment was the first book for more the two 
decades to deal directly with Eisenhower’s response to Sputnik.119  It provided a 
more primary-source driven interpretation that complements Divine’s earlier 
work, but actually does not differ greatly from it.  
In The Sputnik Challenge published in 1993, more than a decade after 
Greenstein’s revisionism had begun to change the perception of Eisenhower, 
Divine focused on the impact of the Sputnik launch on Eisenhower’s 
Presidency.120 He argued that Eisenhower completely missed the symbolic 
significance of Sputnik 1’s launch and the Soviets’ triumph in the race into 
space. His core argument was that by tackling the launch in purely rational 
terms, Eisenhower failed to reassure a fearful public that their fears were 
groundless. His argument was that Eisenhower’s public lack of urgency in 
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responding to the Soviets (while, behind the scenes he was setting the 
groundwork for a spy satellite programme), undermined his leadership and 
ultimately led to massive rises in military spending and a real missile gap – 
albeit one in the United States’ favour.  Divine, who wrote primarily on the 20th 
century presidency and foreign policy issues, offers a highly–detailed 
perspective, but one firmly in the ‘reaction-to-Sputnik’ camp.121 It was also 
limited by largely being a secondary source-led monograph. Had Divine chosen 
to spend more time analysing primary source material, he may well have come 
to a different understanding of the president.  
The 2013 Mieczkowski book again advanced the claim that Eisenhower 
was much more a calm poker player in his reaction to events.  Dividing its 
coverage into three sections, ‘Sputnik’, ‘Setbacks’ and ‘Space’, Eisenhower’s 
Sputnik Moment provided an academic insight not just into immediate events 
surrounding the ‘moment’, but further into the ‘space race’ through the Nixon-
Kennedy presidential race and Kennedy’s actions on outer space after his 
election. In charting Eisenhower’s actions from a political perspective, 
Mieczkowski pushes the case for Eisenhower’s activism and sought to positively 
compare his cautious, moderate and iterative development of a US space 
programme through a comparison of Kennedy’s ‘Race to the Moon’.122 However, 
he also argued that Eisenhower was politically insensitive in the wake of the 
Soviet launches, and showed a lack of inspirational leadership in using space as 
a vehicle to build national and international prestige. Mieczkowski’s work is 
interesting and moves the interpretation of Eisenhower’s reaction to Sputnik 
firmly into revisionist, even post-revisionist, territory. However, on two key 
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counts, its received interpretation is limited. First, it continues to treat 
Eisenhower as a President reacting to a situation. Second, it ultimately brands 
Eisenhower as a failure in both politics and perception.123 The latter point in 
particular is unconvincing, and an examination of Eisenhower’s space policy 
from the inception of the International Geophysical Year, through to the wake of 
NASA’s creation is required. While Mieczkowski delves deeply into primary 
source archive material, he does so from a perspective of discussing partisan 
politics. While he adds to the positive revisions of Eisenhower’s second term, he 
does not challenge the underlying assumption that the president’s decision 
making on space was a reaction to the launch of the Soviet satellites.   
In terms of assessing Eisenhower using space policy as a framework, 
until very recently, pro-Kennedy liberal historians held sway vigorously led by 
former NASA Chief Historian, Roger Launius. His 2010 paper, An unintended 
consequence of the IGY: Eisenhower, Sputnik, the Founding of NASA124 adhered 
strongly to the traditional Sputnik assumption. Launius nailed his colours to 
the mast quickly with an opening statement that says: “In an irony of the first 
magnitude, Eisenhower believed that the creation of NASA was a mistake.”125 
He then raised several interesting and well-observed points about the 
manufacture of the Sputnik crisis by interest groups politicking for their own 
ends. But he displayed an inherent prejudice towards Eisenhower, engaging 
superficially with Eisenhower revisionism, but largely dismissing it. He wrote:  
(One) can become much less satisfied with the Eisenhower 
revisionism. Of course, Eisenhower has attained lofty status as 
some type of grand strategist that seems overdrawn at this point. 
For example, with American prestige clearly at stake in the Cold 
War during the 1950s it is puzzling that the chief executive 
                                                          
123 Ibid, p. 292. 
124 RD Launius ‘Eisenhower, Sputnik, the Founding of NASA’, in Acta Astronautica 67, issue 1 (Oxford, 
2010), pp. 254-263. 
125 Ibid, p. 254. 
58 
 
should have been so reluctant to recognize this fact of life. 
Eisenhower totally mishandled a long list of international 
intrigues with the Soviet Union, completely misinterpreted the 
nationalist fervor of former European colonies, displayed 
alarming incapacity to understand anything happening in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia, and the list goes on.126 
 
Given Launius’ rather trenchant position on Eisenhower, it is unsurprising that 
he sees his actions in 1957-58 as “unequal to the mentality present from 
opponents and those they could convince to support them.”127 His observation 
that NASA was an agency that Eisenhower did not want to create is definitely 
open to challenge.  But one must question Launius’ methodology here. He makes 
sweeping statements concerning Eisenhower’s mis-handling of his “long list of 
international intrigues”, yet disdains from engaging with those intrigues or 
providing any evidence to support his assumptions. The result is a rather 
lightweight critique limited by boundaries that, given the weight of primary 
source evidence, can be (and are) breached by a more detailed review of 
Eisenhower’s handling both of space policy and, indeed, those “international 
intrigues”.128 
 Launius has provided a more positive appreciation of Eisenhower’s 
leadership, but only through a review of the work of others in creating a 
historiography for the origins of the space race. On charting works on what he 
refers to as the origins of the space age, he commented: 
The figure of Dwight D. Eisenhower has dominated this recent 
study, and he has emerged as a much more effective leader than 
thought at the time. Rather than a smiling, do-nothing, golf-
playing president, Eisenhower's leadership handling the Soviet 
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Union in space now increasingly appears farsighted and 
rational.129 
 
He cited Divine’s The Sputnik Challenge as the best analysis of the more active 
view of Eisenhower and Launius’ comment may be read as no more than a 
reflection of Divine’s viewpoint.  
Another relatively recent voice in assessing Eisenhower’s contribution to 
space policy is Sean Kalic who chronicled United States’ space activity from 
Truman to Johnson by analysing presidential actions with regard to the 
militarization of space.130  His well-documented though narrow-cast thesis 
stated that Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson all worked hard to ensure space 
was a not weaponised. All saw military uses for space, primarily for 
reconnaissance, but also for communication, navigation and meteorology. With 
regards to Eisenhower, his specific conclusion was that:  
While the Eisenhower era is often characterized by policies such 
as massive retaliation and New Look, the period 1953-1961 needs 
to be remembered as the era in which the United States 
steadfastly committed itself to the non-aggressive militarization 
of space, NASA’s civilian space program and the global banning of 
weapons from space. The impact of Eisenhower’s actions resulted 
in a solid commitment to a national space policy that emphasized 
the use of military and space programme working in concert to re-
establish the technological superiority of the United States.131 
 
Yet Kalic does not explore further whether the Soviets had ever really 
threatened the United States’ technological superiority or whether they had 
merely given the impression of so doing. Kalic provides just one chapter on 
Eisenhower in a relatively slim volume and his core focus is heavily on the 
military aspect of the space programme. That said, he points the way to 
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important issues, policies and sources that need to be tied into the broader 
debate on Eisenhower’s second White House term.    
Before Kalic and Mieckowski entered the debate, the interaction of the 
President, his presiding and operational officers, and the media had been little 
discussed in the historical analysis of the US-Soviet Space Race. By contrast, 
the ‘race’ has been probed from almost every other angle as regular 
anniversaries of the first satellite, first manned flight, first step – and even last 
step on the Moon have presented opportunities for ever more retellings of the 
journey from Sputnik to the Moon. Yet what remains startling is how virtually 
every analysis recycles the core traditional assumption about the impact of 
Sputnik. The events of the late 1950s are framed as the prelude of a space race 
that was a Cold War enterprise, and, indeed, a microcosm of the wider struggle. 
Even a cursory reading of the main literature surrounding early US space policy 
shows that this is not a debate that easily mirrors the orthodoxy/revisionist/post 
revisionist convention that one would find when, say, discussing the wider 
history of the Cold War. The core messages that emerge time and again are 
focused on the ultimate success of the moon landing both delivering and closing 
the ‘New Frontier’ as extolled by Kennedy in his presidential nomination 
acceptance speech at the Democrat Convention in 1960.132 That traditionalist 
space race history has lain largely unchallenged with few exceptions. America’s 
early space history is far too often discussed as a stand-alone issue, explained 
without any contextual reference to the Cold War-dominated foreign policy 
discourse, or even the US domestic travails of race, economics and social policy. 
Additionally, much of the space race literature is in the form of journalistic or 
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memoir-accounts where the retelling of a familiar tale from a new angle is far 
more prevalent than any insightful analysis.  
However, if there is an ‘orthodox’ analysis of the Space Race, it resides in 
the body of literature produced and maintained by one of the chief actors in 
enacting US space policy: NASA. The title at the heart of NASA’s analysis is 
Chariots for Apollo133 which presents the NASA history of manned space flight 
to 1969. The key to understanding NASA’s interpretation of events is that it is 
seen through the lens of the Apollo landing – this is history described from the 
viewpoint of success, with the race won and the mission accomplished. As such, 
its primary focus is on the Apollo programme, presenting this as the inevitable 
outcome of the earlier Mercury and Gemini programmes. Like many books of its 
genre, Chariots for Apollo boldly presents the claim that:  “Sputnik 1 caused 
alarm throughout the United States, and the ensuing public clamor (sic) 
demanded a response to the challenge.”134 NASA’s formation is covered in 
another single sentence on the same page.  Eisenhower rates hardly a mention 
and his actions in forming NASA, assigning the Mercury manned space 
programme to the new agency and his decision to fund the Apollo programme in 
June 1960 are all covered in the first 22 pages of 366 page book. Chariots for 
Apollo has spawned a complete genre of US space programme literature that all 
views the short history from 1957 to 1969 from the perspective of a successful 
moon landing. The overriding theme is the prestige of a victorious moon race, 
and the emphasis in this literature is on amazing engineering feats, the 
tremendous bravery of the cohort of astronauts and the outstanding project 
management that enabled the US, through NASA, to win the race to the moon.  
This narrative strand builds and reinforces the myth of a coherent narrative 
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that responded to Khrushchev’s Sputnik taunts by aligning all the best America 
had to offer behind a single programme that captured the awe of the world and, 
in a single action, cemented the United States’ position as the dominant 
superpower.  The only presidential policy-making brought to the fore in such 
literature is Kennedy’s moon pledge, the impact of Eisenhower’s advisers is 
almost wholly overlooked.  
This distortion, which has become the popular, if not exactly the 
scholarly, narrative, extends through a wide range of US space programme 
literature from well-regarded titles such as Apollo – the Race to the Moon135, 
through Chaikin’s popular history: A Man on the Moon136 to the recent 
hagiography marking the 40th anniversary of the moon landing, exemplified by 
former BBC Science Correspondent Dr. David Whitehouse’s One Small Step 
which purports to give the inside story of space exploration, but simply ensures 
the Kennedy-Apollo-triumph myth persists without any significant reference to 
Eisenhower.137 In each case, the narrative is one of heroism, both among the 
flyers and those in support roles who ensured that they reached their mission 
goal. But what is most striking is the operational nature of the narrative with a 
focus on what the challenge was and how it was overcome, rather than why that 
particular challenge was important in the first place.  There is a general 
assumption that a manned lunar space programme was the right step for 
America to take and NASA – the civilian agency – was the right body to enable 
the challenge to be met.  
In Apollo – the race to the moon, Murray and Bly Cox follow the familiar 
path to the extent that they begin the study with Kennedy’s May 25th 1961 
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pledge to Congress ‘to send a man to the moon and return him safely to earth 
before this decade is out’. Eisenhower is not evident in the narrative which is set 
it in the context of the Freedom Riders’ civil rights action in Mississippi; 
Johnson’s Vice presidential trip to South East Asia, and most tellingly, the fall-
out from the failed Bay of Pigs invasion.138 Yet immediately, the focus is 
switched to the engineers who moved through Mercury and Gemini and the 
wider context for America’s race to the moon is submerged in a ‘boys own’ guide 
to project management. What is presented back is a compelling adventure story, 
but one that appears politically tactical, without a balancing perspective on 
Kennedy’s political strategy and how this differed from Eisenhower’s focus not 
on prestige, but on national security.  A failing in this narrative strand is the 
telescoped view of the space programme that assumes Mercury was a direct 
forerunner to Gemini and Gemini to Apollo – enabling a convenient, but 
distorted reframing of events.  
The triumphalist strand includes two further sub-genres that have 
helped to preserve the primacy of the traditionalist view of the early years of the 
American space programme. First, astronaut memoirs, and second, space beat-
reporters’ memoirs. Taking the latter first, it is remarkable and a distinct 
disappointment that there are no significant secondary sources reflecting the 
views of key Washington press or broadcast reporters from the space beat 
during the Eisenhower era. Figures such as the Washington Star’s Bill Hines 
and Drew Pearson, whose Washington Merry-go-round column was syndicated 
in more than 600 newspapers across the USA in the 1950s and 60s, wrote 
regularly and insightfully on the space events of the day, yet they left no 
reflections for historians to build on. James Reston of the New York Times left 
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an extensive archive at the University of Illinois, and while his papers feature 
several interesting conversations with both John Foster Dulles and his brother 
Allen, there are no specific files or documents relating to Eisenhower’s US space 
policy.139 What has emerged instead is a number of self-serving accounts of 
reporting life following the NASA caravan. Yet works such as Schefter’s The 
Race140 and Barbree’s Live from Cape Canaveral141 are written from a purely 
operational reporter’s perspective and slip into the realm of hagiography by 
building the role of the journalist into that of a key partner to their astronaut 
and Mission Control sources. The protagonists in the US space programme rate 
journalists somewhat lower on the scale of importance. 
Yet many of the same criticisms can be levelled at the swathe of 
astronaut and Mission Control memoirs that have emerged since Life 
magazine’s overtly-ghosted We Seven which cast the original Mercury 7 
astronauts in purely heroic ‘Buck Rogers’ mould as early as 1962 142 Most titles 
are collaborations with journalists or ghost-written efforts, and, almost without 
exception, they build on the line set by Life, describing small-town, god-fearing 
men who were simply doing a job, and did not see themselves as heroes. The 
accounts are anodyne, and the political implications of the astronauts’ actions 
play a very minor role, subsumed by the Tom Wolfe ‘Right Stuff ‘All American 
Boy’ attitude.143  The astronauts were mere test pilots as NASA was formed and 
had no impact on space strategy in the Eisenhower era. While they remain 
interesting to read about, they provide little insight into the process of decision 
making. The exception comes in two forms: first where the astronaut is 
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prepared to go ‘off message’, and second, where the published work is closer to 
primary than secondary source.  
Brian O’Leary debunked much of the ‘All American Boy’ myth 
surrounding the early astronauts in his work: The Making of an ex-Astronaut144. 
Though he joined NASA under Johnson’s Presidency, he depicts NASA as a 
macho closed-shop, focused on delivering an engineering task where those on 
the programme neither questioned its aims nor sought to push the boundaries 
in terms of true scientific exploration. His view of the astronauts is that they 
were arrogant drones – not quite matching the image NASA was selling to the 
public. On the other hand, T Keith Glennan’s 1958-1961 diary: The Birth of 
NASA145 does get beneath the veneer of NASA’s public affairs projection of the 
early years of the space programme. Glennan, as NASA’s first Administrator 
was an Eisenhower appointment. An academic manager, he was set the task of 
moving the old NACA organisation into the new space age. His diary has not 
been sanitized and though it merely charts his bureaucratic battles to get NASA 
on course, it provides one of the very few insights into the manner in which 
NASA set out to fulfil Eisenhower’s vision for a space programme.  This 
definitely leans to a scientific exploration of space, partnered with the armed 
forces’ national security-led approach. It is far from triumphalist, but best 
serves its purpose treated as a primary source, aligning Glennan’s comments 
with the other contemporaneous voices in the discourse as space policy was 
made. Glennan, indeed, emerges from this thesis as one of the key undervalued 
actors on the space/politics nexus under Eisenhower, and his relationship with 
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NASA’s engineers, the Administration’s policy influencers and indeed the media 
are explored in chapter five.  
The first really specific revision to the triumphalist interpretation was  
Walter McDougall’s The Heavens and the Earth published in 1985 at a time 
when the Eisenhower Library was making more and more material  from the 
Eisenhower presidency available to researchers.146  Published three years after 
Greenstein’s The Hidden Hand Presidency, his work recast the heroic, 
triumphal theme that NASA had nurtured by giving a distinct political edge to 
the rationale of the United States’ space endeavours. McDougall focused on the 
interrelationship of politics and technology and argued that the space agenda 
emerged as a means to prosecute a war – and especially a Cold War - without 
that war ever having to get hot. McDougall began to rebalance the political 
equation, giving Eisenhower due credit for his approach to a peaceful entry into 
space, and his fiscally conservative approach to managing both the civilian 
space programme under NASA and the defence programme both in terms of 
missiles and reconnaissance satellites. McDougall’s approach of historical 
analysis, drawing on a wide range of primary source materials from NASA, 
Congressional Records and the Eisenhower papers, led to his advocacy of the 
concept of technocracy – the management of society by technical experts. 147 His 
argument was that the Soviets made it into space first because as a state actor, 
they were the first to align the political will to technological ability. The USA 
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finally won the race to the moon because they managed the military-industrial 
complex better and maintained their advantage longer.  McDougall argued that 
Eisenhower was unwilling to embrace the technocratic method, fearing it was 
out of kilter with his small government philosophy. He was, however, forced to 
move along the technocratic road by his opponents, prompted by Khrushchev’s 
Sputnik successes.148 Thus, while moving the argument on, McDougall still 
considered Eisenhower to be reactive: driven to action only in response to the 
Soviets’ Sputnik satellites. He argued that Kennedy was not bound by any of 
Eisenhower’ small government limitations and embraced technocracy fully, yet 
he was no great believer in space and limited his own ‘New Frontier’ by setting 
the space between the earth and the moon as the most visible symbolic battle 
ground of the Superpower Cold War. McDougall does not particularly advocate 
the technocratic approach, but regarded it as the best explanation for 
understanding what happened between 1957 and 1969. Since writing The 
Heavens and the Earth, McDougall has changed his position, so as to rebalance 
US presidential achievement in space away from Kennedy and towards 
Eisenhower. In an exchange of emails with this author in 2011, he noted:  
“Certainly if he (Nixon) had won (the 1960 Presidential election) and followed 
the Eisenhower/Glennan NASA plan for incremental progress toward 
infrastructure the US space programme would be decades beyond where we are 
now, both in manned and unmanned exploration (the latter has suffered 
because of the former's big budgets).”149 McDougall is also interesting in that he 
devotes a chapter to the ‘Media Riot’ that followed Sputnik 1’s launch150.  Yet 
this is one of the least insightful chapters in his work. The ‘press’ is not deeply 
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analysed – merely seen as providing a hysterical response leading a hysterical 
nation which catalyses Eisenhower into action.  
McDougall’s technocratic paradigm has become one of the key 
interpretations of the US entry into the space programme and has prompted its 
own sub genres. For instance, Joan Bromberg has explored NASA’s relationship 
with industry and the changing role of the Government in defining the interface 
where NASA’s ‘ownership’ of the space programme begins and ends in relation 
to private industry.151 One of the most recent extensions on the themes of 
technocracy is Columba Peoples’152 discussion of technological determinism, 
catalysed by the launch of Sputnik as a driver of US foreign policy making from 
1957 through to the 1970s. It focuses on decision-making as an outcome of 
previous technological advances setting the scenario where technology almost 
took on a life of its own and locked the US into an unwinnable race. It does not 
explore the symbolic running of that race through Kennedy’s manned space 
programme – but alludes to a situation where external influence was subjugated 
to pre-determined outcomes, initially determined by the race for rockets.  Of 
course, if the Cold War space/missile race ran smoothly on the lines of 
technological determinism, there would be no place for causal influence from 
any source.   
Most serious study of the early American space programme in the 1990s 
and early 2000s was conducted by Roger Launius and Howard McCurdy. Their 
edited volume Spaceflight and the Myth of Presidential Leadership 153 was the 
first to reassess the leadership of each President through the space programme 
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lens.  This volume includes Greenstein and Callahan’s perception of Eisenhower 
vis a vis Sputnik as discussed earlier. 154   
Alongside triumphalism and a linked but parallel theme of national 
security is the bridging theme of symbolism. It is the area that Eisenhower was 
keen to avoid.  The media – as the mouthpiece for the contemporaneous 
discourse - were vital. Yet, their role is downplayed in almost all the existing 
literature. Even more so, the relationship between NASA’s image makers linked 
to its manned space programmes, the political image makers in Washington and 
the editorial decision makers who used the imagery of the new space age simply 
has not been explored in significant depth since Politics and Space155, where 
Mark Byrnes provided case-studies showing NASA’s changing image over time, 
hypothesising that the agency continually adjusted its image in response to the 
changing environment. The assumption is that the space programme was a 
vehicle of political will and was thus flexed to meet whatever political need 
prevailed. With the emergence of numerous new sources of information in this 
area since Byrnes’ work, it is clear that a new study in this area is overdue. 
There have been several recent studies concerning the role of the media and 
indeed the role of technology to support the media, but while they reflect the 
growing interest in the pre-1961 period, each has simply revisited and repeated 
rather than challenged the assumption that Eisenhower’s actions were a direct 
reaction to Sputnik.156 
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In 2007, Kim McQuaid wrote a considered essay on the ‘panic’ effect of 
Sputnik157. He challenged the myth surrounding the impact of Sputnik’s launch 
internationally, demonstrating that if it caused any panic at all, it was elite 
panic, not shared by the wider public. McQuaid’s contention was that this was 
because of selective reporting.  However, this assumes that the media elite had 
access to all of the available intelligence on Soviet capabilities and chose not to 
use it. This is certainly an area for challenge that will be addressed in chapter 
three.  
It is clear that the early space narrative is becoming of greater interest to 
historians.  Therefore it is imperative to revisit the events surrounding 
Sputnik’s launch to chart Eisenhower’s actions in terms of how they 
demonstrate his leadership, and also the gap that exists between the reality of 
his strategy with regards to rockets and missiles, and the triumphalist 
interpretation that has so often been presented as an ‘objective truth’.  
 
A study in confidence 
Discussing Eisenhower through the studies of others, should be balanced by a 
review of Eisenhower through his own words. But before that, it is important to 
assess the core characteristic that is apparent throughout his presidency: self-
belief. To a large degree, this self-confidence came from his rapid rise through 
the military and his resounding success in defeating Hitler between 1944 and 
1945. Yet he may never have gained that opportunity had it not been for the 
way in which he caught General George Marshall’s attention in the Louisiana 
Manoeuvres of 1941. He was General Walter Krueger’s Chief of Staff when 
Krueger’s Third Army routed General Lear’s Second Army in the largest 
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military manoeuvres ever held in the United States. Essentially, Marshall saw 
this as a rehearsal for the real invasion of Europe. According to Smith, Krueger 
deserved the credit for the victory. “His grasp of the strategic requirements, and 
the command and control he exercised over Third Army, were nearly 
flawless.”158 Again, Eisenhower’s role was supportive. He was Krueger’s Chief of 
Staff and thus was the public face of the manoeuvres, conducting the daily press 
briefings. This visibility undoubtedly worked in his favour when officers who 
had performed well in the exercise were singled out for promotion. In reality, 
Eisenhower was riding on the tails of Krueger when he was promoted to 
General. He had performed well in the manoeuvres, but the success in the field 
was very much down to Krueger. This illustrates the view of Eisenhower as 
‘lucky’. He was lucky in so far as he had a tendency to be in the right place at 
the right time. He had consistently attracted the attention of his superiors, from 
Fox Connor onwards, and had performed strongly in each of his postings, 
enabling him to move, albeit quite slowly, through pre-war Army structure. If 
anything, he had created his own luck. Being ‘lucky’ is worth nothing if it is not 
backed by hard work, a comprehensive grasp of the issues in hand, and an 
ability to deliver at the very least what is required, and often significantly more.  
 Early in his relationship with his future wife, Mamie, Eisenhower 
announced his duty would be to the nation first in whatever capacity it chose to 
use him, and to his family second. It appears that such duty was built on self-
control, and that self-control manifested itself in rather few relaxed moments or 
off-the-cuff comments. A career in Army roles demanding discretion, plus a 
pronounced split between his private and public demeanour, makes Eisenhower 
a difficult subject to define through his public utterances. As noted in the 
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‘Methodology’ section of this paper, so much of what he said or even what he 
wrote was ‘for the record’, either consciously or unconsciously. Like Churchill, 
there is often a sense that he is writing for history: to be read by historians and 
political scholars. With his memoirs, there’s a sense of retrofitting action to fit 
what transpired, while his public speechmaking and even official memoranda of 
meetings tend to reflect his public character – the measured, smiling, 
personable character that the first generation of biographers chose to vilify. 
Thus, in addition to the insight of other historians, and his public statements, 
there are two ways to capture the character of Eisenhower as presidential 
leader: first, through the reaction of others to him in the natural interaction of 
policy making; and second, his less guarded, ‘off the record’ comments. This is 
occasionally captured in his own thoughts and utterances, but more often 
through thoughts recorded by others in notes, memoranda and diary entries. 
Yet getting close to the authentic Eisenhower is not easy. Perhaps wisely 
recognising that what goes around comes around, he made it a practice not to 
speak ill of others – even his adversaries. He had a plaque on his desk with the 
inscription: ‘gentle in manner, strong in deed’159. The ‘gentle’ is reflected in his 
unwillingness to be openly critical of others, and William Ewald quoted 
Eisenhower on his philosophy in dealing with those who opposed, or sought to 
oppose him.  The philosophy was simply: “Don’t see, don’t feel, don’t admit and 
don’t answer. Just ignore your attacker and keep smiling.”160 Ewald also noted 
Eisenhower’s self- discipline and highlighted four characteristics he could draw 
together to achieve his aims: “[He] has an enormous capacity for getting on with 
people.  He could judge them, he could make them like him, and, rarest of all, he 
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could judge himself.” 161 What one can surmise from this is that Eisenhower’s 
self-discipline gave him an extraordinary capacity to work with, and draw the 
best from, people with whom he had no personal affinity. Clearly, that was 
sometimes a strain and there is evidence from well before he entered the White 
House that Eisenhower was sometimes impatient, and never had time for the 
self-important. Indeed, in a rare example of written intemperance, he was 
highly critical of Douglas MacArthur when serving under the General in the 
Philippines. He wrote: 
The General is more and more indulging in a habit of damning 
everybody who disagrees with him over any detail, in 
extravagant, almost hysterical fashion. I’ve seen him so this, 
second hand, in the past, but now he seems to consider that the 
combined use of his rank, a stream of generalizations that are 
studded with malapropos, and a refusal to admit the presentation 
of opposing opinion will, by silencing his subordinates, establish 
the validity of his contentions.162 
 
Robert Ferrell omitted this part of Eisenhower’s January 20, 1936 diary entry 
from the published version of The Eisenhower Diaries. Perhaps he felt this 
outburst of well-written but somewhat angry critique was not in keeping with 
the image of Eisenhower he wished to present to his readers. However, the 
diaries do offer occasional insights into Eisenhower’s defining characteristics. 
His White House entries are too few and too considered to enlighten readers 
about the true Eisenhower, but earlier entries, not least in the period after 
World War 2 but before his Republican political life began do show some of the 
underpinning tenets of the man. For instance, newly-installed as Army Chief of 
Staff, he writes: 
I’m astounded and appalled at the size and scope of plans the staff 
sees as necessary to maintain our security position now and in the 
                                                          
161 Ibid, pp. 21-27. 
162 DD Holt and JW Layersaf eds., Eisenhower: The Pre-War Diaries and Selected Papers 1905-1941 
(Baltimore, 1998), entry for January 20, 1936.  
74 
 
future. The cost is terrific. We’ll be merely tilting at windmills 
unless we can develop something more in line with financial 
possibilities.163 
 
Here is a man acutely aware of the cost of maintaining a huge standing army in 
a culture with no tradition of such large-scale full-time soldiery. Even with all 
the goodwill of a successful European campaign behind him and hero status 
with politicians and the public alike, his first though is financial prudence: 
balancing the needs of the country post-war with the military demands of an 
Army at the height of its powers. It is a view he returns to on May 15, 1947 
when taking a more general and discursive view on the strategy necessary for 
the US economy: 
At home, we have rising prices (Packard had to go up yesterday), 
labor troubles, housing shortages and tax squabbles. Unless we 
find a formula which will stabilize the price structure, we are due 
for most serious times.164 
 
It is clear that five years before even running for office, Eisenhower had 
a strong sense that governmental spending needed to be curbed. While not 
aligning himself politically at this time, his core economic sentiments were 
Republican – small government, low Federal spending and support for business, 
although there is no evidence of a clarion call from Eisenhower for tax cuts. He 
had also taken a view in April 1946 on the role the Army should play to draw 
the best out of civilian scientific research and development. In a memorandum 
for Directors and Chiefs of War Department General and Special Staff Divisions 
and Bureaus and the Commanding generals of the Major Commands he wrote: 
It is our job to take the initiative to promote the development of 
new resources, if our national security indicates the need. It is our 
duty to support broad research programs in educational 
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institutions, in industry and in whatever field might be of 
importance to the Army....The association of military and civilians 
in educational institutions and industry will level barriers, 
engender mutual understanding, and lead to the cultivation of 
friendships invaluable for future co-operation.165 
 
Here Eisenhower was showing support for the nation’s scientists – indeed the 
opening page of the memorandum praises the relationship between the military 
and its scientific advisers during World War 2 – as a key, but separate, asset for 
national security. This strong belief in scientific advice and expertise without 
the clouding of specific agendas sets the tone for Eisenhower’s relationship with 
the science, and specifically the R&D community throughout his presidency. Yet 
the fine line between supporting scientific and technological advances, and 
becoming in thrall to the unhealthy relationship of the military industrial 
complex and to those scientists who placed their own importance above the 
needs of the nation clearly affected Eisenhower’s thinking across the period of 
restructuring the armed services, managing the post-Sputnik furore and 
planning his national security legacy. All came together in his final set-piece 
speech as a national politician – his farewell address. To deliver such an address 
at all, not least as the election of Kennedy had been a rebuttal to Republican 
policies, might well be seen as an act of vanity. Yet surely Eisenhower had 
earned it?  He came into the White House a hero, trounced the Democrats twice 
in presidential elections and kept the nation at peace through eight turbulent 
Cold War years. At 70 years old, he was bowing out from public office and would 
not return. This was his last chance to influence public opinion from a national 
stage. For a figure confident that he knew what was best for the nation, it would 
have been odd to merely fade from the scene. It is worthy of comment in that it 
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has been so often misinterpreted. As much as this was a warning, it was a 
recognition that Eisenhower had not been able to rein in the power of the 
military-industrial complex or to effectively manage the scientific-technological 
elite. This might have been achieved under a Nixon presidency, but that was not 
to be. Thus, in a sense, the farewell address is an apology from the outgoing 
president who had not achieved all the goals that were clear to him, and could 
not see those goals being achieved under the in-coming Administration.  
 The speech is best remembered for the warning for government to guard 
against the “unwarranted influence” of the military-industrial complex. But 
there is more to the speech than this sound bite; more that reflects the 
fundamental principles of the president. He opened by noting that in three days: 
“after half a century of service to this country, I will lay down the 
responsibilities of office.”166 The first reference is to his responsibility: his duty 
to the nation. This was Eisenhower’s abiding sense: service to his country. Next, 
he reflected on the US as being: “the strongest, the most influential and most 
productive nation in the world,” but noted that America’s “leadership and 
prestige depend not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and 
military strength, but on how we use our power in the interests of world peace 
and human betterment.” Keeping the peace becomes the major strand of the 
next section, with a pointed warning that to remain at peace calls for “Not so 
much the emotional and transitory sacrifices of crisis”, and nor should future 
leaders “feel that some spectacular and costly action could become the 
miraculous solution to all current difficulties.” Here are Eisenhower’s principles 
distilled: peace achieved by long-term strategy, not through short term 
spectaculars.  
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 The military-industrial complex passage is often taken out of context. 
Eisenhower was supportive of capitalism and favoured small government and 
the freedom for business to operate. But, he was aware that America had no 
tradition of a large arms industry or, indeed before World War 2, of large armed 
services. The warning was not to let the combination of “an immense military 
establishment and a large arms industry....endanger our liberties and 
democratic processes.” The section finished with advice: “only an alert and 
knowledgeable citizenry can compel the meshing of huge industrial and military 
machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and 
liberty may prosper together.” This feels as though Eisenhower is putting his 
strategy of peace through the threat of massive retaliation in the hands of 
citizenry because he does not trust the incoming Administration to follow this 
strategy. With hindsight, he was prescient.  
 The last substantial piece in the speech mirrors the military-industrial 
complex passage and warns both that intellectual curiosity could be lost under 
the weight of government contracts and, balancing this, that “public policy could 
itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.” With his relationship 
with PSAC in particular, Eisenhower had developed an open, challenging 
discourse on science that valued and rewarded intellectual curiosity, most 
especially when it delivered pragmatic solutions. One might draw from the 
farewell address that Eisenhower feared a situation where policy was hostage to 
the scientists who had the greatest industrial backing, public pulpit and loudest 
voices.” Referring to that passage, PSAC’s Herbert York asked Eisenhower if he 
had any specific scientists in mind? “And without any hesitation, without 
thinking, he responded ‘Teller and Von Braun’.”167  
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Conclusion 
Eisenhower’s presidential reputation is in a period of relative rehabilitation, yet 
scholarly opinion of him remains grounded in the ‘Hidden Hand’ interpretation 
of Greenstein. While the liberal interventionist environment of the 1960s 
provided the basis for the initial critical assessment of the Eisenhower 
presidency, there has been no equivalent period of moderate Republicanism 
during which scholars may have further revised Eisenhower scholarship. 
Moderate Republicanism began to fall out of fashion, particularly with grass-
root activists, almost as Eisenhower left office. The turn to the right, begun 
under Goldwater was rather slow, but the rise of Reagan and much more 
recently, the rise of Tea Party politics has left little appetite for scholars to 
revisit Eisenhower again. That has enabled the rather lazy stereotyping as 
expressed by Brogan at the very beginning of this paper to largely go 
unchallenged. However, there are signs of an Eisenhower renaissance. It is 
early days and that renaissance is in the hands of just a few scholars, notably 
David Nichols. However, his work is spurring new interest in Eisenhower, and 
while biographers such as Newton and Thomas may have little that is new to 
say, their studies are drawing a new generation of scholars to reconsider one of 
the most overlooked presidencies of the modern era.  
 Nichols’ approach has been to focus on single issues. First civil rights, 
then Suez and his forthcoming work on Eisenhower and Joseph McCarthy. This 
approach has been followed by other Eisenhower scholars, notably Yanek 
Mieczkowski who has explored the Sputnik issue. Yet his exploration has been 
based on the traditional premise that the post-October 1957 actions were all 
prompted by the reaction in the US to the Soviet success in putting a man-made 
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object into orbit first. While Mieczkowski provides a considered account of 
Sputnik, he actually does little to build on the orthodoxy created out of the same 
liberal interventionist fervour of the 1960s, by Brooks, Grimwood and Swenson 
for NASA that is accentuated by Murray and Bly Cox, Divine, Dickson and even 
Burrows.  This orthodoxy must be challenged since it does not reflect accurately 
either the character of Eisenhower nor the influence his space policy had on all 
that followed. One must question why this orthodoxy has been allowed not just 
to emerge, but to survive with little challenge for so long. The first reason is lack 
of linkage between the space exploration genre and parallel literature on the 
development especially of reconnaissance satellites, but also military missiles. 
Eisenhower’s space policy is traced back to a slow and underwhelming reaction 
to the orbiting of Soviet satellites, and especially the initial failure of the 
Vanguard. Yet this disregards Eisenhower’s work with the Technological 
Capabilities Panel in 1955 which set a clear strategy for both missile and 
reconnaissance development. One must question why this linkage is not made 
more effectively. That may be down to the more popular presentation of the US’ 
greatest success in space – the Apollo programme to land men on the moon. 
Traditionally this narrative has started with Sputnik, but as a failure on behalf 
of an aging worn out Administration. Success comes only when the new 
administration is in place and is catalysed by Kennedy’s moon pledge. This 
draws the nation together to deliver a Cold War victory over the Soviets and the 
ultimate prestige for the US. It is a triumph for the Democrat administrations of 
the 1960s and a fitting legacy for a slain president. There is a significant 
element of this narrative that is true. But it is not the whole truth. There is 
insufficient scholarly research tracing Eisenhower’s policy from his first 
understanding that the US had the means to deliver its nuclear deterrent via an 
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ICBM, to the implementation of policy that enabled parallel secret 
reconnaissance and scientific exploration of outer space.  Equally, there is 
insufficient credit in the current literature given either to Eisenhower as a 
decision maker, or to his legacy in space policy. This chapter leaves the question 
as to whether the narrative of US space exploration starts in the right place. 
Should scholars be charting US space policy back to decisions made in 
Eisenhower’s first presidential term? Finally, assessing the current literature 
raises the question of whether scholars have correctly interpreted the 
Executive/Congressional relationship in the hinge period in the first seven 
months of 1958. Traditional interpretation credits Lyndon Johnson as the 
driving force to get the National Aeronautics and Space Act passed. Yet more 
recent work, notably Robert Caro’s Master of the Senate, suggests Johnson’s role 
was not quite as dynamic as previously portrayed. Clearly that leaves a gap in 
understanding that can, and will, be filled by revisiting Eisenhower’s role, and 
that of his operational officers, in formalising a number of military, civilian and 
national security policy strands into legislation that enabled the 
implementation of an existing presidential strategy.  It is crucial to reassess 
what role the ‘Sputnik Assumption’ plays in the way scholars view Eisenhower’s 
second term today. Challenging that assumption opens the way to challenge the 
overall assessment of Eisenhower as president.      
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Chapter 2: Missile and Reconnaissance Development  
under Eisenhower 
 
This chapter will set the context for Eisenhower’s space policy and show that his 
actions in 1954-1955 created strong foundations that explain his actions during 
and following the Sputnik autumn of 1957. It will demonstrate clearly that the 
roots of both his military missile programme and the scientific satellite 
programme were not direct reactions to the Sputnik satellites and that, indeed, 
Eisenhower’s decision making in 1955 set his space policy on a clear track from 
which it hardly deviated over the course of the final five years of his presidency 
– Sputnik notwithstanding. The chapter will analyse Eisenhower’s missile and 
reconnaissance inheritance from President Truman, then address the work of 
the Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP). While not seeking to retell the 
narrative of the development of Eisenhower’s missile defence and 
reconnaissance strategy, it is vital to establish a contextual framework for the 
president’s later actions with regard to NASA. Therefore, this chapter revisits 
the current literature concerning missile and military intelligence development 
as well as primary source material and reassesses its impact as a precursor to 
the space policy decisions of late 1957 and 1958. Knowing that the US could 
miniaturise a powerful nuclear warhead by 1954, the development of a heavy 
booster was actually an expensive redundancy at the time. This knowledge 
enabled Eisenhower to allow each service to compete to develop feasible IRBMs 
and ICBMs. At its core, the chapter will investigate the importance of the 
Technical Capabilities Panel and the crucial role this played both in 
championing the reprioritising of missile development (missile development 
gained the highest possible priority) and, coupled with this, the development of 
effective reconnaissance. While this is a feature of national security literature, it 
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plays a very minor role in the overall study of Eisenhower’s policy-making. This 
chapter will argue that the successful outputs of the Eisenhower-sanctioned 
reconnaissance developments (U-2, A-12 and Corona satellites) were entirely in 
keeping with both his fiscal conservatism and his drive to base defence spending 
on having ‘just enough’ capability to ensure the Soviet Union was deterred from 
any significant offensive activity. It will also consider Eisenhower’s active 
pragmatism in finding development routes for the U-2 and Corona that were 
speedy, cost effective and bypassed the cloying bureaucracy and budgetary 
control of Congress and the Pentagon.  The success of all of these activities 
provides a counter to the prevailing narrative norm that has a lame duck 
president, driven by the will of the Senate, delivering too little, too late with 
great reluctance. This chapter highlights why historians need a corrective: the 
actions of 1954 and 1955 on missile and satellite development laid the 
groundwork for future United States national security and the undoubted space 
success of the 1960s. Being largely confined to a narrow strand of intelligence 
literature, they have failed to enter the wider scholarly interpretations relating 
both to Eisenhower’s presidency and to the winning of the space race. They are 
crucial to both.  
When Eisenhower succeeded Truman as President in 1953, he inherited 
a nation at war. Truman’s ‘Police Action’ in Korea had, by January 1953, cost 
the United States over 30,000 combat deaths with a further 100,000 combatants 
wounded.1 By July 27, the Americans, on behalf of the United Nations 
Command, and North Koreans had signed an Armistice, and in terms of dealing 
with defence issues, much of the rest of 1953 was taken up with repatriating 
hundreds of thousands of armed forces personnel. The experience of Korea – 
                                                          
1 Defense Manpower Data Center figures, as of May 16, 2008, www.koreanwar-
educator.org/topics/casualties/pdfs/korea.pdf. Accessed January 4, 2013.  
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and, of course, Eisenhower had followed up his campaign pledge and gone to 
Korea to see the situation on the ground first-hand -  had reinforced in the 
president a strong belief that ‘brush fire’ wars should be avoided at all costs. His 
national security focus in his first year in office was on developing a new 
national defence policy, one that became known as the ‘New Look’. As 
Eisenhower detailed in Mandate for Change, he employed “five basic 
considerations...for designing and employing a security establishment.”2 These 
were: the assumption that the US would never start a major war; that modern 
global warfare would be “cataclysmic beyond belief”; that the relationship 
between military and economic strength was “intimate and indivisible”; that the 
armed forces must be modern and not be expected to wage a new war with the 
weapons of the last; and, finally, that the US could not be expected to provide all 
the necessary forces to the free world, but must work with allies. 3 The new 
policy was a considerable change in direction for a military establishment that 
had experienced few, if any, limits on military spending since 1941. As Saki 
Dockrill wrote in her book: Eisenhower’s New Look national security policy 1953-
1961, Eisenhower focused not solely on a military response to the global threats 
the US faced (primarily, but not totally from Soviet communism), but blended 
his response with economic, social and foreign policy concerns.4 The policy 
aimed to reshape the potential military response by focusing more on 
intelligence gathering, covert action and refocusing military capability on 
nuclear weapons delivered first by Strategic Air Command and, in time, by 
means of ballistic missiles. Massive retaliation would not be achieved by a large 
standing conventional force. In short, the primacy of the Army was under 
                                                          
2 DDE, Mandate for Change – The White House Years 1953-56, (London, 1963), p. 446.  
3 Ibid, pp. 446-447. 
4 S Dockrill, Eisenhower’s New Look National Security Policy 1953-1961 (London, 1996), pp. 1-40. 
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threat. The policy was embodied in NSC 162/2 which set out the United States’ 
new selective, flexible approach which relied also on the contribution of NATO 
allies.5 There is little doubt that Eisenhower had inherited significant national 
security problems: nuclear weapons were expensive; the US had to keep troops 
in Europe to allay the fear among the western European allies that they were 
set to be attacked by the Soviets; and mutual aid was slow to take off and 
disproportionately costly to the US. Dulles, too, with his rather blunt, black and 
white attitude to freedom versus communism, was not quite the diplomatic ally 
that Eisenhower needed in order to get the rest of the free world to play its part. 
However, as Dockrill noted, Dulles’ close relationship with Eisenhower did 
generate momentum for the New Look. While not entirely supportive of 
Eisenhower’s intention or actions, she reflected that the policy largely worked: 
Eisenhower created and maintained “a respectable defense posture” while 
keeping the US economy on track and continuing to rebuild post-war global 
markets.6 Eisenhower signed off NSC162/2 on October 30th 1953. However, a 
“Basic National Security Policy” that included clauses on: “collecting and 
analyzing indications of hostile intentions that would give maximum prior 
warning of possible aggression or subversion in any area of the world;” and 
“accurately evaluating the capabilities of foreign countries, friendly and neutral 
as well as enemy, to undertake military, political, economic and subversive 
courses of action affecting U.S. security”, would never be effective if the means 
to collect the necessary intelligence were not available. Nor was there the means 
to project US warheads towards their targets in the USSR. As Michael Hogan 
has discussed in A Cross of Iron, the New Look policy was drawn directly from 
                                                          
5 NSC162/2 ‘Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on Basic National 
Security Policy’, October 30
th
, 1953, Document 163, Intelligence Documents, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1950-55, Office of the Historian, Department of State, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d163. Accessed September 8, 2014.  
6 Dockrill, New Look, p. 275. 
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Truman’s idea (though never a fulfilled policy) of a capital-intensive 
containment that relied heavily on air-atomic power.7 However, during the 
Korean War, Truman had directed military resources away from missile and 
satellite research. 
The 27-page NSC 162/2 document spent its first five pages outlining the 
Soviet threat to the US. It concluded that: 
The authority of the Soviet regime does not appear to have been 
impaired by the events since Stalin’s death, or to be likely to be 
appreciably weakened during the next few years...The Soviet 
rulers can be expected to base their policy on the conviction of 
irreconcilable hostility between the bloc and the non-communist 
world.8 
That continued misreading of Kennan’s Long Telegram, and its influence on the 
Nitze and Acheson-drafted NSC-68 that had been so influential in inspiring 
Truman’s Containment policy appeared unlikely to change, and was reinforced 
in August 1953 when the Soviets announced they had detonated an H-Bomb9. 
However, Eisenhower did briefly consider alternatives including preventative 
war. First, in a classic, private one-to-one exchange, very much a feature of 
Eisenhower’s preferred style of presidential operation, he asked Dulles by way 
of a memorandum “To consider whether or not our duty to future generations 
did not require us to initiate war at the most propitious moment we could 
                                                          
7 MJ Hogan, A Cross of Iron, Harry S Truman and the origins of the National Security State 1945-54  
(Cambridge, 1998), p. 467.  
8 NSC162/2 ‘Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on Basic National 
Security Policy’, October 30
th
, 1953, Document 163, Intelligence Documents, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1950-55, Office of the Historian, Department of State, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950-55Intel/d163. Accessed September 8, 2014.  
9 NSC68 ‘Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on the United States 
Objectives and Programs for National Security’, April 14, 1950, President’s Secretary File, Papers as 
President, Truman Papers, Truman Library, 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf. 
Accessed September 8, 2014.  
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designate.”10 Having talked the issue through with his Secretary of State and 
closest political ally, Eisenhower also raised the issue in the NSC meeting of 
September 24th. During the discussion he noted that:  
The United States was confronted with a very terrible threat, and 
the truth of the matter was that we have devised no way of 
meeting this threat without imposing ever-greater controls on our 
economy and on the freedom of our people. We had been trying, in 
other words, to have our cake and to eat it at the same time. We 
were engaged, continued the President, not only in saving our 
money or in defending our persons from attack; we were engaged 
in the defense of a way of life, and the great danger was that in 
defending this way of life we would find ourselves resorting to 
methods that endangered this way of life.11 
Clearly the options for confronting the Soviet Union were still uppermost in 
Eisenhower’s mind. However, there was no further discussion of preventative 
war options, and by the 162/2 NSC Report, the focus is on other avenues 
through which the US would meet that threat. To that end, the report stated:  
The United States must develop and maintain, at the lowest 
feasible cost, requisite military and non-military strength to deter 
and, if necessary, to counter Soviet military aggression against 
the United States or other areas vital to its security. 
The risk of Soviet aggression will be minimized by maintaining a 
strong security posture, with emphasis on adequate offensive 
retaliatory strength and defensive strength. This must be based 
on massive atomic capability....  
This strong security posture must also be supported by an 
effective US intelligence system...12 
 In his memoir of his first term in office, Eisenhower attempted to put the 
New Look policy into context. He noted that “America could not afford to waste 
money in any area, including the military, for anything it did not need. I knew 
                                                          
10Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State, Denver, September 8, 1953, Whitman 
File, Eisenhower Papers as President, DDE Library. 
11  S. Everett Gleason, Memorandum of Discussion at the 163rd Meeting of the National Security 
Council, Thursday, September 24, 1953, drafted by Deputy Executive Secretary  Gleason on Sept. 25, 
Whitman File, Eisenhower Papers as President, DDE Library. 
12 NSC 162/2, pp19-24, as per note 147. Eisenhower formally approved NSC 162/2 on October 30
th
 
1953. 
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from experience that there was much duplication among the three services in 
research and development, in procurement, and even in roles and missions.”13 In 
fact, even before the New Look policy was signed off in October, Eisenhower had 
asked Secretary of Defense Wilson to begin a reorganisation in the Pentagon 
working to overcome these duplications. In Mid-May, the Navy’s Admiral 
Arthur Radford became chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and it was he who 
actually coined “New Look” for the new defence policy.14 As well as changes in 
the Pentagon, the policy demanded reductions in numbers in the Army and the 
Navy, not least as these forces reverted to a peace-time standing after Korea. 
However, the nuclear threat was, for the time being, to be carried to the enemy 
by the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command (SAC), which, over the period 
December 1953 – June 1955, grew by 20,000 personnel. At the same time, the 
Army shrank by a third to a headcount of 1,000,000, while the Navy reduced 
from 1,000,000 to 870,000.15 With a policy in place – the grand strategy for 
defence as defined by Eisenhower – the intent switched from concept to delivery. 
In this, Eisenhower was helped little by his inheritance from Truman, and 
rather more by the swift advance in missile development, particularly by the Air 
Force, and by the interventions of two key enablers for Presidential policy, Jim 
Killian, and Richard Bissell, Special Assistant to the Director of Central 
Intelligence Allen Dulles.16  
 
The Truman Inheritance 
                                                          
13 DDE, Mandate for change, p. 447. 
14 Ibid, p. 449. 
15 Ibid, p. 452. 
16 Unattributed, ‘Richard Bissell, An Agency Leader, The People of the CIA’, Featured Story Archive, 
2012, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2012-featured-story-
archive/the-people-of-the-cia-bissell-an-agency-leader.html. Accessed April 8, 2014.  
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The development of the US’ first ICBMs and IBRMs has been the subject of 
many historical studies, and it is not the intention of this research to repeat that 
narrative. The significant studies of the early ICBMs and IRBMs all argue that 
little progress had been made by the time Eisenhower succeeded Truman.17 
Following World War Two, President Truman had done little to support either 
the development of rockets/ballistic missiles or of satellites. The focus of the Air 
Force was on developing SAC, while the Army lost the initiative on rocket 
development as it allowed the Von Braun team, which had developed the V2 
rocket for the Germans, to languish in Fort Bliss Texas until 1950 when they 
moved to the Army Ballistic Missile Agency at the Redstone Arsenal in 
Huntsville Alabama. In 1960, Eisenhower stated that Truman’s Administration 
allocated just $1 million to long-range missile development in Fiscal Year 1953, 
sourly noting that this was “less than it was spending to support the price of 
peanuts.”18 Under Truman, the Air Force was largely obsessed with 
aerodynamic cruise missiles, and daily was losing ground on the Soviets who 
had recognised the possibilities of ballistic missile development immediately 
after the end of World War Two when they too had captured a significant 
number of German rocket scientists and V2 materials.19 Of course, the rocket 
                                                          
17 Among the many titles that cover the subject well, Neil Sheehan’s A Fiery Peace in a Cold War 
(New York, 2010), stands out as providing a comprehensive review of the early US-Soviet arms race 
through his study of the Air Force’s General Bernard Schriever who set up the Air Force’s Western 
Development Division under the Air Research Development Command, delivering both the first US 
ICBMs, and the Atlas and Titan rockets that enabled many of the early US satellite launches. This 
research touches on Schriever’s work only where it intersects with the actions of Eisenhower. The 
same can be said for the development of both the U-2 and Corona reconnaissance satellite. Both of 
these developments, which were outputs of the NSC162/2 strategy, are superbly documented in 
William E. Burrows’ Deep Black, (London, 1998), while Philip Taubman’s Secret Empire (New York, 
2003) brings a rather more journalistic angle to air and space intelligence gathering in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. 
18 DDE, ‘Address to the National Republican Convention’, Chicago, July 30, 1960, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11890. Accessed September 9, 2014.  
19 J Harford, Korolev, (London, 1999). James Harford’s scholarly biography of Sergei Korolev, the 
Soviet rocket programme’s ‘Chief Designer’ provides an excellent insight into the early philosophy 
and developments in the Soviet space and missile set-up.  
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engines being developed to propel nuclear missiles to their targets could have 
more than one purpose. Belatedly in 1952, the government asked Aristid 
Grosse, a physicist who had worked on the Manhattan Programme, to look at 
the feasibility of building a satellite. His report was not complete until 
Eisenhower was in office, and it was presented to the Assistant Secretary for 
Defense, Don Quarles, in autumn 1953. Grosse concluded that a satellite 
equipped with a television camera could be a “valuable observation post”. But 
the Air Force advised Quarles that the Grosse report offered “nothing new.”20 
While Truman offered little active support for missile and satellite 
development, he did not oppose small-scale, small-cost research activities 
including the research of Project RAND and a small group of Air Force officers – 
including Bernard Schriever – concerning the use of satellites for military 
purposes.21 Project RAND, as it was first titled, was undertaken by the Douglas 
Aircraft Company’s Engineering Division. RAND – a contraction of research and 
development – had originated in the final months of World War Two when 
members of the War Department, the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development, and war industries recognised a need for a private organization to 
connect military planning with research and development decisions. This was 
precisely the kind of connection that Eisenhower had asked for on April 30, 
1946, when he was Chief of Staff of the US Army.22 23 
                                                          
20 Taubman, Secret Empire, p. 67.  
21 Kalic, Militarization of Space, p. 24. 
22 The Air Force had established a new office of Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and 
Development, to which Project RAND would report, in December 1945. General Curtis LeMay took 
the role. Three months later, the RAND team was installed in the Douglas works in Santa Monica. 
Their first report ‘Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship’, which was 
concerned with the potential design, performance, and possible use of man-made satellites, was 
published on May 2, 1946. http://www.rand.org/pubs/special_memoranda/SM11827.html.  
Accessed May 12, 2014.  
23 DDE, ‘Scientific and Technological Resources as Military Assets’, Killian Collection, MIT, as 
referenced in Chapter 1, footnote 165.  
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Published just three days later and sent for circulation among the top 
echelons of the Pentagon, who were its intended readers beyond its direct Air 
Force audience, the first RAND report Preliminary Design of an Experimental 
World-Circling Spaceship almost certainly crossed Eisenhower’s desk as Chief of 
Staff of the Army, but there is no evidence as to whether he actually paid it any 
particular attention before convening the Technology Capabilities Panel. 
 
Satellite and warhead feasibility  
The RAND report presented an engineering analysis of the possibility of 
creating man-made satellites. It built on existing ideas for rocket technology, 
proposing designs for both a two and a four stage launch vehicle, and concluded 
that, even in 1946, “modern technology has advanced to a point where it now 
appears feasible to undertake the design of a satellite vehicle.”24 It also noted: 
“Such a vehicle will undoubtedly prove to be of great military value”, the report 
stated that the study was centred around a scientific purpose “obtaining much 
desired scientific information on cosmic rays, gravitation, geophysics, terrestrial 
magnetism, astronomy, meteorology and properties of the upper atmosphere.”25 
The essential conclusion was that the technology and expertise was there to 
build a rocket that could orbit a satellite. What was needed was the will to do so. 
That was not apparent under Truman. What was also necessary to give the US 
rocket programme the necessary ‘boost’ was a clear purpose. While the RAND 
report offered a scientific objective, that was never going to provide sufficient 
reasoning for any president, least of all one so focused on small government 
spending as Eisenhower, to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in 
                                                          
24 Douglas Aircraft Inc. Santa Monica Plant Engineering Division, ‘Preliminary Design of an 
Experimental World-Circling Spaceship’, Report No. SM11827, May 2, 1946, p. 1. 
25 Ibid, p. 2. 
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development. The purpose became more clearly defined on March 1, 1954 with 
the Castle Bravo H-Bomb test in the Marshall Islands. This was the first test by 
the US of a dry hydrogen device and, rather than the four to eight megaton blast 
initially envisaged, the device produced a yield equivalent to 15 megatons of 
TNT. The Castle Bravo test was designed to evaluate a first generation air-
droppable device. The unexpected consequence of the test was that the US could 
package a smaller but far more powerful nuclear device than originally 
anticipated.  Indeed, the Mark-21 nuclear device, 12 foot six inches long and 
weighing 15,000lbs was operational by the end of 1955. For the missile 
engineers working on both Army and Air Force projects, it made the possibility 
of mounting a nuclear device on an ICBM feasible.   
 Eisenhower had wanted to keep the results of the Castle tests secret. 
However, the fact that a Japanese fishing boat had been “showered with 
radiation”26 prompted a protest from the Japanese government. Eisenhower 
then dealt with the issues raised by the Castle tests in two press conferences, on 
March 24 on his own, and then a week later with Lewis Strauss, Chairman of 
the Atomic Energy Commission.  At the first News Conference, George E. 
Herman from CBS Radio asked: “Some anti-American newspapers in Japan and 
other countries in the Far East, have been seizing upon these cases of 
radioactive poisoning to make some very strong anti-American propaganda. I 
wonder if you would care to give us some statement of policy of the Government 
of its responsibility towards the rest of the world in these tests?” Eisenhower 
responded: “It is quite clear that this time something must have happened that 
we have never experienced before, and must have surprised and astonished the 
scientists. Very properly, the United States has to take precautions that never 
                                                          
26 S. Ambrose, Eisenhower – Soldier and President (London, 1990). P. 365. 
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occurred to them before. Now, in the meantime, I know nothing about the 
details of this case. It is one of the things that Admiral Strauss is looking up, 
but it has been reported to me that the reports were far more serious than the 
actual results justified.”27 Both the question and the response were quite low-
key and respectful. A week later, through Admiral Strauss’ response, rather 
than any answer from the President, the story, and the public impact of Castle 
Bravo became rather bigger.  
 Eisenhower rather enjoyed news conferences as they enabled him to talk 
directly to members of the press and thus keep some control over the tone and 
content of messages emanating from the White House. However, on March 31, 
he was unable to control Strauss’ rather more vivid way of presenting 
information. Asked by Richard Wilson of Cowles Publications to describe the 
kind of damage and geographical scale of destruction the Castle Bravo blast 
inflicted, Strauss responded:  “Well, the nature of an H-bomb, Mr. Wilson, is 
that, in effect, it can be made to be as large as you wish, as large as the military 
requirement demands, that is to say, an H-bomb can be made as-large enough to 
take out a city. (A chorus of "What?") To take out a city, to destroy a city.” An 
unnamed journalist asked: “How big a city?” Strauss responded:  “Any city.” 
another question came from the room: “Any city, New York?” To which Strauss 
answered: “The metropolitan area, yes.”28  
Hagerty’s diary recorded that the President was not best pleased with 
Strauss’ answers. He wrote: 
                                                          
27 DDE: The President's News Conference, March 24, 1954. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. 
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10191. 
Accessed April 8, 2014.  
28 Excerpts from DDE News Conference, March 31 1954, participants: DDE, Lewis L. Strauss, 
Chairman of the AEC, and various news correspondents,  
www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/library/correspondence/eisenhower-dwight/corr_eisenhower_1954-
03-31.htm. Accessed April 8, 2014.  
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On way down in elevator President said: “Lewis, I wouldn’t have 
answered that one in that way. I would have said: ‘Wait for the 
movie’. But other than that, I thought you handled it very well.” 
Strauss considerably upset. Thought President was mad. 
Actually, President has habit of reviewing actions with people and 
expressing what he would have done in similar situation. Just 
like post-mortem on a bridge hand...29 
It is interesting to consider why Strauss was upset. He was a significant 
political player while at the AEC but not one of those scientist bureaucrats who 
became a close adviser to the President.  Strauss wanted to be seen as a 
newsworthy figure himself, not part of the supporting cast of experts around the 
president. As such, he was never a close confidant of Eisenhower. However, he 
played an important role in communicating just how powerful Castle Bravo had 
been. The message was not lost on the American public – not least as next day’s 
newspapers, including the Washington Post reproduced the text of Strauss’ H-
bomb test statement in full.30 
 If Eisenhower required any precedent to act to draw together the strands 
of missile development and intelligence gathering, he found that precedent in 
his inheritance from Truman. In the closing days of Truman’s presidency, just a 
week before Eisenhower’s inauguration, Truman had signed an NSC paper 
noting that the US’ ability to defend itself from atomic attack was extremely 
limited. 31 The traditional American defence based on geography no longer held 
weight, and the new president’s inheritance was weak development of new 
missile technology, and a perceived growing threat from the USSR based, to a 
large extent, on little credible intelligence detailing what was actually 
                                                          
29 R Ferrell ed., The Diary of James C Hagerty: Eisenhower in Mid-Course, 1954-1955 (Bloomington, 
IN, 1983), entry for March 31, 1954, pp. 36-37. 
30 Washington Post, April 1, 1954, Section A-10. 
31 The report referred to is NSC-140, which marked the establishment by Truman of the Special 
Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC -  
www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/aerial_intelligence/Chronology.pdf. 
Accessed April 8, 2014. 
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happening in bomber and rocket development within the borders of the Soviet 
empire.   
 
The TCP 
Jim Killian was the fulcrum of what became the Technological Capabilities 
Panel. In his memoir, he detailed an intense 11 month period from first 
conversations with the President through to the presentation of the TCP’s 
report Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack.32 This brought Killian into close 
contact with Eisenhower for the first time (although they had met when both 
had been college presidents), and also created the blueprint for organising 
NASA four years later.33 It succeeded because its operation and outputs chimed 
directly with Eisenhower’s style and preferences. The TCP provided a cold, 
impersonal analysis of the United States’ readiness to deal with a surprise 
attack from the Soviets.  It operated on almost military lines. It delivered its 
report when it said it would, and that report was not a litany of issues, but a 
tightly-worded study leading to actionable recommendations that would 
enhance offensive attack capabilities, homeland defence and perhaps most 
importantly, provide, for the first time, an effective intelligence gathering 
platform that would bring accuracy to US estimates of the Soviet threat, 
exemplified by its Bison bomber fleet and its initial ICBM deployment. 
Welzenbach captured the strength of Killian well, describing how he had gained 
Eisenhower’s respect as a “presiding officer who could draw people together and 
the constructive solutions to problems.”34 
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 Eisenhower’s call for a study it seems was sparked by a Pentagon report 
in 1953 that the Soviets had developed a new strategic bomber – the Bison - 
capable of attacking US cities with nuclear weapons. 35 He first met with the 
Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) Science Advisory Committee, of which 
Killian was a member, on March 27 1954. The ODM was the agency created in 
1950 to oversee defence procurement, production, wage and price controls. 
Killian was an obvious member, having been part of the wartime Office of 
Scientific Research and Development.36 By 1953, this had become the ODM’s 
Science Advisory Committee under the chairmanship of Lee DuBridge. 
Eisenhower discussed the danger of surprise attacks on the US, expressing 
concern that “modern weapons had made it easier for a hostile nation with a 
closed society to plan an attack in secrecy and thus gain an advantage denied to 
the nation with an open society.”37 He challenged the committee to find ways of 
reducing the probability of surprise attacks. The response was for the ODM to 
convene a taskforce, endorsed by Eisenhower, to look at three areas of national 
security: continental defense, striking power and intelligence. There were to be 
supporting studies in communications and technical manpower. The attraction 
of the taskforce panel for Eisenhower was that it was to be made up of 
Washington insiders, but not political insiders. All the investigators were 
scientists and engineers, and the steering committee, chaired by Killian, was a 
blend of scientists and/or entrepreneurs who had built up technology-focused 
businesses. They brought to the issues independence of thought and no agendas 
shaped either by Congress, the armed forces or the growing lobby of military-
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industrialists.  Donald Quarles, Assistant Secretary of Defense, also saw the 
benefit of an independent study, but found that, despite Eisenhower’s 
instruction, he still had to sell the idea to Wilson before the Panel members 
could get access to the people and information they needed. He made his case to 
Wilson stating: 
I have reviewed the proposed communication [to Eisenhower 
recommending a full study] and believe that it is well thought out 
by as competent a scientific group as could ever be assembled, 
who earnestly desire to be helpful in a matter of such great 
national importance.....The value of such a study appears to lie in 
the fresh, imaginative approach to the facts, and in the 
spotlighting of the important inferences to be drawn from them.38 
  
The early criticism of Eisenhower by Schlesinger and Neustadt was that he was 
a political naïf; the outsider who could not manage the political aspect of the 
Executive agenda effectively. But that is a reductionist reading of what it is to 
be a political player. Eisenhower was a Washington insider through-and-
through who had worked closely with Roosevelt through the war and had been 
closely associated with Truman through his roles as Chief of Staff of the Army 
and Supreme Commander of NATO under Truman’s Presidency. Earlier, in 
1927, he had worked for Pershing in Washington at the American Battle 
Monuments Commission. From 1929-33 he had been the Assistant Secretary of 
War’s Executive Officer. He had followed this as Chief Military Aide to General 
Douglas MacArthur when MacArthur was Chief of Staff of the Army. Having 
followed MacArthur to the Philippines, he returned to the US in 1939, again, 
briefly to Washington. After a number of staff roles in operational units, he 
finally joined the General Staff in Washington after the Pearl Harbor attack, 
spending seven months scenario planning before being reassigned to Europe. 
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Eisenhower had not entered the White House by a traditional congressional or 
gubernatorial route, but he was far more au fait with how Washington worked 
than many other Presidents before or after his time on office. And, of course, 
while working for Marshall in Washington, he had been fully aware of the work 
of the government’s Office of Scientific Research and Development. One should 
also acknowledge his ability to work with congressional Leaders such as Sam 
Rayburn in the House of Representatives and Lyndon Johnson and Richard 
Russell in the Senate. This ability was a pragmatic ‘strength’ of Eisenhower 
that is generally not appreciated by neo-conservative commentators on the 
presidency. For six of his eight years in office, Eisenhower worked with a 
politically opposed Congress. Yet he achieved most of his strategic aims, not 
least reshaping the armed forces through a series of budget cuts across his 
presidency.   
 There is a certain tongue-in-cheek humour in the way William Burrows 
presents Killian’s actions following the March 27 initial meeting.  
Eisenhower mandated his science brain trust to come up with 
solutions to the surprise-attack problem, and they, in turn, 
responded in the time-honored way of academicians the world 
over. They decided that Killian, then president of MIT, should 
form a subcommittee to study the feasibility of conducting a full-
blown study. The subcommittee reported less than three weeks 
later that it believed a major study was indeed justified. Killian 
duly received a letter from Eisenhower on July 26 urging him to 
head the study. He accepted and had his forces deployed by 
summer’s end.39 
 
However, once given Eisenhower’s mandate, there was nothing humorous about 
the TCP’s operation. The core of the Panel was a Steering Group headed by 
Killian and three project teams of investigators, amounting to around 40 people 
in total, and a military advisory committee. They represented the very best of 
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the US’ military, scientific and industrial communities. Over a period of around 
20 weeks, the three investigating teams convened over 300 meetings with every 
major US military defence and intelligence unit.40 With Eisenhower’s direct 
endorsement, they had access to all of the US’ intelligence and defence 
programmes and brought to their analysis an unpartisan, slightly aloof, 
educated and informed style of questioning. In essence, this was a management 
consultancy audit of US national defence and intelligence conducted by the best 
scientific minds in the country. As a consequence, the final report, pulled 
together by Killian’s Steering Committee in a 10 day period from February 4 to 
14 1955 had an air of cool, objective authority.41 
 
Context for Sputnik  
As a means of understanding Eisenhower’s muted reaction to Sputnik two and a 
half years later, two sections of the report are crucial. They are those focused on 
missile development and on intelligence. It is notable that Project Three, 
investigating the US’s intelligence capabilities was led by Polaroid President 
Edwin (Din) Land, who was to lead the camera development on the U-2 and 
Corona satellite, and Ed Purcell, who was later to be a crucial actor in defining 
the scope and operational role of NASA. Both were close to Killian but also 
fitted the role of useful scientist for Eisenhower. Unlike Strauss,  they put 
scientific service to their country before personal recognition – although that 
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may have been easier given that one headed one of America’s fastest growing 
corporations, while the other was already a Nobel Laureate.  
 Several recommendations of the TCP stand out. First, in relation to 
missiles, ‘General Recommendation 2’ stated that the National Security Council 
should: “formally recognize the present Air Force program for the development 
of an intercontinental ballistic missile as a nationally supported effort of highest 
priority.” Within this, there were two relevant specific recommendations:   
1. The development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (with 
about 5500 nautical mile range and megaton warhead) [should] 
continue to receive the very substantial support necessary to 
complete it at the earliest possible date. 2. There be developed a 
ballistic missile (with about 1500 nautical mile range and 
megaton warhead) for strategic bombardment; both land-basing 
and ship-basing should be considered.  
 
Then, in relation to intelligence, section C offers the rather coy 
statement:  
 
3. We must find ways to increase the number of hard facts upon 
which our intelligence estimates are based, to provide better 
strategic warning, to minimize surprise in the kind of attack, and 
to reduce the danger of gross overestimation or gross 
underestimation of the threat. To this end, we recommend 
adoption of a vigorous program for the extensive use, in many 
intelligence procedures, of the most advanced knowledge in 
science and technology.42  
 
That final statement on intelligence said very little, and this was entirely 
deliberate. The opening of the report had noted: “We obtain little significant 
information from classical covert operations inside Russia...We cannot hope to 
circumvent [Soviet security measures] in an easy way. But we can use the 
ultimate in science and technology to improve our intelligence take.”43  
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Eisenhower had met with Killian and Land on several occasions 
throughout the TCP’s data gathering and had instructed them to provide a 
separate ‘eyes only’ report on their intelligence recommendations that, for the 
sake of secrecy, would not be shared with the whole NSC. It was these reports 
that provided the basis for the development work on the U-2 and its 
reconnaissance capability. However, the TCP report in February 1955 did not 
provide an immediate ‘green light’ for a crash programme of missile 
development nor for work on the new spy plane. Eisenhower remained both 
innately cautious and conscious of process and policy. Therefore, his immediate 
action was to issue NSC Action 1355 which asked for comments on the TCP 
recommendations from all the departments and agencies involved in the NSC by 
June 6, 1955. These, in turn, were collated as NSC 5522 which was the subject 
of discussion at the 257th meeting of the National Security Council on August 4, 
1955. At this, the President broadly gave the go-ahead for speeding up ICBM 
and IRBM development, while just one line in the minutes of the meeting record 
support for the Killian approach to intelligence gathering. Of interest too for the 
development of future space policy was an action which stated: “C–8: Initiation 
of program for small earth satellite (being implemented under NSC 5520).”44 
 Zuoyue Wang, who has provided a comprehensive study of the 
President’s Science Advisory throughout the Cold War, noted that the TCP owed 
its success to the calibre of scientist prepared to join the Panel – especially as it 
was recruiting at the same time as the investigation into Robert Oppenheimer 
was underway. He suggests that moderate American scientists saw the panel as 
an opportunity for them to contribute to national security, maintain their 
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influence and, if possible, to ease the arms race.45 Now, through a formal review 
system, recognised and implemented throughout Executive circles in 
Washington for many years, Eisenhower had found a way to involve catalysts 
for change, who could cut through the stasis built on inter-service rivalry and 
add impetus to a slow-grinding and dysfunctional military and intelligence 
planning process.  
 
Strategy into action 
Following the TCP, the development of missiles was finally given the highest 
priority in September 1955, while work also stepped up rapidly on the 
development of long-range reconnaissance. Eisenhower adopted differing roles 
in missile development and in intelligence gathering through reconnaissance. 
With the U-2, follow-up A-12 (SR-71) and Corona programmes, Eisenhower used 
the CIA to deliver his needs. The result was a rapid solution that met the 
President’s national security requirements. For missiles, he largely left the 
Army, Air Force and Navy to compete with each other for resources, ideas and 
the expertise to turn those ideas into functioning missiles. The result was 
duplication, delay, and solutions that, by the time of Sputnik, had done nothing 
but raise the political temperature in Washington.  
The prevailing view among scholars is that Eisenhower placed the U-2 
and later Corona projects with the CIA as a means to avoid the slow-moving 
bureaucracy and infighting of the armed services.46 It has also been suggested, 
notably by William Burrows, that if a secret reconnaissance plane was shot 
down over the USSR, the political blow would be less severe if it was flown by a 
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civilian rather than a military pilot.47 However, there were two other prime 
reasons why Eisenhower wanted the projects to be under the CIA rather than 
the Air Force: secrecy and control. The fact that the TCP recommended giving 
highest priority to ICBM and IRBM development could not be hidden when the 
president chose to act on the panel’s recommendation. Elevating the 
development to the highest priority status demanded additional funding and 
that had to be approved by Congress. Congressional oversight was largely 
conducted in the public eye and thus, while the details of the missile 
development remained secret, the fact that development was happening was 
very public. This was both politically convenient domestically, and a powerful 
warning to the Kremlin. The development of a high level reconnaissance 
programme to source intelligence could never be so public. Eisenhower had to 
find a route for development that maintained strict secrecy, but also that kept 
the programme away from any potential Congressional meddling that might 
either compromise its effectiveness or alert the Soviets to its existence. The 
‘Aquatone’ project, as it became known, was hardly the most secret of secrets. 
Though CIA-led, it relied on support from the Air Force’s Research and 
Development Division. What made it different from other aircraft research 
projects was that it was achieved beyond Congressional scrutiny. While the CIA 
had to present its budget to Congress each year, significant portions of that 
budget were beyond the reach of Congressional oversight, being deemed for 
national security needs and therefore under the direct control of the Executive, 
in this case through Allen Dulles as head of the CIA.  
 Another reason why Eisenhower chose not to take on the armed services 
at this time in terms of missile development was that he still had an election to 
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fight. As a first term president, every action he took was scrutinised in terms of 
the upcoming 1956 election. Taking on the Pentagon meant also taking on the 
industry dependent on contracts to support a garrison economy and, in effect, 
risking the vote of every defence worker or worker in a defence related-
industry.48 While political lobbying was not quite the black art that it is today, 
the first duty of a member of Congress was to his or her local constituents. And 
if that constituency saw its economy fuelled by a successful defence plant or 
research establishment, said Congressman would work hard to defend that 
business and its workforce, prompted by well-funded interest groups lobbying on 
behalf of the defence industry. If he was serious about re-election, Eisenhower 
would certainly not plan to stir up hostility among his own political supporters. 
Meanwhile, taking on the defence industry also meant taking on the media that 
depended on defence industry for its income through advertising. And whether 
it was Collier’s magazine or Aviation Weekly, this was a section of the media 
that was widely read, widely respected and politically influential.49  
 The lobbyists, both from inside the Air Force’s missile research and 
development operation and their defence industry partners; and through the 
Congressmen they had already won over, had worked hard following the TCP to 
earn a face-to-face meeting with Eisenhower. Without this, it is unlikely that 
Eisenhower would have signed the Presidential Directive NSC1433 on 
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September 13, 1955 proclaiming ICBM development “a program of the highest 
priority.”50 However, the protagonists, notably the Air Force’s Assistant 
Secretary for Research and Development, Trevor Gardner, John Von Neumann, 
the AEC Commissioner who had previously chaired the Air Force’s strategic 
Missile Evaluation Committee, and Bernard Schriever, the Air Force General in 
charge of missile development had used the Killian Committee, and 
Congressional pressure to create an opportunity to address Eisenhower directly. 
Air Force officer Vincent T. Ford, who served on the staff of the Department of 
the Air Force, Office of the Special Assistant for Research and Development, had 
been a seconded member of the Killian Committee staff, and had remained 
working for the TCP once the report had been submitted. From his position 
within the committee reporting to David Beckler, the committee secretary, Ford 
was able to raise the issue of ICBM development with Assistant Secretary of 
State, Robert Bowie, chair of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council, 
and State’s representative on the NSC’s Policy Planning Council.51 It was thus, 
by a rather roundabout means that ICBM development, recommended for 
priority in the TCP report but still a backwater within an SAC-obsessed Air 
Force, reached the NSC in July 1955. 
 The Gardner, Von Neumann and Schriever presentation offers a perfect 
study of how to go about winning Eisenhower’s support. The presentation, as 
described in the eye-witness Ford’s unpublished manuscript: Twenty-four 
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Mnutes to Check-Mate52  both charmed and flattered Eisenhower and presented 
a solution that would deliver an ICBM before the Soviets did, and within the 
strict financial constraints decreed by the President. Gardner set the context: 
 
Mr President, gentlemen, the Air Force is privileged to have this 
opportunity to tell you of the work going on at Inglewood, 
California in the crash development of an intercontinental 
ballistic missile. The development of such a device as a vital part 
of our strategic force structure was not considered technically or 
economically feasible until Dr. von Neumann and his panel of 
scientific experts, using the data derived from the CASTLE tests 
in the Pacific, concluded that it was now possible to develop a 
nuclear warhead of high yield and low weight, and that delivery of 
such a warhead by intercontinental ballistic missile is now 
strategically and economically feasible. This conclusion by Dr. von 
Neumann and his colleagues is known as the “thermonuclear 
breakthrough.”53 
 
So, Gardner opened with due deference but quickly cut to the chase, building on 
what Eisenhower already knew from the Castle-Bravo test. But he approached 
the topic well, not presenting his finding as an Air Force achievement, but as 
the result of independent research by a group of independent scientists. The 
TCP had shown this to be Eisenhower’s proven preferred modus operandus. 
Presenting the Von Neumann committee as an echo of the TCP was an effective 
opening. Von Neumann added technical gravitas and reiterated one of Gardner’s 
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points: that the US needed to invest in missile technology immediately if it was 
to beat the Soviets. Gardner had referred to a nuclear armed ICBM as being “of 
overriding importance to the security and survival of the US” and Von 
Neumann re-stressed the importance of having this technology before the 
Soviets.54 Eisenhower was no believer in an arms race, but the essence of the 
New Look was to have just enough technology-based weaponry to hold a 
National Security advantage. Therefore, this was another telling point. But 
Schriever, like Eisenhower a West Point graduate, cemented the Air Force’s 
case. His speech was tailored to Eisenhower’s needs. It implied that the Air 
Force was in close alignment behind the ICBM programme (it was not!) with the 
inference that there would be a clear path for successful development. It 
presented a very business-like management structure drawing on close 
collaboration between the Air Force and technical experts – the kind of alliance 
Eisenhower had envisaged in his 1946 Chief of Staff memorandum. It advocated 
modern development methods to deliver the right solution on time. Most of all, 
it emphasised cost-consciousness, not the wastefulness and duplication of cost 
and effort the President was used to from the armed forces. As such, it was a 
tour de force, and was an influential factor in Eisenhower’s decision not to 
appoint a missile czar in 1955.  
 
Bissell, the CIA and reconnaissance 
Those elements of Eisenhower’s strategy that were most successfully 
implemented tended to be the ones led by people who fitted the mould of an 
Eisenhower-esque operational officer. Richard Bissell, in 1954 the Special 
Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence, met that requirement perfectly. 
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As part of ‘the Georgetown Set’ of Washington insiders, Bissell, an economist by 
training, was already well-known in executive circles. According to his CIA 
profile, he earned a strong reputation as an effective planner and project 
manager during World War 2 at the Shipping Adjustment Board in Washington. 
His “economic background, childhood fascination with memorizing train 
timetables, and superb organizational skills earned him a reputation as ‘the 
American merchant shipping planner’.”55 After the war, he taught at MIT, 
which brought him into contact with Killian who recruited him from Yale, and 
in 1948, he returned to Government service to help draft and implement the 
Marshall Plan. First, Bissell served as Executive Secretary to Averell Harriman 
on the President’s Committee on Foreign Aid, and then as Assistant 
Administrator to Paul Hoffman, the Administrator of the Economic Cooperation 
Administration which was the Executive agency charged with delivering the 
Marshall Plan. However, there is no particular evidence to suggest that Bissell 
and Marshall engaged at anything more than a professional level and, indeed, 
much of Bissell’s work for the ECA took place after Marshall’s retirement from 
the State Department. Bissell was, however, Deputy Administrator and 
ultimately Administrator of the ECA while Eisenhower was in Paris setting up 
NATO. Each was aware of the activities of the other. Indeed, in an oral history 
interview, Bissell noted that he had met Eisenhower “before the [1952 
presidential election] campaign”56.  
 In relation to his work on the U-2, its successor the A-12 and the CIA 
elements of the Corona Reconnaissance satellite, Killian recorded that: “Bissell 
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proved to be a brilliant project engineer.”57 That was most certainly unexpected 
since he had spent his entire career as an economics expert. But his capacity to 
learn and apply new skills made him an invaluable support in turning 
Eisenhower’s agreed strategy into practice. Indeed, this is a point of comparison 
and similarity with Eisenhower. Both he and Bissell were auto-didacts, able to 
assess and build understanding of new fields with considerable speed. As with 
Killian, Bissell met regularly with Eisenhower and developed a strong 
admiration for the president. “Eisenhower was a man for whom I shared the 
national admiration. I came to know him a bit more (I'd known him before the 
campaign) in the Presidency and saw him on a good many occasions. I liked and 
admired a number of men in the Eisenhower administration, especially during 
its later years.”58 While it is not to say that the admiration was not reciprocated, 
Eisenhower’s abiding obsession with secrecy around matters of National 
Security mean that Bissell does not appear in his diaries, nor in his memoir of 
his first term in office, Mandate for Change and the only official records of his 
meetings with the president across the four years from the first work on the U-2 
to the sign-off decision on the Corona satellite are General Goodpaster’s 
memorandum for the record.59 Yet in the U-2 to Corona period, Bissell was 
absolutely vital to US reconnaissance efforts – and at least one intervention 
from Eisenhower on his behalf ensured that the CIA man was able to turn the 
president’s strategic intent into action that gave the US a significant 
intelligence advantage over the Soviets and ensured Eisenhower knew the full 
picture of Soviet missile and bomber capability in the wake of the Sputnik 
launches.  
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 Much of the key to Bissell’s successful service to the president came from 
continuity. In leading the Intelligence Study as part of the Killian Surprise 
Attack Panel, Polaroid’s Din Land was supported by a team of six, including Jim 
Baker, the foremost designer of aerial lenses, Ed Purcell, who would later serve 
as a key PSAC member, and John Tukey who would also become a long-serving 
PSAC member. Land and Baker in particular, remained active in the 
reconnaissance developments post-TCP, with Baker designing the cameras and 
lenses for the U-2 and later A-12. The rest of the prime team involved in the 
design of the U-2 and its testing was also far smaller than would have been 
acceptable under any Air Force project, ensuring speed, efficiency and the 
opportunity for radical design throughout the process. This was all enabled by 
what might be seen as an unusual demand from Eisenhower at the outset that 
the development be “handled in an unconventional way so that it would not 
become entangled in the bureaucracy of the Defense Department or troubled by 
rivalries among the services.”60 The demand might be unusual as Eisenhower 
was a product of the armed services but was here instructing that development 
should be kept out of their reach. Yet this clearly reflects two aspects of 
Eisenhower. First, his demand for secrecy in all matters of national security, 
and second, his pragmatism when it came to aiding projects of vital importance 
to national security. There is no mention of Eisenhower’s U-2 ‘demand’ in any 
official White House or NSC papers, and the only corroboration comes in 
Bissell’s memoir, which repeats Killian’s assertion, as does Burrows in Deep 
Black.61   
 The most important issues that the U-2 team faced were funding for the 
most expensive elements – in this case a brand-new airframe; and a secure 
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location where all testing could take place beyond the prying eyes not simply of 
the public, but of a potentially jealous Air Force as well. As ever, Eisenhower 
was prepared to get involved where his intervention was necessary, but his 
preferred way of working was to have subordinates approach him with a 
solution rather than a problem. The airframe funding issue was raised by 
Trevor Gardner, the Air Force Assistant Secretary for Research and 
Development as early as November 1954. The Air Force was not exactly 
excluded from the U-2 project, but was confined to a supporting role, not leading 
on any aspect of the project. In that meeting, discussion turned to who would 
pay for a new airframe, the cost of which would run to tens of millions of dollars. 
In his memoir, the only written recollection of the event, Bissell recalled: 
I was sitting near the middle of the table. As I turned to my right, 
everyone was looking in my direction. As I turned to the left, 
everyone on my left was looking in my direction as well. I got the 
point pretty quickly and said I would recommend to Dulles that 
funding for the project be provided from the CIA’s contingency 
reserve, a reserve appropriated and voted on by Congress. The 
rules for its use were that withdrawals had to be authorized by 
the director of the budget and approved by the president on the 
recommendation of the director of central intelligence.62 
 
It was a neat solution and an example of hiding in plain sight that would 
become a feature of Eisenhower’s emerging scientific reconnaissance 
programme. While directly mandated by the President, it had tacit 
Congressional support and a cut-out via the CIA that allowed the President an 
element of deniability (a feature of Greenstein’s ‘Hidden Hand’ assessment) 
should anything go wrong.  
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 Eisenhower also intervened directly in securing a development base for 
the radical new spy plane. Having scouted out possible secure sites, Bissell 
recollected:  
When I returned to Washington, I recommended to Eisenhower 
that he add a piece of adjacent land, including Groom Lake [the 
dry bed lake airstrip vital for U-2 test flying] to the Nevada test 
site of the Atomic Energy Commission. The commission’s work 
was already highly classified, and enlarging the site area would 
be the easiest way to prohibit overflights of the new U-2 base 
without arousing attention from outsiders. Eisenhower approved 
the proposal.63 
 
Aside from giving a clear instruction to implement the recommendations of the 
intelligence work stream of the TCP, an instruction to use unconventional 
development means to maintain security, approving the funding via the CIA 
and enlarging an AEC site to accommodate flight testing, Eisenhower stayed 
out of the specific development work. Such operational work was not in his area 
of expertise nor would he add value by getting involved. Inevitably, this would 
only slow the process. He empowered Bissell to operationally manage the 
development on the understanding that the Washington-insider Bissell would 
cut through red tape and find ways to enable the technological developments in 
a timely and cost-effective manner. Equally, Bissell, not a scientist nor engineer, 
empowered Lockheed’s Kelly Johnson to deliver a radically different aircraft, 
and figures such as Land, Baker and Art Lundhal to develop the tools of photo- 
intelligence. The fact that so much CIA material on the development of the U-2 
remains classified today is testament to the success of the project. Indeed, as of 
2014, the U-2 remains in service with the US Air Force.  Approval for the initial 
development project was given on December 1, 1954. The plane flew for the first 
time on August 8 1955, and the first Soviet over-flight took place on July 4, 
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1956.64 Eisenhower kept a close rein on the U-2, personally signing off all 
development stages and, more crucially, signing off each mission. However, he 
gave his subordinates the freedom to create the best possible intelligence-
gatherer in the best possible way. Bissell’s explanation of the development 
process is an apt description for why the project would not have worked under 
Air Force control and, indeed, one can extrapolate from it much of the reasoning 
for the delays and duplications that bedevilled the parallel ICBM/IRBM 
development.  
Lockheed had by then become personified by [Kelly] Johnson and 
could be trusted not to abuse the government’s interest. The CIA, 
as the procuring organization, was willing to delegate major 
authority to him and to Lockheed. Thus he and I were able to cut 
through layers of red tape and reporting procedures that would 
have slowed the project down. We kept our regular monthly 
progress reports to about five pages, for example; had the same 
program been developed for the air force, it would have required 
the preparation of a document one inch thick. If the project officer 
for an air force plane decided a change was required, he had to 
check with Wright Field, a couple of different laboratories, the 
budget office, the regulations office and so forth – that was one 
reason it was difficult to receive prompt, clear answers that would 
not be subject to repeated reviews.  
  
About two years after the U-2 was up and flying, the officer in 
charge of procurement for the air force...[inquired] into the CIA’s 
unique ability to support the rapid development and deployment 
of an aircraft system....[he] expressed surprise the agency used 
the same procurement office for wings as it did for the engines. 
The air force would never do that.65  
 
Bissell’s memoir provides extensive detail on the development of the U-2 and its 
success from 1956 to 1960 in overflying the Soviet Union and its satellite 
countries and providing intelligence that satisfied the president that so much of 
the Soviet rhetoric about its growing nuclear missile and bomber fleet threat 
was merely that: rhetoric. It was always intended by the TCP that the U-2 
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would be the first in a series of scientific intelligence gathering options and 
indeed, the A-12 supersonic jet project was signed off by Bissell, acting for 
Eisenhower, on January 30, 1960.66 By this time though, Bissell’s team were 
already working on Corona – another example of hiding in plain sight. 
 Of course, in discussing these developments, it is necessary to consider 
the veracity of Bissell’s memoir as a basis for historic research. Undoubtedly, it 
has limitations. It was written over 30 years after the event and long after 
Bissell’s reputation had been severely damaged by his connection to the failed 
CIA overthrow attempt of the Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, known universally 
now as the Bay of Pigs incident. Therefore, there is a sense that the projects in 
Bissell’s career that went well are presented in the memoir in the most positive 
light. Yet it is used here to provide insight into conversations that are not 
documented elsewhere or only in passing, for instance, through Goodpaster’s 
memorandum of the record. The purpose it serves here is to demonstrate that 
Eisenhower made the key decisions around how the U-2 would be developed and 
which agency would take responsibility. Bissell’s credibility on this issue has not 
been challenged and indeed, his memoir has been cited in many other works 
from the orthodoxy, such as Dickson’s Sputnik, the Shock of the Century, to 
recent revisionist biography including Smith’s Eisenhower in War and Peace.    
 
Satellite development 
Following the TCP report, the Air Force announced in March 1955 that it was to 
develop a reconnaissance satellite. In fact, the TCP report echoed a RAND 
study, co-sponsored by the CIA from 1954 which recommended that the Air 
Force should work towards “at the earliest possible date completion and use of 
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an efficient satellite reconnaissance vehicle as a matter of vital strategic 
interest to the United States.”67 This study had dovetailed with the newly-
established Air Force Research and Development Command’s initiation of 
project 409-40, later designated WS117-L. However, this began to gain 
considerable coverage in the aviation media since its existence was completely 
unclassified. For someone with a natural urge towards  secrecy, that was 
entirely unacceptable to Eisenhower. In March 1958, as development on the 
Corona satellite reconnaissance system neared completion, Land prompted 
Eisenhower to turn what was ostensibly a white programme black. Eisenhower 
was a master of removing such discussions from the formal record, but a 
handwritten note from his Staff Secretary, Goodpaster, records the President 
asking for Bissell, Allen Dulles, Killian, Secretary of Defense McElroy, his 
assistant Quarles and U-2 designer Kelly Johnson to meet in the Oval Office to 
discuss Corona.68 According to Bissell, the result of the meeting was that the 
satellite element of the project should be turned over to the same CIA group, 
supported by the Air Force, responsible for the U-2.69 Such was the secrecy 
attached to this project, especially as it came just six months after the launch of 
Sputnik 1, and less than three months after the launch of the first American 
scientific satellite, that it was said by Bissell that Eisenhower’s final approval 
was handwritten on the back of an envelope.70 That envelope has not survived, 
but the ever-efficient Goodpaster drafted a Memorandum for Record noting that 
Corona had been approved.71 In fact, it was Goodpaster’s efficiency and 
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occasional enigmatic diary entries from Kistakowsky, by then Chairman of 
PSAC and the President’s Special Adviser on Science that provided what little 
White House paper trail exists to track Corona’s progress. Eisenhower is notable 
by his absence from this record. An entry from Kistiakowsky in his diary dated 
July 16, 1959 for instance stated that following the regular NSC meeting: 
“Bissell asked for a meeting with the President at 10am Monday regarding 
CORONA. He asked Killian and I to attend.”72 This paragraph was cut from the 
published diaries in the mid-70s, perhaps reflecting the secrecy that still 
attended the project.73 The following Monday’s entry contained an equally 
enigmatic sentence – now not mentioning CORONA at all. “With the President, 
Bissell, Killian and McElroy for an hour. Classified project approved, although 
the President expressed concern about high costs in immediate future.”74 This 
project was the extension of Corona through the summer of 1960 as detailed in 
Bissell’s outline, sent to Goodpaster, as the link with Eisenhower, on July 7 
1959. The extension was for four more Corona flights “for the purpose of 
obtaining precise geodetic fixes and for the extension of existing datum planes 
throughout the Soviet Union.”75  It is rather frustrating to historians that the 
estimated cost of this extension to Corona is redacted in the declassified 
document.  
Corona was not an immediate success in the mould of the U-2. However, 
Defense Secretary Gates, who succeeded McElroy, noted the following in his 
‘Summary of Progress on the Military Space Projects during June, July and 
August 1960’.  
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Discoverer XIII and XIV were launched into polar orbit on the 10th 
and 18th of August respectively. After orbiting the earth for over 
26 hours, both capsules were recovered. DISCOVERER XIII was 
recovered from the sea and DISCOVERER XIV was snatched 
from the air by an Air Force C-119. These events marked the first 
time in history man-made objects, which had been in orbit around 
the earth, were returned and recovered.76  
 
There is no little irony that Corona’s first successful mission, hiding in 
plain sight as ‘Discoverer’, during which the booster launched successfully, the 
satellite achieved orbit, the cameras worked and ejected their film payload 
properly and that payload was recovered successfully occurred as shot-down U-2 
pilot Francis Gary Powers was being tried in Moscow. The output of that 
mission alone covered more than one million square miles of Soviet territory – 
according to Bissell: “more coverage than all the pictures taken of that country 
during the entire U-2 program.”  
 Eisenhower had played a powerful role in the development of US 
reconnaissance capability. And contrary to the critical view of his passivity in 
office, those who worked directly with him soon gained respect for his critical 
and sometimes reflective means of information gathering and processing. “I 
always found Eisenhower business-like and even tempered,” wrote Bissell. “He 
was well-informed, wanting to know everything about the question before him, 
and an intent and intelligent listener. I never saw him exhibit anger in any 
discussion of policy.”77 To some extent, Bissell was lucky. Eisenhower could get 
angry and cantankerous. But evidence suggests that this was when 
subordinates brought him problems rather than recommendations or better 
still, solutions to issues. In swiftly advancing the US’ reconnaissance capability, 
he scored a significant success and was well served by a line of excellent 
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operators from Killian through Bissell to Johnson, Land and Baker who applied 
rare skills to uncommon problems with stunning results.  
When it came to the parallel ICBM/IRBM development, the US was 
successful, but not with the speed or clarity of purpose displayed in the U-2/A-
12/Corona programmes. As discussed before, the issue was quite simply that 
Eisenhower was not, in the middle of his first term, prepared to challenge the 
established practices of the Pentagon – even though those practices were 
bywords for delay and dysfunction. In Mandate for Change, Eisenhower wrote: 
It might have been best, had it been feasible, to remove the whole 
missile program from the hands of the regular military services 
and to establish another “Manhattan Project” similar to that 
through which the atomic bomb was developed during World War 
2. This scheme would have had the advantage of concentrating 
the best scientific minds on one set of programs and eliminating 
duplication and rivalry among the various service activities. 
However, by the time the urgency of the program became 
apparent, each of the services had already organized and was 
using experimental teams of scientists and engineers for missile 
development. To tear up all of these organizations and to 
transplant the scientist, engineers and officers already engaged in 
the business seemed to me, to Secretary Wilson and to my 
military-scientific advisers to promise more delay than would 
continuation of existing procedures.78 
 
Eisenhower’s attempt at simplification and streamlining was carried on 
the back of Charles Wilson, or ‘Engine Charlie’ as the former president of 
General Motors and now Secretary of Defense was known. The 
Wilson/Eisenhower Reorganization Plan Number 6 of 1953 made some changes 
at the highest levels of the armed forces, but further efforts at unifying the 
services further were largely superficial and effectively stymied in Congress 
after November 1954 when the Democrats wrested control from the 
Republicans.  Laying down the law on missile development would provoke 
battles with the services and, potentially with Congressmen intent on 
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benefitting from the military-industrial pork barrel. It was a battle the 
Executive was not sufficiently strong to face, and saw no need to face while the 
US nuclear deterrent could be managed effectively by Strategic Air Command. 
Yet even knowing the power of Strategic Air Command at the time, there is an 
underlying sense of self-justification in the president’s explanation as to why he 
did not press harder for a unified approach to missile development.  
  
Conclusion 
Eisenhower was bound by duty and a desire to serve the US to the best of his 
abilities. He expected that same sense in others and could be cold, dismissive 
and cantankerous when he did not see it demonstrated. In character, he was a 
planner: prepared to plan every possible scenario, even though he knew that in 
the field, be that field political or military, his plans were never likely to be 
delivered as they had been imagined on paper. As a leader, he was not a battle 
general. Until the Louisiana Manoeuvres, his main experience had been as a 
staff support officer, and even in those mock battles, his operational role was 
subsequently exaggerated by admirers. Even when Supreme Commander, his 
key achievements were getting the right people in the field at the right time 
with the right logistical support to achieve victory.  
 As president, he believed that it was not his role to get minutely involved 
in the deep detail of running the country. He set the direction, surrounded 
himself with the people he trusted to deliver on his ambition and got involved in 
issues directly only when those in his command could not deliver his intent. He 
had inherited a country at war, and was perhaps the best prepared White House 
incumbent to have to deal with the consequences of war. He did so 
pragmatically, not by rolling back communism but by finessing a ceasefire and 
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putting energy behind peace talks that were already underway. Of course, he 
also made quite clear the threat of heavy and sustained bombing of North Korea 
if it didn’t help the peace talks to an acceptable conclusion! In ‘waging peace’ for 
the ensuing eight years, he adopted a rational, realist stance that enabled the 
avoidance of war through an overt build-up of a force capable of delivering 
unthinkable retribution on the Soviets via the principle of massive retaliation. It 
was a very logical reliance on a military threat solution coupled with a high 
personal sense of duty in never having to turn to such massive retaliation.  
 According to his vice president, Richard Nixon: “When it came to making 
a final decision, he was the coldest, most unemotional and analytical man in the 
world.”79 That is a reasonable assessment of Eisenhower, and substantially 
different from Neustadt’s assessment which said: 
When he could not work through a set procedure, or when 
channels failed him, or when his associates quarrelled openly, he 
grew either disheartened or enraged.80 
 
The Eisenhower who adopted the New Look Defence policy did not appear 
disheartened even after months of fractious negotiation with the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff.81 In fact, the current state of the historiography paints a rather more 
pragmatic, even ambitious figure. In 2013, Robert Jervis said:  
Eisenhower came in at a very difficult period. The danger of war 
was seen as very high. The American economy was seen as 
unstable with danger of recession and inflation. And the US was 
facing situations that were literally unprecedented.82   
 
As the output from that conference and the latest scholarly interpretation 
showed, Eisenhower succeeded in spite of these difficulties. He made difficult 
but pragmatic decisions. He welcomed expert insight and was prepared to act on 
it, and he found original and innovative means to deliver the tools necessary for 
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continuing national security without submitting to demands for ever more 
funding for ever more military projects. In the same session as Jervis, Evan 
Thomas remarked:  
 
Eisenhower did struggle with his own military. He was frustrated 
by it, but he did cut it by 20 per cent. And however painful it was 
for him, it would have been a lot worse had liberal democrats been 
in control.83   
 
Neustadt is wrong in his assessment of Eisenhower, and in this instance, 
even the latest revisions to Eisenhower’s reputation fail to capture the guile and 
elegance he demonstrated in turning some of the most vital recommendations of 
the TCP into action.  By the end of 1955, he had a policy in place to develop 
intercontinental missiles as a highest priority and was close to the launch of the 
first effective secret reconnaissance of the Soviet Union in the history of the US. 
He had initiated the basic tools necessary for national security and to enable 
feasible space exploration. In 1954-55, Eisenhower took decisions that made far 
greater change in intelligence gathering than the US had ever seen before or 
arguably since. His direct intervention ensured Bissell and his U-2 team could 
bypass the bureaucracy of the Air Force and put a spy in the sky over the Soviet 
Union more than a year before the launch of Sputnik. The flights of the U-2 
provided detailed evidence that there was no bomber gap, and would later refute 
the Democrats’ continued claim that there was a missile gap. His New Look 
Defence policy put emphasis on the development of ICBMs and IRBMs based on 
the knowledge that the nuclear deterrent could be carried effectively by the 
Strategic Air Command for the remainder of the 1950s, giving time for each of 
the services to develop missile systems within the constraint of overall falling 
defence budgets. The Castle Bravo nuclear test had proven the US had the 
means to create much smaller, more powerful nuclear devices that could be 
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carried, in the short term, by the B-52 bomber, and would not require the kind 
of huge rocket booster envisaged by either RAND or Von Braun at the end of the 
1940s.  Having brought together a strong, focused and impartial team through 
the TCP, he was confident that the United States was on course to effectively 
deliver his New Look policy.  
Yet his actions do not meet the super-human standards of a true ‘Hidden 
Hand’ president as envisaged by Greenstein. Refusing to take a tougher stand 
on missile development was a failing and would cost Eisenhower in terms of 
bipartisan political and, albeit briefly, public support in 1957. However, by the 
time of the launch of Sputnik, the ICBMs and IRBMs he authorised after the 
TCP report were close to readiness and the successful series of U-2 Soviet over 
flights proved that Soviet bomber and missile developments presented no 
immediate threat to the United States. The problem was, once Sputnik 1 was 
launched, he was not prepared to tell the American people why and how he 
knew it posed no threat. The orthodoxy pounced on that failure to communicate 
immediately after Sputnik – and there is a case for criticism there. But it is 
clear that the interpretation of NASA (and the US space programme) as a direct 
reaction to Sputnik is quite simply wrong. For Murray and Bly Cox to say: 
NASA was cobbled together by Congress and President 
Eisenhower. NASA was a reaction to the panic caused by the 
Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik 1 in October of 1957…To 
President Eisenhower, this [panic] was all a lot of hysterical 
poppycock; but he also decided that he couldn’t ignore it. The 
United States was going to have a space program whether or not 
he wanted it.84   
 
is no longer credible. Eisenhower had the basis of a pro-active space policy two 
years before Sputnik was launched. 
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Chapter 3: The Sputnik Autumn 
Despite the 1980s being the decade of Eisenhower revisionism, Murray and Bly 
Cox, writing in 1989, still described NASA in terms of a “reaction to the panic 
caused by…Sputnik 1.”1 They added:  
The public furor [sic] surrounding these events [the successful 
launches of Sputnik 1 and Sputnik 2] had been immense…In their 
humiliation, Americans lashed out at a variety of targets – the 
educational system, the military, Eisenhower’s golf, American 
consumerism.”2 
 
This interpretation has been accepted as an objective truth, and 
continues to project Eisenhower as weak and passive in the face of Soviet 
success, acting only as a response to the pressures inflicted by the 
American public. In the 2007 text book, America, a Narrative History, 
Tindall and Shi wrote: 
On October 4th 1957 the Soviets launched the first satellite called 
Sputnik. Americans, until then complacent about their technical 
superiority, panicked…The Soviet success with Sputnik led to 
efforts in the United States to increase defense spending, offer 
NATO allies intermediate-range-ballistic missiles pending 
development of long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMS), set up a new agency to co-ordinate space efforts and 
establish a crash program in scientific education and military 
research.3 
 
The observation that ‘Americans panicked’ is an element of received wisdom 
that features in the arguments of many scholars who present the orthodox 
interpretation of events in the autumn of 1957 and it is often driven by noting 
the newspaper headlines and television sound bites in the immediate aftermath 
of Sputnik 1. Matthew Brzezinski, in Red Moon Rising for instance, painted an 
evocative picture.  
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The warning [of impending Soviet superiority] was echoed by 
thousands of media outlets, big and small, conservative and 
liberal, in radio and television, magazines and newspapers…. 
A strange sense of disconnection gripped the public discourse. The 
more the Administration told America not to worry, the louder the 
media beat the doomsday drums.4 
 
Even among those most associated with Eisenhower scholarship in recent years 
such as Launius, the interpretation of public hysteria greeting Sputnik and 
Eisenhower only moving forward on space issues reluctantly under outside 
pressure still holds sway. 
 
Eisenhower had refused to fall prey to public hysteria over the 
Sputnik launches in 1957, and set in place, only with some 
reluctance, NASA as an independent Executive branch agency in 
1958… 
ln the crisis over Sputnik, lke had felt intense pressure  from  an  
alliance  of diverse  interests to establish a cabinet-level  federal  
entity, something he always thought unnecessarily expensive, and 
once  created,  almost  impossible  to  dismantle, to carry out a 
visible  program  of space exploration.5 
 This chapter revisits the Sputnik autumn, to reassess the evidence of what 
actually happened by focusing on two elements that remain cornerstones to the 
orthodox approach to the impact of the ‘Sputnik Crisis’, namely the reaction of 
the media and other interested actors to the Soviet launch and Eisenhower’s 
actions both in the immediate aftermath of the first Sputnik launch and also in 
the period from his first News Conference following the event on October 9 1957 
to the day of his stroke on November 25 1957.  
First, this chapter places the Sputnik launch in the context of the 
International Geophysical Year. Next, it discusses the immediate impact of 
Sputnik in terms of the media reaction and those who sought to use the media 
to further their own aims. Following this, it reviews Eisenhower’s News 
Conference to assess what impact this had on the nation – primarily through 
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the pages of the press. It will then argue that far from being cowed by the Soviet 
success and the reaction of his political opponents to it, Eisenhower actually 
went on the offensive to the extent that by November 14, less than two weeks 
after the launch of Sputnik 2, he had regained the initiative with the media and, 
more so, had taken the opportunity to drive forward his own national security 
agenda as discussed in the previous chapter. There is another clear distinction 
to be drawn that is hardly discussed in the mainstream Sputnik discourse. That 
is, the very distinct difference between the American response to Sputnik 1 and 
Sputnik 2. Yet these are too often conflated into a single narrative.6 
Eisenhower’s reaction was logical. Following the launch of Sputnik 1, there was 
no clear and present danger to the US, and therefore no need for any heightened 
response. However, this lack of a visible response created a vacuum and a 
damaging sense of passivity, even if this was not actually the case. The launch 
of Sputnik 2 was an opportunity to correct the mis-perception – and this time 
Eisenhower’s actions were more obvious – and also more clearly attuned to the 
public mood. However, the public and the media shaping its opinion had already 
begun to move on by that time. Sputnik 2 did not inspire fear and awe and the 
reaction to it was very different from what occurred the month before.  
The context for Sputnik  
The International Geophysical Year (IGY) was a misnomer. A successor to the 
two previous International Polar Years (1882 and 1932) it was proposed by the 
American International Council of Scientific Unions in 1952. The plan was to 
study the whole earth over the next period of maximum solar activity – deemed 
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to be not a year, but the 18 months from the start of 1957 to the middle of 1958. 
Given that this was a whole-earth study, and also included projects observing 
and measuring activity in the upper atmosphere, the study became a 
Geophysical rather than Polar year, and its international element was cemented 
in 1953  when 64 countries signed up to studies within the umbrella 
programme. Led by James S Lay, the NSC Planning Board, at the request of the 
Department of Defense, produced NSC 5520 the "Draft Statement of Policy on a 
U.S. Scientific Satellite Program"7 which recommended the creation of a 
scientific satellite programme as part of the International Geophysical Year as 
well as the development of satellites for reconnaissance purposes. Largely, this 
was an outcome from the TCP which wrapped the scientific satellite project into 
the overall national security project. Based on this report, the National Security 
Council approved the IGY small scientific satellites programme on May 26, 
1955.8 However, it was not until July 28 that Eisenhower’s Press Secretary, 
James Hagerty, made the news public in a briefing to reporters at the White 
House. The formal statement was dated July 29, since the information could not 
be made public until it had been shared with Marcel Nicolet, the Secretary of 
the Brussels-based Comité Spéciale de l’Année Géophysique Internationale.9 
Hagerty emphasised that the satellite programme was intended to be the U.S. 
contribution to the IGY and that the scientific data drawn from the study was to 
benefit scientists of all nations.10  
                                                          
7 Sourced from http://www.marshall.org/article.php?id=805 26. Accessed October 12,  2012. 
8 JS Lay, ‘National Security Council Report, Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security 
Council on US Scientific Satellite Program’, Washington, May 20, 1955, Special Assistant for National 
Security Affairs Records, DDE Library. 
9 Press release: ‘Plans for Construction of Earth Satellite Vehicle Announced’, July 29, 1955, Box 624, 
Official File, DDE Records as President, DDE Library.  
10 Press Release: ‘Statement by White House Press Secretary, James C. Hagerty on earth-circling 
satellites as part of IGY program’, July 29, 1955, Box 624, Official File, DDE Records as President, DDE 
Library. 
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Meanwhile in Moscow, the USSR had responded to the call for IGY 
projects with its own declaration that it intended to put a satellite into orbit 
during this special period of scientific study. According to his biographer, James 
Harford, the Chief Designer of the Soviet rocket programme, S. P. Korolev, had 
first proposed using the R7 rocket launcher to place a satellite in orbit to the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party towards the end of 1953.11 Soon 
after Hagerty’s announcement of the US intent to develop a US scientific 
satellite as part of the nation’s IGY initiative, the Chairman of the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences Commission on Interplanetary Communications, Leonid 
Sedov, seemed to confirm the Soviet commitment when he told a group visiting 
the Soviet Embassy during the Sixth Congress of the International 
Astronautical Federation meeting in Copenhagen: “From a technical point of 
view, it is possible to create a satellite...The realization of the Soviet project can 
be expected in the comparatively near future.”12 Harford suspected that Sedov 
was himself speculating since the Soviet Council of Ministers did not issue a 
decree authorising the development of any IGY satellite until January 1956.13 
There was more than a certain irony in the fact that US media had been 
predicting a satellite launch since 1955 when the US Vanguard programme was 
announced. In fact, Blakeslee at the Associated Press gave a very accurate 
prediction of the likelihood of a satellite in 1957 in a syndicated article that was 
run by, among many other newspapers, The Courier News, in Blytheville 
Arkansas right at the start of 1957. The paper reported: 
More strides in conquest of space coming in 1957 
                                                          
11 Harford, Korolev p. 123. 
12 Information sourced from International Astronautical Federation http://67-20-84-
59.hostmonster.com/index.html?title=IAC1955. Accessed on 10 June 2014. The sixth International 
Astronautical Congress was held in Copenhagen and on August 2
nd
, news reached the participants of 
the US satellite announcement. Sedov responded the same day in a news conference held at the 
Soviet Embassy.  
13 Harford, Korolev, p. 126. 
127 
 
 
With roaring rockets, man begins his conquest of space in 1957. 
 
Scientists will continue test-firing the rockets designed to bang a 
little artificial moon into outer space. Whizzing around the earth 
every 90 minutes, it will be the first man-made messenger 
exploring the puzzles and hazards of our next great frontier – 
space travel. 
 
The first little ‘moon’, about the size of a basketball, may even be 
launched within the next 12 months. You may even be able to see 
it as a faint, fast-moving dot of light low in the sky at dusk or 
morning.14 
 
As a prediction, it was startlingly accurate. But it made one crucial flawed 
assumption. That was that the ‘artificial moon’ would be American. The article 
went on to talk about the wide US efforts in the IGY, and made no mention of 
the Soviets at all. By May, Blakeslee had changed his tune and wrote: 
 
But the Russians could do it first. For the Russians are also 
planning to shoot man-made moons around the earth…No-one 
outside Russia knows if they’re ahead of us, no single detail has 
been announced of their progress.15 
  
However, stories reflecting US IGY projects appeared in the papers almost 
every day in 1957, and by the end of August, US readers had been led to 
understand that their first satellite launch was just months away. Yet the 
Soviets had been quite open about their plans to launch a satellite, and after 
Vladimir Kotelnikov of the USSR Academy of Sciences presented a paper at a 
conference in Colorado on August 27 stating that the Soviet satellites were 
ready for launch, the US press picked up the story and ran it across the 
newspapers of America.16 As an example, on August 31, The Corsicana Daily 
Sun in the Texas heartland ran a down-page, page 1 article headlined: “Manned 
Satellites Hinted by Moscow”. The International News Service syndicated piece 
stated that in the wake of Kotelnikov’s presentation, Radio Moscow had hinted 
that the Soviet Union planned, as part of their IGY effort, to send much heavier 
satellites into space than their US counterparts, satellites that “might be hurled 
                                                          
14 AL Blakeslee, Associated Press Science Reporter, The Courier News, Blytheville, Arkansas, Jan 1, 
1957, p. 5. 
15 AL Blakeslee, ‘US Prepares to probe Secrets of Outer Space’, Associated Press, Syndicated Article, 
May 27, 1957.  
16 VA Kotelnikov, ‘Soviet Satellites in the IGY’, International Astronautical Federation Conference, 
Boulder, Colorado, August 27, 1957.  
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into space with humans on board.” The article also noted the news that the 
Soviet Union had announced the successful testing of an ICBM.17  
 Yet, still the US public and legislators chose not to believe that the 
Soviet Union would be first to launch a satellite. In Congress, there was a 
strong belief that the USSR did not possess the technology to launch and orbit a 
satellite. During a Senate Appropriations Sub-Committee Hearing in 1957 while 
Werner Von Braun was giving testimony on the possibility of the Soviet Union 
launching a satellite, Senator Allen Ellender, a Louisiana Democrat questioned 
whether Von Braun was “out of his mind”. It transpired that Ellender has just 
returned from a Congressional junket to Moscow where having seen the state of 
Soviet engineering, he was convinced that Von Braun’s view that the Soviet 
Union had the capability to put a satellite into orbit was totally wrong.18    
But in the days before Sputnik was launched, the newspapers were again 
reporting that a US ‘first’ was not guaranteed. At the end of September, there 
were reports that the Soviets were talking seriously about an impending launch. 
For instance, on September 30 1957, the International News Service syndicated 
an article headlined: Russ Scientists to Bare Space Satellite Plans.19 It reported: 
Three top Soviet scientists arrived in Washington yesterday to 
give details of  Russia’s plans for launching earth-circling 
satellites…The International Geophysical Year satellite and 
rocket conference…program calls for the Russians to lead off with 
a “technical description of the USSR satellite vehicle and 
launching program” details still a big secret to western scientists 
and IGY officials…The Russians will be followed into the spotlight 
by Dr. John P Hagen of the US Naval Research Laboratory who 
has been allotted 20 minutes to describe the US program. 
 
Thus, the stage is set for the latest tally on which nation is ahead 
in the race to get earth circling satellites into space first. The 
satellite vehicles are, of course, for scientific research purposes 
and all officials disavow any national competition.20  
 
                                                          
17 International News Service syndicated article, (unattributed) ‘Manned Satellites Hinted by 
Moscow’, Corsicana Daily Sun, August 31, 1957, pp. 1 and 10. 
18 Ellender travelled to Moscow three times from 1955-57 and returned following an interview with 
Khrushchev saying: “The Russian people are better off today under communism than they have ever 
been. As much as I abhor communism, and as much as I dislike to admit that, it is the truth." TA 
Becnel, Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana. (Baton Rouge, 1995), p. 203. 
19 Unattributed, ‘Russ Satellites to Bare Space Satellite Plans’, International News Service (INS) 
Newswire, New York, September 30, 1957. 
20 The INS ‘Russ Scientists…’ piece was sourced from the Pasadena Independent newspaper, 
Pasadena, California, September 30, 1957, p. 4. 
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There was no reason that the launch of Sputnik 1 should have been a surprise – 
especially to journalists and media outlets which had been directly reporting the 
Soviet IGY plans.  
 The headlines reported in almost every book and article covering the 
Sputnik period are accurate. But in this next section, we will discover to what 
degree they tell the full story.  
A short-lived media crisis 
Following the launch of Sputnik 1, the world’s first artificial satellite, on 
October 4 1957, The Chicago Daily Tribune warned, rather alarmingly, that if 
the Soviets “could deliver a 184-pound ‘moon' into a predetermined pattern 560 
miles out into space, the day is not far distant when they could deliver a death-
dealing warhead onto a predetermined target almost anywhere on the earth's 
surface.”21 Meanwhile, The New York Times screamed with a rarely-used three 
deck headline: “Soviet Fires Earth Satellite Into Space: It Is Circling The Globe 
at 18,000mph: Sphere Tracked In 4 Crossings Over US.”22 The media response 
was largely misinformed extrapolation, but it captured the front pages across 
the US, reaching communities large and small. A day after the launch, on 
October 5, The Mansfield News-Journal, in Mansfield, Ohio, 50 miles north of 
Columbus led with the headline: “Red-Made satellite flashes across the US” and 
posed the question “First step to moon landing?”23 The story was the standard 
United Press syndicated material, supplemented by first-person summaries of 
seven Columbus, Ohio “moon watchers” who had stayed up all night attempting 
to tune in to Sputnik’s radio signal, and view the satellite via telescope.24 The 
                                                          
21 Chicago Daily Tribune, Chicago, October 6, 1957 – Section 1 leader article, p. 2. 
22 New York Times, October 6, 1957, p. 1. 
23 The Mansfield News-Journal, Mansfield, Ohio, October 5, 1957, p 1. 
24 Ibid. 
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following day in California, The Sun-Telegram in San Bernardino chose to focus 
on the political reaction to the launch. Its headline stated: “Soviet Victory 
sparks Cry In Congress”, and the story, this time drawn from the New York 
Herald News Service, covered the Democrats’ demand for an inquiry into how 
the Administration had let the Soviets win what it characterised as the race into 
space.25   
Despite the lack of any concrete evidence that the satellite posed any 
threat to US national security, there was a perception that it did. The 
perception, which remains at the core of the orthodox interpretation today, was 
that the launch had undermined a central certainty of the capitalist world. 
Until now, the US assumed it was technologically superior to the Soviet system 
(as well as socially, culturally and politically). At a stroke, the nation’s definition 
of itself as the world leader was rocked – at least from a media standpoint. It is 
claimed that the real effect of Sputnik was to alter America’s – and the Free 
World’s – perception of itself, its strength and its supposed superiority. Even if 
the launch delivered little in terms of scientific capability, it changed the 
perception of Soviet capability and by implication, the Soviet threat. However, a 
careful analysis of those media outlets that were most alarmist shows how 
transient any sense of panic actually was. The New York Times offers a 
reasonable case study. By October 10, less than a week after the launch, the 
tone of the reporting had changed. The third most prominent article on page one 
of the paper was headlined: “Moscow predicts satellite will stay aloft for long 
term.”26 By October 20, there were still 29 references to Sputnik in the paper, 
but no fewer than seven were adverts, including one for an apartment to rent 
                                                          
25 The Sun Telegram, San Bernardino, California, October 6, 1957, pp. 1-2. 
26 HM Schmeck jnr., ‘Moscow predicts satellite will stay aloft for a long time’, New York Times, 
October 10, 1957, p. 1.   
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which, like Sputnik, was, according to the vendor, “No pie in the sky deal”.27 By 
November 1, Sputnik had moved entirely from the news pages to the 
advertisements. Indeed, the book review pages carried a display advertisement 
for Max Shilman’s ‘Rally Round the Flag Boys’. The advertorial copy stated: 
“You won’t find Sputnik in these hilarious pages, but there are guided missiles 
galore, misguided marriages and more laughs per page than any book on 
satellites!”28 This does not reflect the orthodox image of a nation in panic. 
What is also largely ignored in most versions of the orthodox 
interpretation of Sputnik is that not all of the US media reacted in the same 
way to the Sputnik launch. In 1957, as today, there were no national 
newspapers serving the United States. The New York Times,  Washington Post 
and, to a lesser extent, Los Angeles Times were widely read across the country 
and saw themselves as the media leaders in setting the opinion of the American 
public. However, newspapers (in their final years as the prime news medium in 
the land) were stubbornly parochial; heavily focused on their local or, at best, 
regional markets and always inclined towards the local market impact of any 
story. While the New York headline screamed, the Milwaukee Sentinel led its 
October 5th edition with: Today We Make History.29 Sputnik was nowhere to be 
seen. Instead, the item gripping the attention of the people of Wisconsin was the 
first-ever World Series Baseball game to be played in the city. For the record, 
the Braves lost game three to the New York Yankees, but recovered to take the 
series 4-3 – becoming the first-ever relocation team to take the Pennant. 
Baseball relegated Sputnik to page five of the paper – and in many local 
                                                          
27 New York Times, October 20. 1957, Section R, p. 22. 
28 New York Times, November 1, 1957, Review Section p. 2.  
29 Milwaukee Sentinel, October 5, 1957, Section 1 p. 1. 
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markets, the World Series was seen as significantly more important than the 
orbiting satellite.  
However, many regional newspapers, and also both cinema newsreels 
and the still entertainment-led TV news networks, took their news from the 
major national news agencies – Associated Press, International News Services 
and United Press, part of Scripps-Howard. The output of these agencies ensured 
that the Sputnik story maintained energy even beyond the initial shock. On 
October 9, Scripps-Howard syndicated a story across its newspapers and 
affiliates written by Jim G Lucas and Dickson Preston. “Interservice Fussing 
Helps Reds Win Satellite Race” attacked “belated claims that the US was never 
in a race”, by using a memorandum from the Court Martial of John C Nickerson 
of the ABMA which claimed that the Army could have put a satellite in space a 
year before Sputnik.30 The pejorative tone of the piece was clear. It did not use 
named sources nor directly accuse Eisenhower of failings, but was critical of the 
Administration by implication. It concluded:  
Meanwhile the Air Force also was developing an IRBM missile — 
known as Thor — which today would appear able to do as good a 
job as Jupiter. But from somewhere came a decision the project 
would go to the Navy. At the time the Navy had no big missile 
project of its own. It revived a cancelled missile, the Viking, and 
decided to make it do the job. As Navy spokesmen later told 
Congress, it considered Vanguard a “bargain basement” project 
anyway.31 
                                                          
30 ‘Army Tries its Misguided Missile Man’, Life Magazine, July 16, 1957, p16. The Court Martial of 
Colonel John C. Nickerson, Jr. took place in June 1957. Nickerson pleaded guilty to 15 counts of 
breaching Army security regulations. The charges were based on his release of a document 
containing defence secrets, along with a personal memorandum highly critical of the Secretary of 
Defence's decision to limit the Army's missile and rocket R&D role to ranges of 200 miles or less. His 
lawyers argued that his motive was to get permission for the Army to maintain operational control 
of the Jupiter missile system being developed by ABMA. On June 29 1957, the General Court Martial 
board suspended Nickerson from his rank for one year, fined him $100 pay per month for 15 
months, and issued an official reprimand. The personal memorandum, referred to in the Scripps-
Howard news story was discussed in court in the presence of 71 reporters.  
31 JG Lucas and D Preston, Scripps-Howard Staff Writers, Washington DC syndicated feature sourced 
from El Paso Herald Post, October 9, 1957, p. 1. 
133 
 
These agencies were fierce rivals, each aiming to extend their syndication in a 
crowded marketplace that was in sharp decline as television began to seriously 
encroach on its pre-eminence as a news medium.32 INS was founded by William 
Randolph Hearst, twice elected as a Democrat to the House of Representatives. 
Even after his death, its political allegiance was to the Democrat cause, not 
least through Hearst newspapers such as the San Francisco Examiner.33  
According to his biographer, Scripps was more interested in selling newspapers 
than in politics, and his heirs used Sputnik 1 and Sputnik 2 as an opportunity 
to sell as many newspapers and syndicated stories as possible.34 The Associated 
Press was (and remains) a not-for-profit co-operative, but even in its role of 
syndicating coverage from such titles as the Washington Post and New York 
Times, it contributed to the flurry of interest in the Soviet achievement. 
The other aspect of the Sputnik story that kept it in the news was the 
local, parochial angle. When the initial surprise at the Soviet launch subsided, 
newspapers sought to keep the story alive by focusing on interactions in the 
local community – whether that was political comment, or, as was more often 
the case, a local citizen tracking the satellite’s orbit. In Alabama, the Athens 
Limestone Democrat featured an Athens college professor, James Gillespie, who 
“picked up the ‘beep-beep’ of Russia’s earth satellite on his ‘ham radio’ outfit.”35 
While repeating the main details of the satellite’s launch and orbit, the article 
focused on Gillespie’s history as a radio ‘ham’, and noted he had been born in 
China. Even four days after the launch, he, rather than the satellite, was the 
subject of the story. The Sputnik story was not the lead article for the paper 
                                                          
32 In 1950, television penetration of U.S. households was only 9.0%. By 1955, it had reached 64.5%. 
By 1965 it reached 92.6%. Sourced from US Television bureau of Advertising figures, 2010. In 1957, 
there were 1,755 daily newspapers in the US, with a combined daily circulation of 57,805,000.   
33 N Frazier, William Randolph Hearst, Modern Media Tycoon (Woodbridge, CT, 2001). 
34 G Baldasty, EW Scripps and the business of newspapers (Urbana, ILL, 1999). 
35 Athens Limestone Democrat, Athens, Alabama, October 8, 1957, pp. 1 and 8. 
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that week. That honour went to a story on how the local agricultural community 
had dealt with severe local storm damage, and was headlined: “Farmers Have 
Managed to Save 15.032 Bales Cotton”.  
It is true that the impact of Sputnik 1’s launch initially went far beyond 
its scientific value. It was not seen nor reported simply as a scientific triumph - 
other than by the TASS news agency in Pravda and on Radio Moscow36 - but as 
a direct threat to the USA’s national security and by implication, the security of 
the non-communist world.  The Chicago Daily Tribune’s hyperbole: “Death 
dealing warhead” and “capable of hitting any chosen target anywhere in the 
world”37 shows a level of language that was intent – consciously or not – on 
sowing fear in a society that had only recently come to terms with the Soviets as 
a thermonuclear power.  
It is ironic to note that even in Moscow the initial interest in the launch 
of Sputnik 1 did not capture the significance of the launch and was distinctly 
low-key. The Soviet public first learned of the “scientific experiment conducted 
at such a high altitude” through a down-page article on the front of Pravda. The 
issue that day was led by Marshal Zhukov’s visit to Yugoslavia, and the Sputnik 
announcement was initially made with no hype, little triumphalism and, under 
just the terse banner ‘TASS announcement’.  The article stressed the peaceful 
and scientific nature of the mission and the authorities clearly had not yet seen 
the propaganda possibilities that the launch offered. The authorisation to 
proceed with a Soviet satellite project had come from the Praesidium of the 
Academy of Sciences as early as August 30, 1955.38 As the proposal was not for a 
major weapons project, it received lower priority status and this did not require 
                                                          
36 Pravda, the Soviet daily newspaper, printed the TASS news announcement in full on page 1, but 
down-page, October 5, 1957. 
37 Chicago Daily Tribune, October 6, 1957 Section1, p.2.  
38 Hall and Shayler, Rocket Men, p. 60. 
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approval from the party leadership. While the Soviets had stated more than a 
month before that they were ready to launch a satellite, the actual details of the 
launch were shrouded in secrecy, with confirmation of the satellite appearing 
from Moscow only when Sputnik was safely in orbit broadcasting to the world. 39 
Significantly, while the Pravda report closed with a generic socialist homily, 
there was no specific political statement – no message from Khrushchev putting 
down Eisenhower or boasting about the technological achievement from the 
world’s leading socialist economy.  This supports the assertion that neither he 
nor the Politburo saw the political and propaganda significance of this scientific 
achievement at this stage. According to his son Sergei, Khrushchev was in Kiev 
when he learned of the launch and was certainly not waiting expectantly for any 
pre-planned outcome. 40 The reaction in the West over the coming days delighted 
him; it highlighted the significance of the successful launch and gave him a 
useful propaganda tool for foreign policy. For Khrushchev, from this night on, 
the space programme was never about space exploration. It was a bold display 
of military might meant to match – and indeed top – America’s own frequent 
displays of firepower.  
But the administration was quite aware that the Soviet satellite was 
likely to be launched first. Overflights of the Tyruratam launch site by a U-2 
aircraft in August 1957 had alerted the White House that the Soviets were 
preparing to launch a rocket, so there was no reason for the government to 
respond to what was not an unexpected event.41 But to alert the media from 
                                                          
39 The Soviets released a number of journal articles including Mikhailov’s ‘On the Observation of the 
artificial satellite’ published in the USSR Astronomical Journal, Vol 43, no. 3, p.313 – Moscow 
September 1957. This was freely available to western scientists and, indeed had been translated by 
US Intelligence. 
40 S. Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and Creation of a Superpower (University Park, PA, 2000) p.156.  
41 On August 5, 1957, a U-2 mission was launched from Lahore, Pakistan, which captured the first 
pictures of the new Baikonur Cosmodrome near Tyuratam – see SD Schultz, ‘Why Gambit and 
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official US sources that a launch was imminent would also have been an alert 
that the US had the capability to spy on the Soviet launch site. This would 
compromise future U-2 operations. Thus, Eisenhower silently faced a dilemma. 
He could not respond to the short-lived media hyperbole, but for reasons of 
national security, could not say why.  
 
The Eisenhower reaction 
It would be wrong to say that Eisenhower did not react to Sputnik – clearly he 
did. But it is even more wrong to suggest that all his subsequent actions in 
relation to space were a knee-jerk reaction to the fact that the Soviet Union had 
put the first satellite in space. Indeed, after an early mis-step that had much 
more to do with managing national prestige than it had to do with national 
security, Eisenhower actually used Sputnik as an opportunity to reinforce his 
national security strategy and add further weight to the policies he had 
sanctioned after the TCP report in 1955. Following Sputnik 1’s launch, however, 
critics have latched on to his silence in the period from October 4 until his News 
Conference on October 9 to present a picture of weak indecisiveness. 
Immediately following the launch of Sputnik 1, Eisenhower was neither as 
nimble nor adept as Greenstein’s ‘Hidden Hand’ model would lead one to expect. 
In fact, critics, including Schlesinger, have given this as a prime example of why 
the Greenstein model does not work. However, such criticism is unfair both on 
Greenstein and on Eisenhower. Where it is fair to criticise Eisenhower is in his 
immediate management of the post-Sputnik message. Essentially, he did not act 
quickly enough to reach the American public directly and reassure them that 
the United States was not threatened in any way by Sputnik and nor had the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Hexagon? U.S. National Security and the Geopolitical Setting, 1957–1960’, in National 
Reconnaissance, issue 2012 U1, p. 3. 
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country fallen behind the Soviets in any tangible way.  Throughout his 
presidency up until the Sputnik launch, the operation of the media within the 
US had fitted well into the Elite Model of media influence described by Walter 
Lippman in 1922.42 Lippmann asserted that the public are dependent on the 
media for opinion forming, and the Elite Model states that the media are 
controlled by small numbers of people in the political elite, think tanks and 
representatives of large business interests. What Sputnik catalysed was a 
distinct split within the elite. Politicians such as Lyndon Johnson, defence 
industry lobbyists and Pentagon budget holders all saw Sputnik as an 
opportunity to advance their own agendas, and thus operated at odds with the 
president. A distinction must be drawn here with other members of the elite 
such as the Boards of the Hearst and Scripps news organisations. Their 
motivation was simply to sell more newspapers and syndicated news stories. For 
Johnson, here was a high profile issue that could provide a campaign platform 
for the 1960 Presidential Race.43 For corporations including Convair, Lockheed, 
Martin, RCA and Boeing, competing with the Soviets in space offered the 
prospect of lucrative contracts that would offset any future downturn in their 
military aircraft business caused by the New Look defence policy’s move 
towards delivering the nuclear threat via ICBMs instead of conventional 
aircraft.44 And for the still-competing armed services, there was the opportunity 
to lobby for primacy in meeting US national security needs for defence against 
                                                          
42 W Lippmann, Public Opinion first published 1922 (Greenback Books edition, New York 2010). 
43 Lyndon Johnson’s political use of the space issue is discussed in detail in chapter four. 
44 By 1957, Eisenhower’s Defence budget cuts, aimed squarely at reducing conventional forces were 
beginning to bite. While Strategic Air Command was growing and defence contractors were 
beginning to see opportunities for more technologically-driven military solutions, the overall DoD 
budget had been cut by 20% from its 1952 high to $45.4bn in FY1957. The defence lobby was the 
best organised lobby in Washington, working closely with members of both Congressional chambers 
and the Pentagon, and becoming the first professionally organised lobby, paid for by the major 
defence contractors.  
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Soviet-launched nuclear missiles.45 Each faction of the elite moved quickly to 
publicly air their cause, using the tools open to them both in the daily 
newspapers hungry for stories that would sell more copies, and the national and 
trade magazines which depended on advertising sales (often to defence 
companies) for revenue.46 This ‘noise’ that was generated in the days and weeks 
immediately following Sputnik’s launch now sits at the core of the orthodox 
argument. Yet, when one steps back and looks again at it, it was extremely 
short-lived, and largely manipulated by elite actors with something to gain 
financially, militarily or politically. 
The opportunity for the media reaction came the morning of October 5 
when James Hagerty informed Eisenhower of the launch. Eisenhower’s 
immediate decision to stay in Gettysburg and focus on his golf game and 
relegate the initial White House response to Sputnik to Hagerty and Foster 
Dulles was a poor decision. This was one of the very few occasions across 
Eisenhower’s eight years in the White House when he was poorly advised by 
Hagerty. The headlines in the major city newspapers the day after Sputnik’s 
launch should have alerted his White House advisers – and particularly the 
seasoned newsman Hagerty – to the fact that Sputnik was an issue that 
demanded the direct and reassuring intervention of the president immediately. 
However confident Eisenhower was that the Soviet satellite was little more than 
an irrelevance, by staying in Gettysburg and failing to be seen to treat it 
seriously, he enabled ill-informed sections of the media fuelled by speculative 
                                                          
45 Both ICBM/IRBM development and continental defence systems had been prioritised as a result of 
the TCP recommendations in February 1955.  
46 Magazines such as Aviation Week and its newspaper partner Aviation Daily acted as national 
mouthpieces for the aerospace industry since they were totally reliant on the industry for their 
survival and profit. Their ‘editorial’ was largely created in the PR departments of the major 
corporations. While the corporate PR teams did not have quite the same relationship with more 
general national news magazines, they delivered a heavy advertising spend with full page 
advertising, often featuring ‘expert’ significantly biased advertorial, was carried in the major news 
weeklies such as Time and Newsweek almost every week.  
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agents looking for political or contractual gain to fill the void and make the job 
of reassuring the wider American public harder than it should have been.  
However, Eisenhower’s critics here should re-examine the evidence. The 
effect of Eisenhower and Hagerty’s media mis-step was short-lived, lasting no 
longer than October 9 when Eisenhower next faced the media in his News 
Conference. While the notes of Hagerty’s October 5 Daily News Conference are 
all about Sputnik, by Monday October 7, the interest had already begun to cool, 
and Hagerty has to deal with just two Sputnik-related questions.47 There is a 
case for saying that Eisenhower was right to keep his counsel and let the heat of 
the immediate media response burn out quickly.  
Eisenhower had no more effective supporting operator through his 
presidency than Hagerty. The former New York Times newsman had been on 
Governor Thomas Dewey’s staff from 1943, acting as press spokesman and 
adviser for Dewey’s unsuccessful 1944 and 1948 runs for the presidency. It was 
this role he undertook in the Eisenhower campaign in 1952, and its success led 
to his appointment as Press Secretary. What set him apart from Press 
Secretaries both before and since was his strikingly close relationship with 
Eisenhower. According to Robert Ferrell, who edited Hagerty’s political diary as 
well as the Eisenhower Diaries, the bond between the President and his 
appointee was “an almost father-and-son relationship.” 48  The President was 
instinctively drawn to Hagerty and treated him as a friend and confidant. In 
fact Ferrell regarded Hagerty as Eisenhower’s “single close friend” in the White 
House. Hagerty was part of Eisenhower’s inner circle for policy making. 
Eisenhower respected his political judgement and leaned on him to shape policy 
                                                          
47 Daily News Conferences, October 5 and 7, 1957, Box 49, News Conferences, Hagerty Collection, 
DDE Library. 
48 RH Ferrell, Hagerty, p. xlv. 
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to ensure it not only appealed to the nation, but in particular, that it satisfied 
the weak alliance of right-wing and centrist Republicans in Congress.  
This may well have been because Eisenhower had not come from that 
party-political background. While he had a strong political instinct, he relied on 
those with a direct background in party affairs to advise him on the nuances of 
Republican Party and Congressional thought and likely reaction. Hagerty also 
had a significantly wider remit than simply media relations. He often chaired 
the White House Staff meetings and sat in (and contributed to) almost every 
important White House meeting, either working directly with the president, or 
representing his views and wishes. Like Killian, he instinctively knew what 
Eisenhower’s view would be on an issue, and as such, was entirely trusted and 
highly valued by the president to fulfil his wishes.  
In weighing up whether Hagerty’s advice for the president was wrong, 
had he simply been the president’s media expert, and not privy to a deep 
knowledge of the issues and workings of Eisenhower and his inner circle (and, 
indeed, a member of that circle), he might have recognised the potential 
problems that Eisenhower’s lack of immediate overt leadership on the issue 
would bring. It was an occasion when knowing too much about national security 
issues meant that the media adviser was not able to advise effectively on how 
best to manage the post-Sputnik message.  
 
Low key 
Eisenhower’s actions following the launch of Sputnik 1 were very low-key.  This 
is apparent from the diary entries of his Private Secretary, Ann Whitman. 
Whitman was a meticulous diarist and kept a running account of the President’s 
movements, meetings and visitors, along with personal asides on the mood of 
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the Oval Office and the key participants in executive government. Her entry for 
October 4, 1957 reads: 
In office for about an hour. Many signatures.  Saw General Cutler on 
approval of NSC record of action. Tom and Jim had various problems in 
connection with the Queen’s visit. 
 Flew to Gettysburg for golf with George Allen.49 
There is no sense in the entry of any consideration about the launch of a 
Soviet satellite being front of mind, nor fore-knowledge of what would take place 
that night. If anything is conveyed, it is the sense that the upcoming State Visit 
from Queen Elizabeth II was the most pressing issue in the minds of the 
Administration. Certainly the coolness of reaction from the White House to the 
Soviet satellite is reflected in the fact that there are no diary entries at all on 
October 5, 6 or 7. Eisenhower stayed in Gettysburg, playing golf, dining with 
friends and, apparently, thinking about the defence reorganisation talks he 
planned to have with Defense Secretary Wilson early in the week. The diary 
picks up on October 8 when Whitman records: “The President in Office at eight 
o’clock to discuss Russian satellite with officials of the National Science 
Foundation. General Goodpaster will prepare notes.” While this was the first 
meeting of the day, Whitman also records that the President was heavily 
involved in other business, notably meeting with Senator Smith of New Jersey; 
the Finance Minister of India together with the Indian Ambassador and Sir 
Brian Robertson, who had served with the President in the North African 
campaign in World War Two. The conclusion that can be drawn here is that 
Eisenhower still had not attached great significance to the Sputnik launch, but 
was aware he needed to confirm his own low key reaction by talking the issue 
through with his science advisers.  
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At this stage, Eisenhower understood better than most the real situation 
the Soviets were in, but could reveal little of this without undermining US 
surveillance efforts. He did not comment officially on the launch until October 9 
when he issued a statement prior to his White House news conference, 
congratulating the Soviets on their achievement.50 This statement had been 
carefully constructed in conjunction with Hagerty and Chief of Staff Sherman 
Adams.  But the president had consulted his scientists before issuing the 
statement.  In his memoir, Killian noted that meeting of October 8 when 
Eisenhower met with Detlev Bronk, President of the National Academy of 
Sciences, who, along with critiquing the draft statement: “told (Eisenhower) of 
(William) Golden’s original proposal that there should be a full-time Science 
Adviser to the President supported by an advisory committee of eminent 
scientists, both located within the White House.” 51 Bronk’s own account, written 
some years after the event, so taken with a little caution, noted his response to a 
question from Sherman Adams as to whether Sputnik called for any alterations 
to the existing US research and development program, particularly for missiles. 
Bronk responded: “I see no reason to change our programs. We should not 
constantly change our programs in response to every action by the Soviets.”52   
Bronk’s response is significant for two reasons. First, here was a senior 
scientist who was aware of the existing programmes in hand and advised the 
president there was no need to change track. Second, it is clear that Eisenhower 
was already planning for the future, not least in upgrading the role of Science 
Adviser, and bringing it into the White House. Eisenhower certainly did note 
the suggestion and at Bronk’s urging, sought out the Nobel Laureate and 
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eminent physicist, Isidor I. Rabi, Chairman of the ODM Science Advisory 
committee at the time. Even before Eisenhower formally met the country’s 
leading scientists on October 15, the way was being paved for a high-powered 
adviser to join the White House team. Killian fitted the mould for the first 
Presidential Science Advisor perfectly. He had already proven adept at 
managing the needs of the President and the abilities of scientists, military 
leaders and Washington bureaucrats alike through his shrewd leadership of the 
TCP. While delivering a final report of depth and clarity, Killian had also 
produced the result that Eisenhower wanted, giving him further justification to 
pursue the New Look defence policy, ultimately at the expense of the 
expansionist Strategic Air Command. Killian intuitively understood the 
president’s needs – and was far better placed than most in the scientific 
community to deliver on those needs. Bringing Killian into the White House 
inner circle, though it happened in the wake of Sputnik, was much more the 
fulfilment of a plan that had emerged from the TCP project three years before.  
  Throughout the post-Sputnik period Eisenhower never lost his 
composure but his outward calmness concealed a hidden motive. While 
Eisenhower and the U.S. intelligence community had been evaluating proposals 
for an orbiting military reconnaissance satellite, they had also been grappling 
with the political ramifications of likely Soviet reaction to over-flights of its 
territory. The launch of Sputnik effectively ended those concerns, allowing the 
United States to pursue a policy of space as an ‘open platform,’ establishing that 
national boundaries did not extend into space. Donald Quarles, Eisenhower's 
assistant Secretary of Defence, commented to the President on October 8th that 
the Soviets: “have, in fact, done us a good turn, unintentionally, in establishing 
the concept of freedom of international space”, a principle which the Soviets 
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could not now refute. McDougall argued that the administration actually 
allowed the Soviets to launch a satellite first in order to secure their ‘open skies’ 
objective.53 Quarles’ comment refutes this interpretation, and suggests that 
McDougall was stretching the argument too far.   
Quarles’ comments are captured in a ‘Memorandum of Conference with 
the President’ drafted on October 9 1957 by Eisenhower’s Staff Secretary, 
Goodpaster.54  It records the meeting referred to by Ann Whitman that the 
President held the previous day with Quarles, Alan Waterman, Director of the 
National Science Foundation, several of his colleagues and a number of White 
House advisers including Adams, and Hagerty.  It was the meeting prior to 
Eisenhower’s visit from Bronk. There is no sense of tension or urgency in the 
note. Goodpaster records a conversation in which Quarles states that a 
Redstone rocket “had it been used, could have orbited a satellite a year or more 
ago. The Science Advisory Committee had felt, however, that it was better to 
have the earth satellite proceed separately from military development.”  Noting 
that the President stated that when this information reached Congress they 
were bound to ask why this had not happened, Goodpaster paraphrased 
Eisenhower adding:  “timing was never given too much importance in our 
program, which was tied to the IGY.” The tone of the whole memorandum is 
low-key and relaxed and indeed the group appear to have discussed a response 
to the Soviet launch. Goodpaster wrote: “The President thought that to make a 
sudden shift in our approach now would be to belie the attitude we have had all 
along.” According to Goodpaster, Adams had summed up that attitude when he 
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recalled that Dr. Pusey had said that we had never thought of this as a crash 
program, as the Russians apparently did.55  
In the traditional interpretation of the Sputnik Autumn, there is a sense 
that the USSR’s action caused first panic and then inaction in the 
Administration. The evidence drawn from the meetings that took place between 
Eisenhower, his appointees in the DoD and his advisers at the National Science 
Foundation suggest otherwise. Undoubtedly there were meetings to assess if 
Sputnik posed any threat. However, these swiftly concluded that the Soviet 
capability was known, there was no threat to national security, and 
Eisenhower’s defence strategy was not going to change. He already had a path 
marked out for progress in space and this was not fundamentally changed by 
Sputnik.  
 
Meeting the nation’s media 
At this stage, it is possible to surmise that Eisenhower felt the storm over 
Sputnik 1 was dying down and that the voices of anger and outrage would be 
calmed by the president’s complete unwillingness to engage with criticism of his 
policies and the polemics of those speaking to the media. However, Eisenhower 
waited a full five days after the launch of Sputnik 1 to respond to the media and 
he was taken aback by their hostility at his news conference on October 9. His 
belief was that the early ill-informed press responses such as that of the 
Chicago Daily Tribune on October 6 would dissipate once he provided the calm 
reassurance that had previously been readily accepted by the Washington press 
corps – and therefore, by their readers. 56 Indeed, the President had been used to 
an easy ride from the press. He was still revered as the great war leader and the 
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man who had brought an end to the war in Korea within six months of 
assuming the presidency. He had presided over a period of strong economic 
growth and his approval ratings remained high. But on October 9, he faced 
journalists prepared to question the administration’s view that Sputnik was just 
“a silly bauble”, prompted by political critics of the administration such as 
Democrat Senators Stuart Symington, previously Secretary to the Air Force 
under Truman, and Senate Majority Leader Johnson who had already been 
publically critical of the administration’s lack of response. 57 The United Press 
syndicated story on Sputnik dated October 5, and published across the country 
the following day had been headlined: “President not upset over Russian 
satellite but aides show concern”.58  The story quoted Symington and reported: 
Senator Stuart Symington (D-Mo) one of the sharpest critics of 
this country’s missile program, said that Russia’s launching of an 
earth satellite “is but more proof of growing Communist 
superiority in the all-important missile field.” 
 
Symington sent a telegram to Senator Richard Russell (D-Ga) 
calling for an investigation of the US missile program by the 
Senate Armed Service Committee which Russell heads. 
 
He said that the investigation would give Americans the truth 
about the US missile program, “something they have not been 
getting.” 
 
Symington said that “while we continue to learn” of Russia’s 
missiles, “this government continues to cut back and slow down 
its own missile program.” 
 
Symington, Like Johnson, was positioning himself as a potential Democratic 
Party contender for the 1960 presidential election. But he lacked the Senatorial 
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power of Johnson who began to appear in the news coverage of Sputnik himself 
only on October 8 following Russell’s agreement to launch a preliminary 
Congressional inquiry, as per Symington’s request.59 Johnson was certainly not 
the first Democrat to use Sputnik as a potential platform to raise his profile 
higher, but the fact that his sub-committee of the Armed Services Committee 
was interested in reviewing the US missile program definitely gave the 
journalists a new line of questioning about the Congressional challenge for the 
president at his October 9 News Conference.  
Whitman’s diary entry commented on Eisenhower’s early-morning 
preparation for the news conference.60 Meanwhile a series of drafts of 
statements to be used in that the press conference make it abundantly clear 
that while Eisenhower may have been playing down the impact of Sputnik, he 
was well aware of the probability that the reaction to Sputnik could escalate 
into wild speculation at the hands of journalists sensing a massive story, and 
from those within the military-industrial complex who saw the Russian satellite 
success as the spur they needed to press for higher spending on defence.61 
Whitman noted that the President was in his office “much too early – 7.37am – 
and immediately started dictating about outer space...”  She commented on the 
swearing-in ceremony for Neil McElroy who had succeeded Charles Wilson as 
Secretary of Defense (one would have expected this to be the most important 
event of the day), but also noted that immediately after the ceremony, “certain 
of high defense officials were in President’s office for about 15 minutes to 
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discuss the Russian satellite, more as a preparation for the President for press 
conference than anything else, I believe.” 
The tone of the news conference is quite different from others across the 
Eisenhower presidency. While the transcript clearly shows the 1950s politeness 
and deference the press was used to operating by, there was an edge of hostility, 
and there were some sharp questions that Eisenhower did not deal with 
particularly effectively.62 United Press International Reporter Merriman Smith, 
noting the satellite launch and the Soviet claim to have successfully launched 
an ICBM – both ahead of the US - challenged the President as to what he was 
going to do about it. Robert Clark of Associated Press echoed his colleague, 
asking if the Russians were now ahead of the Americans. ‘Miss May’ Craig, 
Washington Correspondent for the Portland Marine asked Eisenhower if the 
satellite gave the Russians the ability to launch missiles from platforms in 
space, while NBC’s Hazel Markel asked: “Are you saying at this time, with the 
Russian satellite whirling about the world, you are not more concerned or overly 
concerned about our nation’s security?”63 
Eisenhower’s response was calm – as had been his responses to the 
previous questions. He denied the link between the satellite and ICBMs; he 
downplayed the Soviet satellite advantage, though he acknowledged it as a 
psychological success. He had attempted to allay Miss Craig’s fears by stating 
that the satellite was most certainly not a nuclear missile platform, and sought 
to allay those of the whole nation. He said: “I see nothing at this moment, at this 
stage of development that is significant in that development as far as security is 
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concerned.” Indeed, he felt that the Soviets had done little more than “put one 
small ball in the air.”64 
In his News Conference, Eisenhower was clearly aiming at calm 
reassurance. Yet his responses seemed a little flippant, one would suggest 
because the assembled journalists had not been immediately prepared to accept 
his statement on Sputnik and had continued to press him on the issue. He was 
unshaken in policy terms, but had not yet gained the high ground with the 
media. He was not helped that day by a mis-alignment that ensured his 
message, and that of new Secretary of Defense McElroy were out of step. 
Whitman recorded that McElroy “held a press conference today [thus competing 
in effect with the President’s press conference] and while the President said that 
the Russian success with the satellite would not cause us to speed up our 
missile programme, Mr McElroy said in effect that the programme would 
[Whitman’s underlining] be speeded up.”65 What is interesting is how McElroy, 
intentionally or not, immediately disregarded what others would have taken as 
an order from the President in that meeting with advisers which McElroy 
attended. Goodpaster wrote: 
(Eisenhower) recalled that there had been a definite and 
intentional separation of the military and scientific lines of effort 
with the satellite proceeding as a scientific project.  
When military people began to talk about this matter...they tend 
to make this matter look like a “race” which is exactly the wrong 
impression. 
He ended by saying he wanted to enlist the efforts of the whole 
group in behalf of “no comment” on this development. There was 
an indication from the group of understanding and support of 
what the President wanted.66 
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McElroy was brand new to the Pentagon having, like many figures in the 
Eisenhower Cabinet, joined from industry. He had no background of military 
service, indeed he had most recently been President of Proctor & Gamble. His 
comment on speeding up missile production was ultimately proven to be correct, 
but at this time when Eisenhower, as Chief Executive, wanted all his direct 
report cabinet members speaking as one, McElroy’s responses were distinctly 
off-message. 
Evidence such as the New York Times case study from earlier in this 
chapter point to a change in tone by the newspapers after Eisenhower’s October 
9 News Conference. Sputnik was no longer ‘new news’. And while it remained a 
useful subject for the news agencies to syndicate in their circulation battles, the 
story began to move from the news pages further back through the papers. 
Taking one ‘heartland’ example, the Kansas City Star, from Kansas City 
Missouri, led with ‘World Title to the Braves’ on page 1, but there was a down-
page article detailing how readers could spot “Sputnik’s burnt-out rocket” as it 
orbited over the US.67 In six days, the newspaper perception of Sputnik had 
changed from a threat to a curiosity. Eisenhower featured on page 3, but only in 
welcoming the prime minister of Ghana to the White House as his breakfast 
guest. By the following day, the paper had localised the Sputnik story with two 
page 1 pieces. The first “’Beep’ a tocsin for education” reported on the chancellor 
of the University of Kansas’ pleas for a crash program to train more scientists. 
It was a popular call at the time, but a somewhat opportunistic plea from an 
educator. The second story “Set for Sputnik party” reported on how a local 
retailer had recorded the Sputnik beep onto vinyl records and was selling them 
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for $2.95.68 By Sunday, October 13, Sputnik had disappeared from the news 
pages, which were led by Queen Elizabeth 11’s arrival in the US, and the birth 
of a baby hippo at Swope Park Zoo.69 
 
The response of TV and news magazines  
Eisenhower faced a second wave of potentially difficult media coverage on 
Sputnik: that of the news weeklies and television news talk shows which had to 
wait until their regular publication and scheduling slot to comment on the 
Soviet satellite. As a prime example of the latter, on October 12th, Retired Air 
Force General George Kenney talked to Mike Wallace on the top-rated ABC 
show ‘Interview’.70 Kenney had been MacArthur’s senior Air Force commander 
as Commanding General, Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific in World War 2, 
and came to the TV studio as a war hero and renowned defence analyst.71 Yet 
his interpretation of the significance of Sputnik was riddled with 
misunderstanding and misinterpretation, and merely repeated – with little 
added depth - the newspaper headlines from the previous week. His core 
argument was that the successful launch of Sputnik 1 proved that the USSR 
had developed the rocket technology necessary to propel an ICBM into United 
States air space, posing a serious threat to the security of the country. Kenney 
argued that it demonstrated that America had been too complacent and 
apathetic about the Soviet ability to develop weapons and produce them in 
quantity. He claimed that such apathy had given the Russians a lead in the 
nuclear race, and the day the Soviet political and military staff decided they 
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could win a nuclear war, they would “pull the trigger”. Thus war was now 
demonstrably closer.  He added that the United States had neglected the ICBM 
problem and stated that the United States was now behind the Soviet Union in 
nuclear weapon development because the American public, whose opinion, 
according to Kenney, steered defence policy, had not taken the threat seriously 
enough. Kenney was quick to place the blame on the American people rather 
than Eisenhower for the perceived defence shortcomings, noting that they 
elected all those responsible for making defence and foreign policy decisions, 
and those decision makers were driven by the public appetite for: “a balanced 
budget, lower taxes, bigger Social Security benefits, more pensions and better 
roads.” He was actually quite measured in his argument, but was consistently 
prompted by Wallace, the presenter, who set up the interview by describing the 
post-Sputnik period as “A struggle for control of outer space.” Certainly, by the 
end of the programme, the viewing public would not have been reassured by the 
key message emerging from this prime-time news leader: World War Three is 
now closer.  
 The news weeklies initially offered a similarly portentous tone. This was 
aptly summed up by the editorial in Time on October 14 entitled Red Moon over 
the US which stated that Sputnik: 
opened a bright new chapter in mankind’s conquest of the natural 
environment and a grim new chapter in the Cold War…Russia’s 
victory in the satellite race proved that the US had not tried hard 
enough.72 
 
 
These were leaden-sounding words, but what did they actually mean? At first 
reading, they seem critical of the president – for “the US had not tried hard 
enough”, it is easy to read that Eisenhower had not tried hard enough. But was 
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the “grim new chapter in the Cold War” a Russian satellite that did nothing 
more than go beep, or could it have been the demands of the retired generals 
and grandstanding politicians for the US to enter a phase of crash spending on 
nuclear armaments? While scholars have tended to read a single meaning into 
the post-Sputnik media coverage, there have been few attempts to chart the 
changing tone of the coverage. 
It is clear that over the fortnight following the news the Sputnik 1 was in 
orbit, those pushing a particular anti-Administration agenda used the media to 
further their cause. Often the messages were relatively subtly planted, but 
pushed the message hard that the US needed to ramp up its defence spending. 
For instance, the Kansas City Star did return to the Sputnik issue to run a long 
editorial piece on October 20 discussing the view headlined: “Sputnik the result 
of Soviet science system”73 The piece noted that the USSR spent 40% more on 
atomic research than the US, and urged the government not just to meet but to 
outstrip this sum. On the same weekend, a widely-circulated Associated Press 
piece forecast additional defence spending, no tax cuts and stiffer credit controls 
as a result of Sputnik.74 Yet, both the case for increasing basic US research and 
for ramping up defence spending were parts of Eisenhower’s existing policy 
stemming from the TCP recommendations in 1955. They were neither created 
nor shaped by Sputnik. Indeed, the so-called Sputnik crisis seemed less of a 
crisis day by day by day.  
While Sputnik had dominated the Presidential Press Conference on 
October 9, it was relegated to item 4 on the agenda and gathered little interest 
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at the next Presidential News Conference on October 30.75 It is notable too that 
there was no clamour from the White House beat reporters for an additional 
press conference in the intervening weeks. The traditional reading of Sputnik as 
sparking a crisis does not hold true when the Presidential News Conferences are 
analysed. While Sputnik was the main topic of discussion at the Presidential 
News Conference on October 9, it was not the only one. The exchange with the 
press also featured two questions on the Little Rock school desegregation 
issue.76 By October 30, the mood had changed considerably. The News 
Conference was wide-ranging, opening with a comment on the bombing of the 
Israeli cabinet before taking in the upcoming NATO annual meeting in Paris, 
bi-lateral conversations with Macmillan, segregation in the South, the rise in 
the cost of living, prospects for the stock market and Eisenhower’s views on who 
should be the next Governor of New Jersey. In short, it was back to business as 
usual.77  
 
Opportunistic attacks 
Immediately following the announcement of Sputnik’s orbit in the US, there 
was a high degree of bandwaggoning from those in the military and political 
establishments who saw outer space as an opportunity to advance their own 
agendas. US Senate Majority Leader, Lyndon Johnson wrote what has 
subsequently been described as a diary entry, but one that was made public first 
in his presidential memoir The Vantage Point: “Now, somehow, in some new 
way the sky seemed almost alien. I also remember the profound shock of 
realizing that it might be possible for another nation to achieve technological 
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superiority over this great country of ours.”78   General James Gavin, a member 
of the US ICBM development team described Sputnik as ‘a technological Pearl 
Harbor’ – though of course it provided a great lever to swiftly place the US 
IBCM programme at the top of the president’s agenda. Symington was still 
using the same line a month later as he sought to establish his own space 
credentials in preparation for a possible challenge for the White House in 
1960.79 Indeed, the perception of the Soviet success both in the Pentagon and on 
Capitol Hill was not a scientific triumph but a militaristic threat – which played 
directly into the hands of the ‘hawks’ of the Military-Industrial Complex.  
The US Navy, too, was not slow in issuing statements to the media that 
mixed scare tactics with shameless promotion of its own strength. However, by 
October 9, even as Eisenhower prepared to address the White House press 
corps, the tone was changing with rather more perceptive comment and 
questioning emerging in the US media – even in the rural heartland of the mid-
west. On October 9, the Journal’s Opinion, in the Salina Journal, the closest 
daily newspaper to Eisenhower’s boyhood home in Abilene, Kansas, stated: 
At this writing, it appears the Russians and the U. S. Navy have 
won the Sputnik contest. The Russians have floated their 
basketball in space, thereby deflating our ego...The U. S. Navy 
won because its bright public relations experts rushed into print 
with the assertion that the Russians also have intermediate range 
missiles capable of placing nuclear warheads on every Allied base 
in western Europe.   The Navy contends that while this makes our 
overseas Air Force bases worthless, it enhances the value of Navy 
aircraft carriers which move about on the deep too fast to become 
missile targets…That also provokes sober thought. Were it not for 
the costly, senseless, bitter rivalry between the Navy, the Air 
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Force and the Army, it is quite likely we would be ahead of the 
Russians, not behind them.80 
 
Pyrrhic victory  
The success of the  Sputnik 1 mission won a ‘race’ of propaganda and prestige 
for the USSR, but the victory was pyrrhic and even by the time Sputnik 2 
became the second man-made object in space, the Soviets’ victory was already 
beginning to tarnish. The shock of the new was a once-only effect, and the 
American media’s response to Sputnik 2 was less fearful and less polemical. 
However, it would appear that the traditional scholarly narrative of the effect of 
the first Sputnik launch on the American public does not quite reflect the 
historical reality of the reaction. On April 14, 1958, Oliver Gale, Special 
Assistant to the Defense Secretary wrote to McElroy with some findings gleaned 
from Claude Robinson’s Public Opinion Index.81 Robinson was George Gallup’s 
partner in their pioneering market research business, while Gale had set up 
Procter and Gamble’s first public relations department and had moved to the 
Pentagon when McElroy, the P&G President, moved to the DoD. Gale noted 
Robinson’s sample survey of 1,000 adults in the general public and 117 
newspaper editors made immediately after the launch of Sputnik 1.  Under the 
heading “Impact of Sputnik”, the memorandum noted: 
The news of Sputnik’s launching was known to 95% of the public, 
but 40% noted the news and dismissed it without serious thought 
as to what it might mean to them and their country.  
After Sputnik, 80% thought we were “at least even” with the 
Soviets or “would catch up before long”; editors had a more 
alarmed point of view.82 
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This simply does not reflect the sense of crisis which infuses the orthodox 
interpretation. Gale noted the difference between the public, where the response 
was somewhat sanguine, and the “more alarmed” view of editors. Yet this 
differentiation is too often overlooked in the narrative. Roger Launius’ 
summation of the launch and Eisenhower’s reaction reflects an orthodox 
approach: 
During the furor that followed Sputnik 1 and Sputnik 2, many 
people accused the Eisenhower administration of letting the 
Soviet Union best the United States. The Sputnik crisis reinforced 
for many people the popular conception that Eisenhower was a 
smiling incompetent; it was another instance of a "do-nothing," 
golf-playing president mismanaging events.83  
This is not true.   
 
Eisenhower’s media offensive 
Sputnik 2 appeared to be another propaganda coup for Khrushchev, putting the 
dog Laika into orbit just a month after Sputnik 1’s launch. Behind the scenes, 
Eisenhower had been manoeuvring since the October 9 News Conference to 
educate the public in how to deal with the new reality of artificial satellites. His 
position remained unchanged from the first Sputnik: he saw no indication from 
Sputnik 2 that the Soviets actually had a workable, accurate and reliable ICBM, 
and urged both Nixon and Dulles to stress these points. Indeed, Nixon had used 
this argument in a public speech in San Francisco on October 15, and Dulles in 
a meeting with the press a day later.84  But the information released by the 
Soviets appeared to challenge the administration’s thinking.  Sputnik 2 carried 
a 1,121lb payload, which underscored the strength of the Soviet rockets. The 
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fact its payload was a dog implied the Soviets were focused on manned space 
flight.  
This time, rather than play down the significance, Eisenhower chose to 
go on the offensive and address the nation via television on November 7.  He 
addressed the fear in people’s minds about national security. In seeking to 
soothe the nation, he said: “We are well ahead of the Soviets in the nuclear field 
both in quantity and quality. We intend to stay ahead.”85  Here Eisenhower, 
advised by Hagerty, regained the media initiative by addressing the US public 
directly rather than allowing journalists to editorialise around his words, and 
did so quickly before rumour could fill any fact-free vacuum. Such a response 
played well with the news magazines, but they did not immediately side with 
the president. Their longer publication cycles allowed some to feature both the 
Soviet propagandising of Sputnik 2 and the Administration’s response.  
For example, Time was the most hyperbolic in its response, especially 
when it noted: “The Soviet rocket generated a total thrust more than enough to 
power an atomic bomb to the moon, more than enough to power a missile 
around the earth.....In such an apocalyptic week, communism’s new coalition of 
dazzling technology and cut-throat politics represented an epochal threat to the 
free world.”86 The New Republic was rather more circumspect and stated:  
The tendency to over-react to sputniks by concentrating on 
missiles to the jeopardy of all else (or, to put it more precisely, to 
react in the wrong ways) can be held in check by bearing in mind 
that it is a long way from the successful test firing of an 
intercontinental ballistic missile to an operational system. That 
was so the day after Sputnik 1 went up, and it still is.87 
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 Internationally however, even journals such as Spaceflight, the journal of the 
British Interplanetary Society and thus untouched by the political machinations 
stirred up by Sputnik, added warnings to the President on the apparent power 
of the Soviet rockets. “It is… logical to assume that at least in the early 
development stage (the rocket) was a military project, having as its goal the 
delivery of an H-bomb warhead over perhaps 5,000 miles.”88 But the purely 
negative sentiments of the media were short-lived. This was to a large extent 
down to the more active and considered stance that Eisenhower took in the 
wake of the second Soviet satellite. His action had ensured the media tide began 
to turn in his favour.   
It was not, however, an immediate 180 degree turn and for a while, the 
nation – as exemplified by the press – did not know what to think. The 
November 18 1957 issue of Life provided a prime example of the almost 
schizophrenic response of the news magazine editors to the new attack on US 
confidence.89  Within this single issue, Life praised Eisenhower for his 
November 7 radio and TV address, and was positive about his appointment of 
Killian as Special Scientific adviser.  It interviewed influential figures on the 
President’s speech, eliciting mixed reactions: two positive and two negative. 
Investment Banker Ferdinand Eberhardt felt the President’s planned actions 
post-Sputnik “may prove inadequate to meet the needs of our present critical 
situation.”  Unsurprisingly, Eisenhower’s former rival for the White House, 
Adlai Stevenson, was also critical: [Eisenhower’s speech had] “too little sense of 
urgency.” But seemingly in the spirit of balance, the magazine published two 
pro-Administration views. Paul Foote, Assistant Secretary for Research at the 
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Department of Defense found the Killian appointment “a good first step to 
having a Secretary of Science in the Cabinet, a move he favors.” The president of 
defence contractor Boeing, William Allen, echoed Foote’s praise for the 
appointment of Killian stating: “Now is the time to speak of what we need, not 
what we have.”90 Meanwhile a feature and an article later in the magazine 
highlight even further the state of flux much of the media was in as it moved on 
from initial positions following the launch of the first Sputnik, to more 
considered positions just six weeks later.  
If the November 7 TV and radio broadcast had begun Eisenhower’s fight 
back, that fight gained momentum in the second of three planned addresses to 
the American People. Titled ‘Our Future Security’, the speech, which was also 
carried on radio and television, was made in Oklahoma City on November 13 as 
Eisenhower joined the Oklahoma State leaders to celebrate the 50th anniversary 
of Oklahoma’s statehood.91 This speech set out clearly Eisenhower’s view of 
security and his undiminished desire for fiscal responsibility – in fact, it is a 
microcosm of Eisenhower’s driving tenets: peace through national security and 
fiscal austerity. This was not a particularly rousing or glamorous speech, but 
after the reassurance of the November 7 address, it did much to articulate the 
Eisenhower vision for security, and thus explain his resistance to the clamour 
for ever-increased defence and rocket spending. Giving the speech, Eisenhower 
sounded far more comfortable delivering an address in the ‘Heartland’ than in 
the earlier address which was made from the Oval Office. The speech was 
written very much as a joint effort between Eisenhower and former Director of 
the US Information Agency, Arthur Larson, whom Eisenhower had brought into 
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the White House as a Special Assistant specifically for the purpose of drafting 
speeches on science and national security policy. It underwent much iteration 
with Eisenhower’s notes and changes visible across each of the drafts as the 
speech developed.92  Eisenhower repeatedly cut out the metaphors and replaced 
high-flown sentiment with the kind of plain speaking he was comfortable in 
delivering. The result was a very Midwestern style of delivery. Eisenhower also 
instructed Larson to remove any specific references to attacks by his political 
opponents – he did not need to give them any further exposure.  
The main theme of the speech was security. Eisenhower first 
acknowledged the Soviets’ “rigorous educational system and their technological 
achievements.” But he warned that this achievement was “happening under a 
political philosophy that postpones again and again the promise to each man 
that he will be allowed to be himself, and to enjoy, according to his own desires, 
the fruits of his own labor.” Having reminded his audience of his anti-
communist credentials, he was eager to remind America of its strength: “It is 
found in the quality of our life, and the vigor of our ideals. It manifests itself in 
the ever-astonishing capacity of free men for voluntary heroism, sacrifice and 
accomplishment when the chips are down.” Eisenhower went on to provide a 
lesson to his audience, that the Soviets were quite willing to launch “aggression 
by violence [but also by]...propaganda and subversion, economic penetration and 
exploitation.” He then set out America’s defence, stating that it was based on “a 
strong nuclear retaliatory power [and]...co-operation with our allies.” The lesson 
stated the costs of different elements of defence – both those he supported and 
those demanded by his political opponents and military commanders. In five 
years, he said, his Administration had spent $211 billion on national defence. 
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He acknowledged the calls for “an indiscriminate increase in every kind of 
military and scientific expenditure.” But then Eisenhower delivered a sober and 
reasonable assessment of actions that would most likely emerge from the 
planned national security review – planned as an annual event, and therefore 
not driven by any perceived need to react to Sputnik.  
Eisenhower picked up on elements of the still-secret Gaither report, not 
referring to the report directly, but talking about speeding up the dispersal of 
SAC to additional bases; quicker SAC response to emergency alarms; 
improvements to early warning systems and developing “active missile defense 
against missiles” as well as adding long-range missiles. The point was to drive 
home that under Eisenhower’s command, his appointees were doing much of 
what their political opponents had accused them of not doing in the wake of 
Sputnik. For the President, throwing money at the issue did not necessarily 
hasten the solution, and while some areas – such as ICBM development – 
required more funding, that would come only by prioritising according to need. 
That, for Eisenhower had to be a balance. For every ICBM programme, 
commensurate cuts needed to be made elsewhere – either in defence or in 
civilian programmes. This was a plainly stated message to Congress. 
Eisenhower would not tolerate deficit budgeting. “Now, in the Federal 
government’s civilian activities, we shall have to make some tough choices.” 
As the speech developed, Eisenhower drew it away from additional 
spending on crash military programmes. In making his key argument that the 
US should be investing more in scientific education and basic research, he noted 
that ‘more’ did not necessarily mean more Federal funding: “Frequently time is 
a more valuable coin than money. It takes time for a tree to grow, for an idea to 
become an accomplishment, for a student to become a scientist.” He both asked 
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for greater investment in science education and the patience of the American 
people to let that education take root. In terms of US basic research, he noted 
that: “compared with any other country’s, [it] is considerably greater in quantity 
and certainly equal in quality.” But he was aware at “the fast rate of increase in 
the Soviet effort and their obvious determination to concentrate heavily on basic 
research.” Again, the solution was not money. “You cannot say to a research 
worker, ‘Your salary is tripled, get busy now and produce three times as many 
basic discoveries’.” 
This speech reassured the US public that the nation had the defences in 
place to withstand any Soviet threat, but also pushed back the arguments of 
Eisenhower’s post-Sputnik detractors by stating that his Administration was 
doing exactly what they had stated he wasn’t doing – SAC was being 
strengthened; missiles were being developed and all this was being achieved in 
the American spirit of openness and freedom for the individual to succeed. Any 
dramatic acceleration in any of the programmes mentioned would require cuts 
elsewhere – and the challenge was to Congress to identify and deliver these. It 
was rather a clever political speech just a year out from mid-term elections. This 
was a speech of calm assurance, a confidant rebuttal from a leader with no need 
to fear either the Soviets or his own domestic detractors. Once the November 7 
date had been set to counter any hostile reaction to the launch of Sputnik 2, the 
Oklahoma City speech evolved to be the middle element of a three-part response 
to Eisenhower’s critics, with the final address set for Cleveland, tentatively 
planned for November 29.93 This concluding element was never delivered due to 
Eisenhower’s stroke on November 25. However, his policy was clear. With the 
Oklahoma City speech in particular, Eisenhower delivered a series of points 
                                                          
93 Ibid. 
164 
 
that were all consistent with his National Security policy from considerably 
before the Sputnik 1 mission. Whereas a traditional interpretation points only 
to a knee-jerk reaction that delivered the agenda of others, a re-reading of what 
Eisenhower actually did shows that he made no changes to his long-term 
strategy, but used the opportunity provided by Sputnik to enact his own agenda.  
 
The dead dog bounce 
The final point to consider here is the newspaper reaction to Sputnik 2. Again, 
in the orthodox interpretation, Sputnik 2 is often conflated with Sputnik 1 and 
there is no separate investigation into the way the newspaper reaction to the 
second satellite differed from the first. In Eisenhower in War and Peace, for 
instance, Smith covered both off in a single paragraph which concluded: 
Sputnik orbited the earth 560 miles up, travelling at a speed of 
eighteen thousand miles an hour. Shortly afterward came Sputnik 
II, launched on November 3, six times larger than its predecessor 
with an orbit even higher.94 
 
The reaction was very different though, and reflected increasingly the 
reassurance Eisenhower’s active presence was making, and the growing belief 
that what he had said in his News Conference on October 9 was actually true.  
On Monday November 4 1957, The Chicago Daily Tribune led with the 
banner headline: ‘DOG ROCKET SPEEDS IN SKY’95. Its approach was 
consistent with the United States’ other major regional daily papers. The article 
focused on the Soviet success in putting the animal into orbit and the page 1 
lead implied that the Soviets had said the dog would be brought back alive. Yet, 
while the article carried the additional information furnished by the Soviets this 
time round, notably the size and weight of the satellite and the details of the 
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dog, initially named ‘Curly’ in the American media, there was equal weight 
given to the US scientist view that it was doubtful that the dog could be 
returned. In fact, the piece noted that ‘Curly’ was breathing out carbon dioxide 
which would ultimately kill it.  
The Tribune continued its news coverage on page three with several 
short pieces considering the political impact of this latest launch. Edward 
Teller, whose hawkish reaction to the initial Sputnik launch had shown him no 
supporter of Eisenhower’s more outwardly-moderate view of US-Soviet 
relations, was quoted as saying: “Russians have ways of imposing instruction 
and production that we do not have. It’s everybody’s job in the US to ensure we 
do not fall behind in technology.” Even this was a step down from the short-lived 
hyperbole of the previous month. Further coverage on pages three and five of 
the paper noted no reaction from the White House and Republicans admitting 
no surprise about the new Soviet satellite. Partisan Democrats though remained 
critical: Senator Jackson [D. Wash.] of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
was quoted by the Tribune saying that the administration “should appoint an 
all powerful missiles chief and undertake immediately a ‘bold program’ for 
increasing scientific and engineering training.96  
This was about as polemical as the Sputnik 2 coverage got in the 
newspapers. Indeed, there was rather a twist in the tale for the Soviets as even 
on the first day of launch coverage, the Soviet scientific and technological 
triumph ran into trouble with a very powerful lobby they would simply be 
unaccustomed to in Moscow: animal lovers. In contrast to the pop science 
hyperbole that followed the launch of Sputnik 1, the Chicago Daily Tribune 
focused on a very ‘human interest’ aspect of the flight. In a page lead entitled: 
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“ASPCA assails Russian sending of dog out into space”. Warren W McSpadden, 
General Manager of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals stated: “The ASPCA deplores the use of a dog or any other living 
animal, in these earth-launched experiments, whether by the Russian 
government, reported in the press as already having taken place, or by any 
other government.  Such use will, the ASPCA believes, result only in the 
unnecessary sacrifice of the animal, or in great pain or suffering should it 
survive. Moreover, sending a dog to outer space cannot possibly advance human 
health and welfare.”97 
By the following day, Sputnik was relegated to four paragraphs down-
page on page one with the start of the American fight back. The story quoted 
Dan Kimball, Head of US Aeronautics and Aerospace company Aerojet saying 
America had a rocket capable of putting a half ton satellite in space.98  Yet this 
piece still had to take second place to Chicago Mayor Daly’s new housing plans. 
Without a local angle, space news lost out to a local story.  A day later, the 
Federal mid-term and gubernatorial elections had overtaken the Sputnik story 
as the paper’s main news with the headline reflecting Democrat Governor 
Robert B Meyner’s overwhelming re-election in New York – a major blow to 
Eisenhower and Nixon.99 The President’s decision to address the country on 
national security shared the front page – but there was clearly no sense of panic 
about Sputnik 2. By November 7, the paper was speculating that Eisenhower 
was considering launching a larger rocket than the Russians, despite no word 
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whatsoever emanating from the White House, while its more outlandish 
extrapolation stated that the Soviets would be on the moon by 1967.100  
On November 8, the key Sputnik related stories in the Democrat Atlanta 
Constitution noted that the President’s TV address had been “aimed at 
reassurance” and that he had used it to announce James Killian of MIT as 
“Science Czar”. Just four days after the launch, this news was carried only on 
page 18 and given equal treatment to the on-going human (animal) interest 
story, “Space dog feared doomed”.101 However, there was simply too much 
domestic US news for the Sputnik 2 story to gain as much propaganda value for 
the Soviets as the Sputnik 1 launch a month before. The element of shock and 
surprise had gone. This launch was expected, and events from the 
Gubernatorial and Senatorial elections; follow-up to the new British Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan’s visit, and the search for wreckage of a downed San 
Francisco-to-Honolulu bound airliner with 44 aboard all vied for a place in the 
news pages both of the Atlanta Constitution, and newspapers across the 
country.  
 
Missile success 
Part of Eisenhower’s sang-froid in the face of the first Soviet satellite launch 
was no doubt due to the increasing success of the Atlas and Titan ICBM and 
Thor IRBM testing by the Air Force as well as the Jupiter competitor missile 
developed by the Army. The USAF missile development programme, under 
Schriever, was moving ahead rapidly. As often happened with new missiles, the 
first test flights of both Thor and Atlas were failures. The first Thor flight on 
January 25 1957 ended just 18 inches above the launch pad. Repeated failures 
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followed, but by September 20, Thor 105 deposited a dummy warhead 1,495 
miles from its launch site and on October 11 just a week after Sputnik 1, Thor 
106 delivered its warhead along a perfect 1,725 mile course before it splashed 
into the Caribbean near Venezuela.102 Atlas faced similar teething problems. On 
June 11 1957, the first Atlas ‘A’ test vehicle was launched from Cape Canaveral. 
Standing 75 feet and one inch tall, the missile drew thousands of spectators to 
the Cape to see its launch.103 The ‘flight’ lasted just 24 seconds, covering around 
1.6 miles before a range safety officer ordered its destruction due to a fault. The 
launch was thus only a partial success as was the follow-up test in September. 
However, in both cases, the faults that had led to failure were pinpointed 
quickly. The June failure was down to a failure in the turbo pump, while a failed 
liquid oxygen regulator caused the second test to be aborted. Both could be fixed 
quickly as Schriever told the Joint Chiefs of Staff who, in turn, informed the 
president. The remedies were proven in the faultless flight of the third Atlas 
test vehicle on December 17, 1957.  
The Army’s Jupiter Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) had 
already undergone two successful tests before Sputnik, while the Titan multi-
stage ICBM was slated for first testing at the start of 1959, with the solid rocket 
fuelled Minuteman and sea-borne launched Polaris ICBM both reaching the end 
of their design stages. Even on the civilianised side of the rocket programme, 
the Navy’s new Vanguard rocket, designed to launch the United States’ IGY 
satellite had enjoyed testing success. On October 23, 1957, the United States 
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) successfully tested a three-stage Vanguard 
rocket. There were two test launches before the October 23 event.  The first test 
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vehicle, TV-0, was launched on December 8th, 1956. It tested the rocket’s 
telemetry systems. Then, on May 1 1957, the TV-1 tested the separation and 
subsequent second-stage ignition capabilities of the two-stage rocket design.  
While there were a number of aborted launches, all three of these tests were 
successful, further reinforcing Eisenhower’s confidence that the United States’ 
military and civilian rocket programmes would ultimately be successful.  The 
success of the missile programme testing was a key factor in Eisenhower’s 
measured response - or indeed non-response - to Sputnik and it was 
undoubtedly the new phase in this military programme that was most 
important for the President as he sought to disentangle the military and non-
military elements of the emerging space programme.  The ongoing successes of 
the military missile development programme underpinned Eisenhower’s calm in 
the wake of the Sputnik launch and his refusal to be drawn into either 
speculation or any kind of hyperbole at the October 9 news conference where the 
tone of questioning had drawn a dividing line between the media and the 
Administration. The White House remained calm but with no wish to share 
national security secrets, while the press and broadcast media sold stories on 
the basis of speculation, ill-informed comments from those outside the 
Administration’s inner circle, and tactical attacks from those looking to use 
space to their own political or economic advantage.  
 
Recovery: Gaither and Executive Privilege 
In December, when the initial interest in Sputnik had faded, the 
recommendations of the Gaither Report were leaked. This was a highly political 
action that could have crippled Eisenhower’s presidency. Yet his actions in 
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dealing with it reflect the ascendancy Eisenhower was regaining over those who 
criticised his reaction to the Soviet success in space. 
 The term ‘Executive Privilege’ was coined in the Eisenhower years, not 
by the President himself, but according to Arthur Schlesinger, by his Attorney 
General, William Rogers, who had succeeded Herb Brownell in the post. 104 The 
chief issue he dealt with in his term as Attorney General was segregated 
schooling. Outer space was most certainly not a major concern, but he did advise 
the President on dealing with the Gaither Report in the face of significant 
Congressional pressure to publish a document that potentially could add 
considerable heat though precious little additional light as the President sought 
to impose his will in the immediate post-Sputnik era.  The TCP findings in 1954 
had catalysed action on the US missile programme, on the U-2 spy plane and on 
Corona. The panel system had worked well, and in 1957, it made sense for 
Eisenhower to authorise a similar confidential study into the United States’ 
passive defence systems. The study was prompted by a report from the Civil 
Defence Administration recommending a $40 billion appropriation for bomb 
shelters.105 Rowan Gaither, Chairman of the Board of the Ford Foundation was, 
at Killian’s recommendation, appointed to chair the civil defence study. But 
Gaither became ill almost as soon as the task force commenced its work. 
William Foster, a former Secretary of Defense, took his place as co-director, 
alongside Robert Sprague, president of the defence contractor, the Sprague 
Electric Company. Eisenhower had specifically instructed the task force to focus 
on passive defence. But by September, there was strong evidence of ‘mission 
creep’. While one might have expected this to be initiated by Forster, after his 
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years in DoD, the zealot for widening the mandate to include reviewing the 
nation’s active nuclear deterrent was Sprague. He was rather in thrall to RAND 
Staff Report R-290, compiled by Albert Wohlstetter in September 1956 and it 
was Wohlstetter who influenced Sprague to widen the scope of the study.106 This 
claimed that just 150 Soviet ICBMs could wipe out the entire SAC B-52 fleet in 
a surprise attack.107 While there were many reasonable elements to 
Wohlstetter’s report, such as the need to disperse the US nuclear bomber force, 
it was rather apocalyptic in its sentiment. However, the Gaither taskforce made 
the most polemic elements the centre of their response to the Administration. 
This response gained a rather more hawkish edge in the final drafting which fell 
to Paul Nitze. Given his background, it is unsurprising that Nitze’s draft was 
unequivocal in its demand for another massive investment in defence 
spending.108  
The Gaither committee presented its findings to the President on 
November 4, a day after Radio Moscow announced the successful orbit of 
Sputnik 2. The committee reconvened to address the NSC three days later. The 
report had been through many hands in the Pentagon prior to the NSC meeting 
and appeared to provide significant ammunition for those in the defence lobby 
looking to see significantly increased spending both on SAC’s bomber force and 
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more starkly, a vast increase in both the number of ICBMs and IRBMs – and 
the rate at which they should be produced. Titled Deterrence and Survival in the 
Nuclear Age the report devoted relatively little space to the committee’s original 
remit of reflecting on the state of US passive defence.109 It was startling in its 
demand to offset the perceived threat of Soviet ICBMs by building an ever-
larger deterrent force. Perhaps the most telling section is how this would be 
funded. If ever a report supposedly prepared for the benefit of the president 
misjudged both the needs and the nature of the president, it was Gaither. On 
page 4 of the report, the committee laid out its estimate of the Soviet threat: 
The singleness of purpose with which they have pressed their 
military-centered industrial progress has led to spectacular 
success. They have developed a spectrum of A- and H-Bombs and 
produced fissionable material sufficient for at least 1500 nuclear 
weapons. They created, from scratch, a long-range air force with 
1500 B29-type bombers; they then substantially reequipped it 
with jet aircraft, while developing a short-range air force with 
3000 jet bombers. In the field of ballistic missiles they have 
weapons of 700 n.m. [nautical miles] range; in production for at 
least a year. and probably surpassed us in ICBM development. 
They have developed air to surface and probably submarine-
launched cruise missiles; built 250-300 new long-range 
submarines, and partially modernized 200 others. They have 
created an air defense system composed of 1500 all-weather and 
8500 day jet fighters, equipped at least 60 sites, each with 60 
launchers, for a total of 3600 launching pads for surface-to-air 
missiles provided with a sophisticated and original guidance 
system and a ground environment of 4000 radars. At the same 
time they have maintained and largely reequipped their army of 
175 line divisions while furnishing large quantities of military 
equipment to their satellites and Red China.110  
The figures, lifted largely without question from the RAND study, were 
without any significant substantiation. The panel had not, of course, had access 
to Eisenhower’s reports on the U-2 over-flights of Soviet territory or other CIA 
material. These told a very different story. There was indeed a weapons and 
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missile gap between the US and USSR – but it was hugely stacked in America’s 
favour. If they had rather overemphasised the scale of the Soviet threat, the 
committee demonstrated just how out of touch it was with the president’s 
thinking when it came to fund the necessary increase in defence spending to 
deal with the perceived shortfall in US preparedness.  
The added defense measures to which the Panel has assigned 
relative values will probably involve expenditures in excess of the 
current $38 billion defense budget. 
The measures of highest value to strengthen our deterrent and 
offensive capabilities are estimated to cost over the next five years 
(1959-1963) a total of $19 billions. 
Additional measures of somewhat lower than highest value, for 
the protection of the civilian population include a strengthening of 
active defences, a fallout shelter program and the development of 
a defence system to protect cities from missile attack. The 
estimated cost of these items total a cost of $25 billions over the 
next five years..... 
The American people have always been ready to shoulder heavy 
costs of their defence when convinced of their necessity.111  
Eisenhower was not convinced. He recognised the good sense in 
dispersing SAC’s bomber force and was prepared to go along with the Air Force’s 
drive to speed up the ICBM/IRBM programme which had been lagging under 
Wilson’s tenure at DoD (not least because Eisenhower had insisted on reducing 
defence spending.). However, he had no intention of vastly increasing offensive 
military spending to balance out a threat he knew to be wildly exaggerated. In 
fact, his response to Gaither is a fair reflection of the Eisenhower Presidency. 
Ever since the Korean Armistice, he had concentrated on finding means to 
reduce defence spending while building just enough nuclear threat to meet the 
counter-threat posed by the Soviets and latterly the Chinese. Increasingly that 
expenditure had moved from large ground forces, an over-sized navy and the 
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massive retaliatory threat of the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command to a focus 
on a smaller, nimbler force for policing actions, and a missile-based nuclear 
deterrent. Now the rather misinformed rhetoric of the Nitze-crafted Gaither 
Report threatened the twin tenets of Eisenhower’s strategic view: fiscal 
conservatism and an innate desire to maintain peace with the Soviets.  
Eisenhower’s response to his oral briefing on November 4 and the 
extremely well-attended NSC briefing three days later was rather a classic of 
Presidential style. S. Everett Gleason, who minuted the meeting caught 
Eisenhower’s tone superbly. He was not going to panic nor bend to the Nitze-led 
argument. He noted that he had advocated an increase in the Defense budget 
from $38bn to $39.5bn, but that this had been rejected by Congress.  He then 
questioned whether the evidence presented was done so in order to protect the 
United States against a real Soviet threat, or merely to enable the maximum 
number of people in the defence and related industries to make as much money 
as possible out of the situation: 
The President added that in the light of what had been presented 
at the Council meeting today it was essential that we neither 
become panicked nor allow ourselves to be complacent. It was 
necessary urgently to make an economic, psychological, and 
political survey of what could and should be done. In this context, 
perhaps the advent of Sputnik had been helpful. The President 
added that we certainly did not wish to appear frightened… The 
President believed that we could correct this situation. The 
problem was whether we could correct the tendency of every 
American to try to get the maximum for himself out of the 
operation of our free economy. 112  
 
In discussing the impact of the proposed massive increase in both passive and 
offensive defence spending on foreign relations, John Foster Dulles made it 
abundantly clear that the president was not going to act on the major 
                                                          
112
 ‘Memorandum of Discussion at the 343d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, 
November 7, 1957’, prepared by SE Gleason, November 8, 1957, NSC Records, Whitman File, DDE 
Library.  
175 
 
recommendations of the report, but that the committee members were going to 
have to come to that realisation rather than get a straight rebuttal from the 
President. One point was key: the struggle with the Soviet system was not only 
a military contest. 
 
Secretary Dulles then returned to the point that our struggle with 
the Soviet Union and international communism was not just a 
military struggle. Up to now it has been primarily a cold war. 
Accordingly, there was great danger that we should so focus our 
eyes on the military aspects of the struggle that we lose the cold 
war which is actually being waged, forgetting that an actual 
military conflict may never be waged. The Soviet Union could 
make enormous gains in the economic struggle between us if the 
United States devotes so much of its resources to military 
measures and shelter programs that no resources remain for 
waging and winning the cold war.113 
 
As a further step towards burying the unacceptable, Eisenhower asked the 
various agencies present at the meeting to study the report and report back on 
any of the recommendations they felt worthy of further consideration. It was a 
rather charming way of letting the committee know that nothing substantial 
would be implemented. And indeed, he concluded by stating that “he could not 
thank the Security Resources Panel and its Advisory Group enough for the 
marvellous piece of work they had done.”114 In normal circumstances, that 
would have been that. The task force had been assembled at the President’s 
request. They had made their report and the President had listened. As far as 
Eisenhower was concerned, that was the end of the Gaither process. However, 
Eisenhower’s opponents – Democrats such as Nitze – had too much information 
that could be damaging to the current administration to let such a potentially 
incendiary report lie.  
 
                                                          
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
176 
 
A Question of Trust 
One of the enduring strengths of Eisenhower’s relationship with his chosen 
advisers was his utter faith in their integrity. It was Eisenhower’s view that 
those close to the President should not leak information – unless he told them 
to. In practice, such discretion and devotion to the Administration’s cause had 
ensured the efficient implementation of Killian’s TCP Report enabling such 
programmes as Corona and the U-2 to still be very secret even across the 
Washington political village. But someone close to Gaither, almost certainly 
Robert Sprague, quite possibly in conjunction with Nitze, was talking to the 
press. On December 20, just two weeks after the Vanguard test failure, and 
while Eisenhower was still recovering from his stroke, Chalmers Roberts wrote 
an in-depth piece summarising the report’s recommendations in the Washington 
Post.115 Publication in the Post ensured the Gaither summary would be read 
both nationally and internationally. Democratic Senator Joseph Clark of 
Pennsylvania than raised the temperature a little higher by inserting Roberts’ 
story in the Congressional Record. Particularly through his Sub-Committee on 
Preparedness, Lyndon Johnson pressed the Administration to make at the very 
least a sanitised version of the Gaither Report (and indeed the previous Killian 
TCP Report) available for scrutiny by Congress. It is questionable whether this 
would have had any benefit to the nation. However, in pressing for publication, 
Johnson was making an overt political manoeuvre both to emphasise his 
Congressional leadership (and potential for future Executive leadership), and, 
more so, to embarrass his Republican opponents. But Eisenhower was adamant 
that he had no intention of publishing either report. Indeed, in his memoirs, 
Killian records that:  
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The constructive impact of the study was greatly diminished 
when it was leaked to the press. In the administration, the leak 
discredited the report, and it doubtless did provide ammunition 
for opposition politicians who wanted to attack the 
administration. All of this made it difficult for the president to 
follow through on those parts of the report of which he 
approved.116 
It is interesting that Killian raised these points. Had the report not been 
leaked, the Administration could have claimed credit for any steps it took 
following the report’s receipt and digestion. But the leak provided ammunition 
for Eisenhower’s opponents. They could claim support for all Gaither’s 
recommendations and state that the decision of the Administration to disregard 
them was a failure of government. Making the Gaither recommendations public 
took them away from the President and made the report seem all the more 
critical of the Administration. Eisenhower was stubborn, and though the 
concept of Executive Privilege was new, he was firm in his belief that it was the 
right of a President who commissioned a report to keep its findings to as small a 
group of insiders as possible and act on those findings as he saw fit. It became 
apparent that some of those involved in compiling the report were lobbying for 
its recommendations to be implemented. That was not their role.  At the NSC’s 
350th meeting on January 6, 1958, Eisenhower made his position abundantly 
clear.  
The President commented that he believed that before we got 
done with this Gaither thing we would find ourselves obliged to do 
things which we normally would never think of doing [releasing a 
classified report to the President prepared confidentially by a 
board of consultants appointed by the President]. Mr. Cutler 
expressed his very deep opposition to making any concessions to 
the demand for versions of the Gaither report, and said that what 
the Congressmen and Senators were most interested in were the 
timetables in the Gaither report. The President replied in 
exasperation that he was sick to death of timetables; he had had 
experience with them for years, and they never proved anything 
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useful. Mr. Cutler repeated his view that even the issuance of a 
sanitized version would have catastrophic results.117 
 
Conclusion 
For over 50 years, the reading of Eisenhower’s reaction to Sputnik has been 
wrong. It has been built on the assumption that the president was caught cold 
by the launch of the Soviet satellites and that his reaction was both slow and 
forced. More recent revisionist interpretations, starting with Divine and 
continued by Mieczkowski have moved towards detailing Eisenhower’s response 
as both pragmatic and understandable within the limitations of his fiscal 
austerity and narrow focus on national security. But even in these revisionist 
observations, Eisenhower, in some respect, fails. For Mieczkowski, one of the 
key failures was “failing to heed the warnings of a first satellite’s prestige.”118 
This made his job tougher and opened him to attack from the media and 
Congress alike. His failure was one of imagination: the ability to link satellite 
success to enhancing the image of the nation.  Mieczkowski also noted that 
Eisenhower’s rigid fiscal conservatism, while eventually enabling him to leave 
office with the lowest inflation rate among all out-going presidents, absolutely 
ensured he neither would nor could fund a space race for national prestige.119 
Perhaps this is less a case of failure, than of a hindsight view of missed 
opportunity. Yet what is striking about even the most recent accounts of 
Eisenhower’s actions on space is the unquestioned assumption that they were a 
response to Sputnik. The evidence does not support this conclusion. Through the 
intelligence gathered by the CIA with its U-2 over flights, Eisenhower knew 
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that Sputnik posed no threat to national security. Through the work of the TCP, 
the strength of Strategic Air Command and the steady progress on the 
development of IRBMs and ICBMs, he knew that he had the elements in place 
to deliver his threat of massive retaliation which provided the fulcrum of the 
New Look Defence policy. As he said himself, Sputnik did not change that “by 
one iota”. 120 His long-term strategy was not even changed by the Gaither Panel 
recommendations. He also knew that as the end of the International 
Geophysical Year – and its planned climax for the US with the launch of its own 
satellite – approached, he needed to take steps to enable the next phase of US 
space policy to proceed along the parallel tracks of secret military projects and 
public scientific ones. Consequently, his action was a continuation of this path 
and the need to react in any meaningful way to the obvious Soviet propaganda 
play of the Sputnik launches simply was not a factor in his thinking.  
 It is true that after the first Sputnik launch this rather narrow national 
security-based thinking did hinder him in his response to the American people 
and the wider world through the media. But he did seize back the initiative – to 
the point that Sputnik 2 swiftly became a non-event. What is most compelling is 
that he won back the initiative by enacting his own pre-existing policies, not by 
following the lead of others.  What furore there had been in the wake of the 
Soviet launches had been largely media-manufactured and sustained by those 
with an agenda, whether that was purely political, or related to defence 
spending. It is likely that Eisenhower could have headed off that furore sooner 
had his initial response been less tardy. Staying in Gettysburg playing golf on 
the weekend following the first Sputnik launch was a poor decision prompted by 
poor advice from an expert employed to brief him both on the media’s needs and 
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their likely reaction to events. Waiting three further days to provide any 
meaningful response to the growing concern, particularly among the media, was 
not a show of strength but a lapse in understanding of the impact not of the 
particular threat the satellite posed, but of the very fact that the Soviets had 
launched it and launched it first.  But it is wrong to dwell on that early mis-step 
as the traditional narrative has. It actually provides no evidence that he was 
taken unawares by Sputnik. Nor is it evidence that he had no space policies in 
place. From October 9 onwards, Eisenhower worked pragmatically to allay the 
media’s fears and those of the wider public. But what was crucial was that he 
was not diverted from his own path on both missile development and in 
fulfilling US expectations of the IGY. In reality, Sputnik was little more than a 
minor bump in the road. The political fight against the President’s moderation, 
particularly in defence spending, continued after the initial flurry of Sputnik-
inspired publicity, and the President’s poor health at the end of 1957 rather left 
a void in the Administration’s response to criticism. But Eisenhower’s stoic 
determination in following his chosen path for national security, and what that 
meant for the incipient US space programme, ensured the Administration’s 
wishes became legislation just nine months after the first Sputnik launch. 
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Chapter 4: From confrontation to legislation: dealing 
with the Democrat challenge and building a space 
policy 
 
Eisenhower’s second term in the White House is rather too easily dismissed as a 
period when nothing happened and the president left little mark in terms of 
active presidency. He was the caretaker president, allowing John Foster Dulles 
to shape and deliver his major policy relating to the Soviet Union.1 While 
revisions to this caricature began as early as the 1980s, the myth remains.  This 
chapter follows the progress of the Executive as Eisenhower and his advisers 
moved on from the first US ICBM tests and the ending of the IGY towards the 
implementation of the first US space policy. In doing so, it presents an effective 
case study that demonstrates that far from being a caretaker, Eisenhower was 
still very much an engaged leader, developing and driving policy in support of 
his twin aims of enhanced national security and a balanced budget. The 
development of space policy captures Eisenhower in microcosm: not micro-
managing every operational decision, but working through experts to achieve 
his policy goals. The period covered in this chapter is from the end of the 
supposed furore of the Sputnik autumn, through to the enacting of legislation in 
July 1958. In reassessing the actions taken by key actors throughout the 
process, it focuses first on Lyndon Johnson, traditionally seen as the ‘founding 
father’ of space legislation, before detailing the interaction specifically of 
Eisenhower and his PSAC advisers in moving from a military-led proposal for 
space development, to a civilianised solution that took the outcomes of both the 
IGY and ICBM/IRBM development programmes, and shaped an effective way 
forward for the United States’ action in space. This chapter will reassess the 
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role of the Executive in driving forward a policy that was in existence – albeit in 
nascent form – prior to the Soviet satellite launches of autumn 1957. Rather 
than taking the traditional approach of regarding all that followed in 1958 as 
being a reaction to Sputnik, it will question quite how vital Johnson was to the 
drafting of the legislation, and revisit the chronology of events to assess who 
actually played the key roles in driving the first American space policy. In so 
doing, this chapter will acknowledge that Johnson played an important role, but 
show that others had input that was just as vital, and that the Executive came 
far closer to achieving its goals in developing a natural follow-on to its IGY 
policy than its Congressional opposition achieved in promoting a Gaither 
Report-inspired response to Sputnik. This chapter answers questions on the role 
Eisenhower took as an active driver of policy development, and analyses how 
those shaping policy for him worked with the president to define a solution that 
was both politically and financially acceptable. 
 
LBJ and Sputnik  
Following the launch of Sputnik 2, Senate Majority Leader, Lyndon Johnson 
used his opening speech in the first session of the Senate Preparedness Sub-
Committee’s post-Sputnik hearings to “ask the people in charge to tell us...how 
we can regain the leadership.”2 Over the next two months, Johnson attempted 
to expose the Administration’s perceived flaws in developing a credible missile 
and space programme while he sought to present himself as the country’s 
leading advocate for space exploration. Indeed, orthodox historians claim 
Johnson was the architect of the legislation that enabled the creation of NASA, 
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and that these hearings enabled him to claim legislative primacy in driving this 
first US space policy. Johnson’s role is often taken as an accepted truth. For 
instance, in Debbie Levy’s Presidential Leaders: Lyndon B Johnson, aimed at 
senior school and US college students, Johnson’s role is accounted for in a single 
paragraph. It stated: 
he approached another pet project, space exploration, without 
hesitation. He was an early and enthusiastic supporter of the US 
space program. In 1958, he played an important role in the 
passage of the National Aeronautics and Space Act. The law 
created NASA – the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration – to advance the nation’s knowledge of space 
flight and exploration and related issues.3 
 
Levy’s work is not at the pinnacle of political scholarship, but is representative 
of a canon that takes the assumption of Johnson as architect of NASA as read. 
Indeed, the interpretation of Johnson as a crucial player in the creation of 
NASA has been a staple of scholarly interpretation throughout the period of 
Eisenhower revisionism. In Presidential Studies Quarterly in 1994 for instance, 
Thomas Gaskin recounted Johnson’s interaction with Eisenhower on foreign 
policy across Eisenhower’s second presidential term. Gaskin delivered the 
standard interpretation for Johnson’s influence writing: 
In the ensuing months [following his first round of Senate 
Hearings, discussed below], Johnson got the Senate to create a 
Special Committee on Space and Aeronautics which he chaired. 
From this committee he helped shape the Eisenhower legislation 
that established the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), insured that it was under civilian 
control, and forced Eisenhower to accept legislation creating a 
Space Council which would set policy.4 
 
Gaskin makes the common assumption that Johnson was at the centre of 
the process to create NASA and a powerful mover in shaping the 
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organisation’s purpose and governance. However, that assumption will 
be questioned in this chapter.   
As owner of a number of TV and radio stations across Texas through 
Texas Broadcasting (later the LBJ Company) Johnson was certainly extremely 
media-aware. As such, he saw the issue of space policy as a means to gain 
prominence via the media. With the 1960 presidential race beginning to shape 
up, he also had an issue to use as a means to gain support for his candidacy for 
the Democratic Presidential nomination. Time reported his addressing the 1958 
Democratic Caucus saying: 
Our national potential exceeds our national performance. Our 
science and technology has been, for some time, capable of many 
of the achievements displayed thus far by Soviet science. That the 
Soviet achievements are tangible and visible, while ours are not, 
is a result of policy decisions made within the governments of the 
respective nations. The evaluation of the importance of the control 
of outer space made by us has not been based primarily on the 
judgment of men most qualified to make such an appraisal. Our 
decisions... have been made within the framework of the 
Government's annual budget. This control has, again and again, 
appeared and reappeared as the prime limitation upon our 
scientific advancement . . . What should be our goal? If, out in 
space, there is the ultimate position—from which total control of 
the earth may be exercised—then our national goal and the goal 
of all free men must be to win and hold that position.5  
Yet one must consider what he said in 1958. He was advocating increased 
spending on “tangible and visible” space achievements, and his objective was “to 
win and hold” outer space. Both points were anathema to Eisenhower who had 
not interest in a space race or any kind of Cold War proxy contest in space. Nor 
had he any intention of spending a dollar more than he had to in order to ensure 
the national security of the United States. Of course, space is also a ‘Trojan 
Horse’ which provided Johnson with the means to mount a wider attack on the 
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administration, undermining Eisenhower’s budget-led approach and, implicitly, 
criticising his fitness to govern.  
Most Johnson scholarship focusing on the early years of US space effort 
stresses the significance of his contribution to getting the United States into the 
‘space race’ both through his sub-committee’s pricking of the President into 
action, and through the masterly way he drove the 1958 National Aeronautics 
and Space Act through Congress. In his biography Lyndon B. Johnson – Portrait 
of a President, Robert Dallek perhaps best articulated the orthodox line on 
Johnson’s congressional management of the space issue. He asserted that the 
first phase of the Preparedness Sub-committee hearings from November 1957-
January 1958:  
allowed Lyndon to identify himself as the country’s leading 
congressional advocate of a stepped-up effort in space. He 
dominated the hearings, introducing witnesses, leading cross 
examinations and making himself the principal spokesman to the 
press...Lyndon was the architect of the new organisation.6 
 
Dallek’s take on Johnson’s Senatorial command over his sub-committee’s 
hearings deploys fairly standard, traditional themes by taking much of its force 
from characterising Eisenhower as a passive non-player, at odds with the 
American people and especially its politicians. But this viewpoint – and more so, 
Johnson’s impact in championing the NASA legislation - has come under 
particular scrutiny recently, with Robert Caro, taking a rather different line on 
just how influential Johnson actually was.  The orthodox line has Johnson 
playing a very significant role shaping the arms-length independent agency to 
manage the USA’s civil space programme, leading the process to move the plans 
for NASA from executive desire to Congressionally-approved legislation. 
Pushing through the kind of legislation Eisenhower favoured in a Democrat-led 
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Congress was never going to be easy. Eisenhower required allies-of-
circumstance: politicians he could work with even if their aims were somewhat 
different from his own. Johnson fitted that profile and, following their work 
together on the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Johnson’s championing of the Space 
and Aeronautics Act of 1958 has generally been regarded as an extension of this 
relationship – another opportunity for the Leader of the Senate to project his 
importance on the national stage and to an international audience.7 This was all 
grist to his intended challenge for the Democratic presidential nomination in 
1960.  However, Caro takes a rather more nuanced view of LBJ’s relationship 
with space legislation and thus with the President over it. Yes, Johnson used 
the aftermath of the first Sputnik launch for his own political gain, but when 
the time came to steer the legislation founding NASA and setting the first 
formal US space policy through the Senate, he was, in Caro’s view, much more 
the passenger than the driver. Caro wrote that following the launch of Sputnik, 
Johnson was actually a little slow off the mark and not the first Democrat to 
react to the Soviet satellite. Indeed, Democrat politicians, whose first reaction 
was to assume that “the Administration had squandered America’s lead in 
missilery and that the nation had been caught unprepared”8, turned first not to 
Johnson to challenge the Administration, but to Senator Richard Russell, 
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee (ASC). But Russell felt that 
LBJ was better suited to investigating just how ‘prepared’ the US was to meet 
this new perceived Soviet threat. Indeed, Johnson led the ASC’s Preparedness 
subcommittee.  
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Caro noted that Johnson assured the Administration, Defense Secretary 
Neil McElroy and Senate Republicans that the investigation would be non-
partisan. Yet in Caro’s view, his key intention was to demonstrate his 
ownership of the missile/rocket/satellite issue and to use it as a bolster to his 
impending entry into the race for the Presidency. He stage managed the 
hearings impeccably: creating a precise order intended to create the maximum 
impact on the Administration, the media and therefore the wider American 
public. First, he called those scientists deemed likely to embarrass the 
Administration –Teller first, soon followed by the nation’s most recognised space 
figure: Werner von Braun. Then, as Caro put it: “came the Generals (Le May, 
Hyman, Rickover and Gavin)….to paint a disturbing picture of how an overly 
economy-conscious Administration had allowed its emphasis on a balanced 
budget to interfere with the nation’s security.”9  
The Senate Preparedness Subcommittee met from November 25 1957 to 
January 23 1958 “on matters pertaining to outer space” and a summary of 
selected testimonies was used by Johnson’s Space and Astronautics sub-
committee as it began to debate the Administration’s proposed legislation in 
April. 10 In total, 73 witnesses appeared at the Hearings, and their testimony 
totalled 2,376 pages.11  
Senate Hearings 
On November 25, 1957, Teller was the first significant scientist to face the 
Preparedness Subcommittee. It was an ominous day since it was also the day 
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when the President suffered his stroke. While he was active in the White House 
within a week, the illness effectively took Eisenhower out of the public arena 
until the following January. Thus, as Eisenhower succumbed to the onset of old 
age (at least, according to the traditional interpretation) coupled with the 
dangers of a 1950s lifestyle (he still smoked and consumed rather more alcohol 
than one would consider wise for the leader of the free world today), at the other 
end of Pennsylvania Avenue, Johnson attempted to twist the political knife. 
Teller had been active in criticising the Executive in the wake of the Sputnik 
launches. Evan Thomas described Teller as “a reliable purveyor of gloom and 
doom”12  and the self-styled ‘father of the H-bomb’ did not disappoint, although 
one has to question whether he was the right person to be addressing the 
committee at this point. Teller was an expert on nuclear physics, not on 
satellites. Yet, in the more deferential 1950s, his views were sought and shared 
on all aspects of science.  
The Russians are definitely ahead in the ballistic missile and 
satellite fields.....Unless we get an engine with a large thrust, we 
will be behind in the general field of the control of outer 
space....Control of outer space is as important, if not more 
important than the ballistic missile. If the Soviet Union should 
control over outer space with satellites before we do, this country 
will be in mortal danger.....if the Russians chose, and they had the 
hydrogen warhead, they could put a hydrogen bomb on top of the 
Capitol.13 
Teller’s polemicizing was entirely without any basis in fact.  He vastly 
overestimated the power of the Soviets and also their intent, while being 
entirely outside Eisenhower’s circle of command (and therefore information) 
when it came to developing space and missile policy. Teller was an arch 
conservative, intensely hawkish and at odds with Eisenhower’s moderate 
Republicanism. His testimony, which unsurprisingly gained significant coverage 
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in the media was focused on building bigger, more powerful missiles – 
something Eisenhower knew was not necessary. While an eminent physicist, he 
was neither an intelligence nor missile expert. Thus, his testimony was accorded 
rather more value than it was actually worth when it appeared in the 
newspapers the following day. The widely syndicated Roscoe Drummond 
column, which appeared in newspapers across the mid-west commented:  
In vital aspects of science, Dr. Teller – who has the credentials to 
speak and be heard – says we are about 10 years behind. In 
ballistic missiles, the lag is about 18 months.14 
  
While Teller’s remarks gained prominence, there were slightly different 
viewpoints expressed by witnesses in the first week of hearings. None, though, 
particularly redressed the balance in favour of the president.  
Also on that first day of testimony, Dr. Vannevar Bush, who headed the 
Office of Scientific Research and Development and thus had been responsible for 
mobilising the nation’s scientists during World War 2 (including Jim Killian) 
wanted another wave of mobilisation, this time to: 
make sure that from here on in, our missile and satellite 
development programs move on smoothly and effectively at 
maximum speed...We should provide for unified military planning 
in everything we do so that future developments will be in order 
from the outset   I would not recommend at this time a civilian 
organization outside the Department of Defense to carry on 
military development   Co-ordination can be done better within 
the Department of Defense.15 
Bush was concerned at the internecine rivalry that still stalked the Pentagon 
and each service’s development programmes. His sentiment made sense, but no 
doubt appeared another criticism of the Executive to the watching media, their 
viewers, listeners and readers.  
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General James Doolittle testified the following day. As a war hero best 
remembered for leading the B25 bombing raid on Japan in 1942 as well as his 
key role in the bombing offensive over Germany16, still a towering figure in the 
American imagination, his words carried weight – more so as he had been 
invited to testify as Chairman of the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics (the NACA).17 His essential line was simple: “We need more basic 
research.”18 Taken with the headline comments of the previous day, his 
testimony began to paint a picture of a President asleep at the wheel; who had 
allowed the US to fall behind the Soviets and thus put the nation at risk. While 
Eisenhower was far from asleep, he was most certainly incapacitated due to his 
stroke as Johnson invited witnesses to testify before the committee. Therefore, 
the President’s early defence fell to his appointees in the Department of 
Defense, his newly-appointed Secretary, the businessman-turned politician, Neil 
McElroy19 and then Assistant Secretary Don Quarles, who was rather more 
engaged on the inside story of the development of the United States’ missile, 
and therefore rocket capability.  
McElroy’s testimony of November 27th was short and to the point.  But 
under questioning, he fell short, once again, of upholding the Administration’s 
line.  First, supporting the President’s line, McElroy stated: “Dr. Killian can 
make a real contribution if he improves coordination in various research 
activities in government, such as National Science Foundation, NACA and 
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Atomic Energy Commission.” This was helpful in alerting the US public that 
Killian was much more than a ‘missile czar’. But if Eisenhower hoped that 
McElroy could keep to the line first played out from the White House via John 
Foster Dulles and Jim Hagerty on October 5 that Sputnik had no impact on US 
actions either in missiles or satellites, then that hope was rapidly dashed under 
cross-examination.  “Had we known the Sputniks were to be launched we would 
have done things differently. Sputnik surprised me.” he said.20  
He also said that if he had been privy to the intelligence knowledge, he 
would not have been so surprised. It was a brief flash of a chink in the armour, 
which, surprisingly was not picked up either by the committee or the media. 
McElroy seemed to suggest that the President had access to intelligence 
information regarding the launch of Soviet satellites. Yet the President or his 
spokesman had given no indication of that in any public comment. However, 
McElroy neglected to mention that boasts of an imminent Soviet satellite launch 
were being made quite publicly by Sedov at the end of September.  
Don Quarles, speaking on the same day, was much more rigorous in his 
justification for the pace and priority of American action, and attempted to 
defuse some of the more polemic interpretation of the Sputnik satellites:  
The satellites do not prove the Russians are more advanced in 
rocketry than we are. Even if they did it would be a minor rather 
than a major factor in the near term balance of military 
power...The military significance of launching a satellite can be 
exaggerated by failing to take account of all the other factors that 
do tend to make such a test of this time relatively less important 
than it was represented to be. [Other factors such as bomber 
retaliatory power]... does not entitle one to believe that they have, 
either have had at that time or will have in the near future, a 
striking power based on this kind of development.21 
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Quarles questioned the assumption, prompted by Johnson, that a satellite 
equated directly with the ability to launch a nuclear missile strike. To that 
extent, his statement was beneficial to Eisenhower. But prestige mattered as 
much as the reality of national security, and for the US public, the questioning 
of Quarles gave further credence to the belief that America could have launched 
the first satellite, and that the blame for not doing so lay at the president’s door. 
Quarles noted that the US could have launched its satellite ahead of the 
Soviets. “Had we started early enough, I think there is no doubt, we could have 
launched our satellite ahead of theirs.”22 He explained the subsequent US 
course of action by saying that in 1955, when the IGY was being prepared, the 
‘best judgement’ was to separate the civilian satellite from the military missile 
programme and that the Navy was best placed to handle the job through 
Vanguard. This would ensure that IGY work would not interfere with the top 
priority of the ballistic missile programme. However, hindsight forced him to 
agree that the ‘satellite lag’ was in part caused by the lack of a unified 
programme – a criticism of DoD and therefore by implication, the president. 
However, he noted that the civilian scientists were also partly to blame through 
their desire to get more and more instrumentation into the satellites. He 
acknowledged that the Army could have orbited a satellite using the Jupiter 
booster, but that this would have required additional investment and that was 
not favoured in 1955/56 by the public. Quarles had spread the blame for ‘failure’ 
far and wide – with the president far from blameless. 
Lieutenant General James M Gavin, who had come to prominence as the 
Deputy Division Commander of the 82nd Airborne who had parachuted into 
France as the advance force in the very early hours of D-Day and had become a 
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national hero, led the military fusillade describing Sputnik as: “Perhaps the 
most significant thing of our times.”23  While Gavin saw sense in creating a 
civilian organisation to manage space exploration, he was in the military 
minority. His colleague from the Air Force, Clarence Irvine, Deputy Chief of 
Staff for Materiel, was adamant that further funding for research, development 
and deployment should reside with the US Air Force. His most memorable 
response to the questioning was to say: “We do not need any more commissions, 
czars or organisations.”24 In between Gavin and Irvine came the Army artillery 
General John Medaris, and Wernher Von Braun. Medaris, reciting the 
chronology of the Jupiter-C development, was equally transparent in his case-
setting for winning the development of satellites for the Army. His view was 
that all missile development should be the responsibility of the Army – since a 
missile was merely an extension of an artillery piece. He pointed out that the 
Army had long had the capability to launch a satellite, having successfully 
tested the satellite configuration in September 1956. Pre-empting Von Braun’s 
testimony which was to follow, he noted that the missing element in missile 
(and therefore rocket) development was the ‘big thrust engine’. He did not see 
satellites and missiles being an either/or decision, and nor did he see the need to 
prioritise one over the other. “The priority [for the United States] should be on 
the attainment of a space capability at the earliest possible date. Satellites and 
ballistic missiles have many basic techniques that cannot be separated. 
Divorcement [sic] of the two impedes both.”25 
Von Braun, the German-born engineer who had become the public face of 
US rocketry through his TV exposure and numerous articles in Life, Colliers 
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and other widely-read publications, followed his military manager. His 
testimony was timely in so far as it came eight days after the failure of the 
Vanguard launch, when the rocket blew up just feet above the Cape Canaveral 
launch pad, and 10 days after his Mars space show had been aired on the ABC 
network.26 His line was trenchant, predictable and self-serving: “The Russians 
are definitely ahead in the ballistic missile and satellite fields,” he said.27 
“Unless we get an engine with a large thrust, we will be behind in the general 
field of the control of outer space....If we want to establish control of outer space 
by manned vehicles we will need large engines. I believe the control of outer 
space is more important than the ballistic missile.” This was very much against 
Eisenhower sentiment, since ‘control’ of space implied some element of battle, 
and the one thing that the President was absolutely adamant on was the 
peaceful exploration of space. 
Eisenhower was a long-term, strategic actor. His philosophy was to wage 
peace, and thus only fight battles as a last resort – and only when he knew he 
had the capability to win. Outer space was a potential battlefield that 
Eisenhower’s forces were not going to be in a position to control. As early as 
1947, in a West Point Commencement speech, Eisenhower had said: “War is 
mankind's most tragic and stupid folly; to seek or advise its deliberate 
provocation is a black crime against all men….For Americans, only threat to our 
way of life justifies resort to conflict”28 Therefore, in his way of thinking, space, 
where there was no actual threat to the way of life of US citizens was never 
going to be a battlefield. That made Von Braun’s later statements on the 
capabilities of artificial satellites largely redundant – though he was prescient 
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(if out of the information loop) in his understanding of the potential for 
reconnaissance satellites. Portentously, Von Braun agreed that Sputnik proved 
that the USSR had the means of sending a hydrogen warhead anywhere in the 
world and that a Sputnik-type vehicle gave them orbiting bombing capability. 
Within months, Ed Purcell’s paper was to prove that notion to be far-fetched. 
However, Von Braun was right in saying that a satellite the size of Sputnik 2 
“would be entirely capable of carrying a combination of optical and television 
equipment to use as a powerful reconnaissance instrument.”29   
By 1960, Eisenhower had deployed such satellites. Von Braun, of course, 
was using the Capitol stage as a platform for advancing his own claims for a 
central role in the US space programme. He reiterated that his team was ready 
to: “get a man into space in five years and build a space station in 10.” He asked 
for an annual budget of $1.5 billion to make this happen, and was open to 
control of such a programme being handled either by the Department of Defense 
or a new agency. Notably, Von Braun stated that the ideal set-up for the US in 
space would be for the consolidation of space and military effort under one man. 
He was, it seems, too modest to suggest a name.   
Von Braun was highly skilled in playing to the crowd – be they the 
assembled Senators or the wider public reached through the media. Certainly 
the Washington Post regarded his testimony as important and appeared swayed 
by the force of his argument. The following day, it led with the headline: “All out 
push to dominate space urged”30. Overall, Von Braun’s skilful answering of 
Johnson’s committeemen’s questions earned positive reviews. The New York 
Times described his testimony a “hit”.31 It seems fair to say that his intervention 
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was the apogee of the Johnson Hearings. After Von Braun’s bravura 
performance, the Hearings became rather repetitive, with the repeated request 
for more money to be pumped into the Department of Defence varied only in 
tone and dependent on which service the speaker was representing. Lieutenant 
General Donald Putt, the Air Force’s Military Director its Science Advisory 
Committee and Deputy Chief of Staff for Development, summed up the military 
mood saying: “We need funds for research and development on future bombers, 
nuclear propulsion for aircraft, electronics, missiles, satellites, chemical 
propulsion and new fuels.”32 There were not too many areas of potential 
spending that he chose to leave out.  
Johnson’s Committee broke for Christmas on December 17, and never 
really regained its energy in the New Year. That said, Johnson was still keen to 
emphasise the distinct gap between his thinking and that of the President, 
stepping out of the supposed bi-partisan environment of the committee hearings 
to do so. Just three weeks before the US launched its own satellite, Johnson 
reflected the critical thinking around the fear of Soviet domination in space. 
“There is something more important than the ultimate weapon,” Johnson 
declared when he addressed the Democrat Caucus. “That is the ultimate 
position – the position of total control over Earth that lies in outer space.”33 
Johnson’s sentiment exposed a radical difference in his thinking on space from 
the president. Eisenhower saw good reason to exploit space militarily for 
communication, meteorology and reconnaissance purposes, but did not rate 
space as likely to be highly important in future wars. Johnson, on the other 
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hand, was an early advocate for the weaponisation of space and certainly saw 
the military having command of all US space efforts. 
The one testimony of note from the January committee hearings came 
from Nelson Rockefeller. Rockefeller gave testimony on January 10 1958 in his 
position as chairman of the President’s Advisory Committee on Government 
Organisation, a role he had held since 1953. Although a moderate Republican, 
Rockefeller, grandson of the founder of Standard Oil, was both independently 
extremely wealthy, and set to run for political office (he was elected Governor of 
New York later in the year, and was a rival to Nixon’s Presidential run in 1960), 
and thus the stage offered by Johnson’s Committee gave him a national 
platform to reinforce his credentials and views with the American public. His 
answers to the Committee’s questions highlighted a difference in thinking from 
the president. “The Russians have given space a higher priority of effort. Our 
scientific effort should be intensified,” he commented.34 And although, even at 
this early stage in the process, he was well aware of Killian’s PSAC drive to 
secure the civilian space agency through a reorganised NACA, he said: 
“Problems of where research in space should be done should be decided by the 
Secretary of the Department of Defense.” He also stated that the decision on 
whether the new space agency should reside within the Pentagon or not should 
be decided not by the president, but by the Secretary for Defense. Such 
sentiment hardly helped the Administration’s case – but also rather pointedly 
showed that Rockefeller was not an Eisenhower insider in the evolution of the 
Administration’s first space policy.  
 
Written evidence 
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In addition to the in-person hearings, the Committee also reviewed written 
evidence, with weight being given to the American Rocket Society which had 
first written to Eisenhower on October 14 in the wake of Sputnik 1’s launch and 
the Rocket and Satellite Research Panel, which had written to the Committee. 
Their papers were combined as a joint proposal for a national programme for 
space flight. The Rocket and Satellite Research Panel’s signatories spanned the 
upper echelons of military research, supported by their key suppliers (Convair 
and General Electric), and included Von Braun from the Army Ballistic Missile 
Agency and Pickering and Stewart from the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. The 
American Rocket Society’s report, signed by its president, George Sutton and 
James Van Allen whose Explorer satellite was soon to be America’s first 
artificial satellite, focused a little less on money (the Rocket and Satellite 
Research Panel was looking for additions to the Defense budget of no less than 
$10bn), and was prescient in the programme it presented. This focused initially 
on a series of unmanned scientific earth orbit and both moon and Venus 
circumnavigation flights, followed by “Returnable, manned satellite in flight 
around the earth by 1961 or 62,” and “Small inhabitable permanent satellites by 
1963.” (space stations). Suggesting how exploration might develop later in the 
decade, the Society called for a “Manned expedition to the moon by 1 or 2 men 
by 1968; establishment of a permanent human (moon) base, if desired, by 1970” 
and “Fast manned reconnaissance flight to Mars and Venus, without landing, 
beginning 1972.”35  
While Johnson generated a wealth of news coverage up to and through 
the hearings, they dragged on too long and their findings were undercut by the 
successful orbiting of the first US satellite – Explorer 1.   So where did that 
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leave Johnson? It would seem that he was left with a short-term hot issue that 
did much to create the concept of the ‘missile gap’ – but an issue that by 
February was losing heat to be replaced by the domestic worries of the onset of 
recession. Indeed, the launch of the Explorer satellite on January 31 1958 did 
much to bring public opinion in the US back in synch with Eisenhower’s 
unwavering line that America had nothing to fear from the launch of Soviet 
satellites. Johnson’s subcommittee report had 17 rather general 
recommendations for strengthening military security which included advocating 
a national programme for space exploration. However, it failed to include plans 
for a space agency, either military or civilian.  
As public opinion shifted towards the President on space and missile 
issues, the media’s appetite for Johnson’s crisis-talk faded. As soon as that 
happened Johnson’s interest switched to what really mattered to him: poverty, 
education and economic opportunity. Caro has shown that that although the 
bills to create a new Senate Special Committee on Space and Astronautics were 
introduced to the Senate by Johnson in February, they held no interest for him. 
More importantly, we will see through the next part of this chapter that the core 
legislation to create NASA was drafted not by the committee but by the 
Eisenhower Administration – principally by Killian’s PSAC team.  Johnson’s 
Preparedness Investigation had generated a lot of heat and but exponentially 
less light, providing mainly a platform for disgruntled scientists and budget-
hungry military figures to take the opportunity to indulge in what Divine 
describes as “military sour grapes”.36   However, contrary to Caro’s outline of his 
involvement, LBJ’s moment in the sun was not yet over. He was able to keep at 
the forefront of the outer space debate as both the House and Senate debated 
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proposed legislation covering both the United States’ first formal civilian space 
programme, and how that programme would be administered. But, his role 
changed significantly in 1958, as the Executive wrested control of the space 
issue back into the hands of the Administration.  
The testimony delivered at the Hearings was important in so far as each 
piece of evidence was mulled over in the media and those portions that attacked 
the Eisenhower administration’s policies have later been picked up and 
sustained by orthodox interpreters of the Sputnik ‘crisis’. Certainly, Johnson’s 
statements and the testimonies of the likes of Gavin and Von Braun, form 
cornerstones to the orthodox space race chronology. Yet they had no actual 
bearing on Eisenhower’s parallel track. Killian was already at work assembling 
the team that would define and shape NASA and its role within the 
administration’s space policy, while the Explorer satellite’s launch – enabled by 
Von Braun’s ABMA Jupiter rocket team, deflated his own polemic testimony 
from the previous November.    
 
Damage to Presidential approval 
Towards the end of 1957, Eisenhower’s approval ratings had fallen from 79% to 
57%- by far the lowest rating of his presidency.37 But it was really only in the 
very early days in October that he had appeared out of step with the American 
public. Their view, short-term as it was, no doubt was heavily influenced by the 
agenda-setting media titles with a national reach such as the New York Times, 
Washington Post and the news weeklies  which, albeit briefly, lined up against a 
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perceived slow-moving presidency. Indeed, Time crowned Khrushchev its man of 
the year for his Sputnik successes.38  
Eisenhower’s stroke in late November hindered his ability to put the 
Sputnik satellites in true context. The messages he had begun to spread 
through his reassurance talks, first the national TV address on November 7, 
and second, the Oklahoma speech on November 13 had been well received. But 
his stroke meant he was unable to deliver the third planned talk. So, as Killian 
was making plans, out of sight of the media gaze, to draw together the threads 
of civilian and military rocket activity, the President was rationing his 
appearances and involvement in day to day White House affairs and thus 
unable to contribute fully effectively to the shaping of a post-IGY military and 
civilian environment. The only publicity surrounding US space involvement was 
the daily reporting of Johnson’s Senate hearings. 
American prestige dropped further early in December with the first test 
of America’s Vanguard rocket. This was to be launched from Cape Canaveral on 
December 6 1957 in the full gaze of the media with an on-looking public 
audience of thousands and a TV audience of millions.  For the scientists 
advising the President in Washington and for the engineers directly involved in 
the programme, it was merely a staging point on the way to perfecting the 
Vanguard rocket. But particularly to a media cohort stung by Sputnik, this 
‘launch’ was all about catching up the Soviet space lead. However, ‘Test Vehicle 
3’exploded four feet off the pad.39 Thanks to live TV coverage, necessitated by 
Eisenhower’s requirement that IGY activities be entirely open to public 
scrutiny, millions watched the unfolding debacle in amazement. The 
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humiliation by the media was more international than domestic. In London, the 
Daily Express led next day with the headline: ‘US calls it Kaputnik’.40 The Daily 
Herald was no less scathing with: ‘Oh what a flopnik!’41  The French were 
scornful with Paris-Journal’s “It seems there is a worm in the grapefruit”.42 Of 
course, the US regional dailies were not slow to report on the test failure. Their 
response was typified by the Louisville Courier-Journal which reported: “A shot 
may be heard around the world, but there are times when a dud is even 
louder.”43 At the United Nations, the tongue-in-cheek Soviets asked their 
American counterparts if the US might wish to receive assistance under the 
Soviet programme of foreign aid for technical assistance to backward nations.44 
 
Creating a distinction between militarized and civilian space 
While Eisenhower had been willing to let his three armed services compete to 
develop both satellites and missiles in the hope that competition would bring 
forth rapid technological advance, the effect had not been what he hoped for. 
However, much had been going on behind the scenes, not catalysed by Sputnik, 
but more as the next phase in a continuum that had begun at Bikini Atoll and 
was entering a natural next phase with the final months of the International 
Geophysical Year.  
The most important aspect of Eisenhower’s civilian space policy, 
developing NASA from a wealth of possible approaches to an entity bounded by 
legislation, occurred between the start of February 1958 and the end of March 
when Eisenhower instructed Killian to develop objectives for the United States 
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in space and the organisation necessary to achieve them. Over this short period, 
a PSAC sub-committee, reporting to Killian but ably led by Nobel Laureate Ed 
Purcell, combined the task of setting the outline for the United States’ first 
formal civilian outer space policy and, in parallel, defining a structure for 
bringing that policy to life. This combination proved a masterstroke. In so doing, 
it provided an insight into why Killian’s relationship with Eisenhower was so 
effective.  
The launch of the Explorer satellite had received what Whitman 
described as a “muted” reaction within the White House.45 Yet this was not the 
whole truth. Despite being in his golfing cottage on the Augusta National 
Course, Eisenhower had taken an interest in the launch, and General Andy 
Goodpaster kept a record of a three way call between himself, the President and 
Jim Hagerty over the course of the launch until a signal was picked up from the 
satellite denoting its safe orbit.46 In the eyes of the mainstream American 
public, the launch of the Explorer satellite negated the Soviet lead in space. For 
the Army Ballistic Missile Agency headed by General Medaris the successful 
mission was a lever to be used to wrestle control of the forthcoming space 
programme – while it also served to double the intensity of the Air Force’s 
rivalry with the army for the control of the space mandate.47  
On February 4, PSAC instituted the Purcell Panel.48 On February 21, a 
key participant in the Panel, S. Paul Johnston, Director of the Institute for 
Aeronautical Sciences expressed four organisational alternatives for a way 
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forward. The four options, were: first, establish a new government agency. This 
would be costly and at odds with Eisenhower’s strategy of limiting government 
spending. Second, assign the space programme to the Atomic Energy 
Commission. This would be a popular decision with Congress, but the Panel 
noted, via Johnston, that the AEC had no experience in the space field, and 
space would be an unwanted distraction from its vital atomic energy roles. The 
third option was to establish the NACA as the controlling agency. Johnston 
stated:  "[e]xtending [the NACA's] interests into space technology would seem to 
be a logical evolutionary step from its research activities of the past 40-odd 
years." The final option discussed was to assign space to the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (ARPA) of the Defence Department. ARPA was created on 
February 7, 1958. "ARPA could take on the job with a minimum of additional 
legislation," wrote Johnston, "but military interests might outweigh the purely 
scientific and civil aspects.”49 
Initially Eisenhower’s preference was for the military to maintain control 
of all rocketry, but this was primarily for budgetary reasons – he saw no reason 
to divert money for missile research into civilian space exploration.50 But he had 
also maintained from the outset of the IGY that uses of space beyond military 
needs should not rest in the hands of the DoD and Minnich noted in his record 
of the meeting: 
The president’s feeling was essentially a desire to avoid 
duplication, and priority for the moment would seem to rest with 
Defense because of the paramountcy of Defense aspects. However, 
the president thought that in regard to non-military aspects, 
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Defense could be the operational agent, taking orders from some 
non-military scientific group.51 
Killian, Herb York and Kistiakowsky took part in this meeting at the White 
House on February 4 and Eisenhower met them again three days later. Across 
the meetings he reiterated to them that military space objectives had to have 
the highest priority, but in setting general capabilities for civilian space 
exploration, they had to resist competing pressures. What was left unsaid was 
where these pressures would come from though it can be assumed Eisenhower 
meant the branches of the military, the aerospace industry and Congress.  
While Eisenhower had no interest in competing in any kind of a space or missile 
race with the Soviets, he was increasingly aware of the public impact of 
perceived Soviet successes. In his ‘Memorandum of Conference with the 
President’ covering the February 4 meeting, Goodpaster wrote:  
The President stressed the importance of picking out the phases 
of activity in which we should undertake to compete with the 
Soviets, and to beat them. We should not try to excel in 
everything. He added that psychological as well as technical 
considerations are important -  at times appearances are as 
significant as the reality, if not more so.52 
Essentially, he was not opposed to ‘races’ per se, but only wanted to compete in 
those of his choosing – again, reverting to his strategic intent of never fighting a 
battle unless he was sure he could win.  
As Goodpaster noted, Killian took the President, Rockefeller, and 
Percival Brundage, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, through the options 
for the new organisation in a meeting on March 5.53 Killian followed 
Eisenhower’s wish to put military programmes first – highlighting the role of 
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the ARPA which had been established under DoD Directive 5105.15 on 
February 7 1958.54 Goodpaster recorded that Killian: “stressed the need to make 
use of existing facilities and competence, the limited scope of military space 
activity as presently foreseen, the need for a civilian agency to handle the civil 
aspects, with Department of Defense (ARPA) handling the defense aspects. He 
indicated the recommendation to use the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics [NACA], substantially reconstituted and made responsible to 
Presidential direction.”55  In broadly accepting Killian’s recommendation, 
Eisenhower’s response considering the new civilian agency (referred to as NASA 
in the Memorandum) was something of a feat of mental gymnastics. Goodpaster 
recorded that:  
It seems to him that military activity on space projects is 
acceptable in the area of application of knowledge. He feels 
certain, however, that discovery and research should be scientific, 
not military. He felt there is no problem of space activity (except 
ballistic weapons) that is not basically civilian, recognizing that 
application of findings may be made to serve military purposes.56  
 
As Sean Kalic has recognised, Eisenhower was certainly prepared to militarise 
the use of space, but not to weaponise it, and drew a distinction between 
scientific exploration and discovery and more overtly military aspects that was 
rather less apparent to succeeding presidents. 57  However, it was the necessary 
distinction to bring NASA into being. It was not a distinction either the 
scientists or most certainly the military minds had drawn in Johnson’s 
Preparedness Sub-Committee Hearings. It was, however, the distinction that 
Eisenhower had drawn in 1955 when prioritising spending on military missiles, 
while creating a separate non-military budget in support of the IGY-related 
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development of the Vanguard rocket and satellite by the Naval Research 
Laboratory.58  
While even at this stage the president and Killian were in agreement on the 
organisation of the new agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, DoD and even 
both the Army and Air Force were still lobbying hard to be the prime player in 
the solution the Killian/Purcell team was planning. Whatever the solution was 
going to be, it would be a distinctly difficult balancing act. But Purcell managed 
this with panache by partnering the discussion on the Governmental 
Organization of civil space programmes with the very elegant “Introduction to 
Outer Space” paper issued by the White House on March 26 195859.  Killian and 
Purcell had first introduced the concepts of the paper in a briefing to the 
Cabinet on March 14. The elegance of the paper is still apparent in a number of 
ways. First, though Purcell was a leading Harvard physicist and Nobel 
Laureate, his paper is easily accessible to a lay audience. At the outset, it 
offered four reasons for the United States to explore outer space:  
 The compelling urge for man to explore and to discover 
 To use space to defend ourselves 
 National prestige 
 Scientific observation and experiment 
Purcell’s paper presented a pragmatic approach to space exploration suffused 
with both a latent excitement and scientific curiosity.  Describing first the 
principles of orbital flight and rocket thrust, the paper offered an insight into 
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sending unmanned craft to the moon, then to Mars and to Venus. It looked at 
the costs of scientific exploration and stated the benefit of scientific satellites for 
meteorology and communication. While focused on the civilian aspects of any 
future programme, it did not shirk “The Military Applications of Space 
Technology”. Here, the paper was at its most powerful, laying out the military 
programme for satellite reconnaissance, communication and meteorology. The 
text highlighted in particular the benefits of satellite reconnaissance.60 This was 
a masterstroke of ‘hiding in plain sight’. The Discoverer/Corona programme was 
well into development and the paper effectively summarised what this ‘black’ 
satellite programme would do. The brief but persuasive summary not doubt 
owed much to the presence on the committee of Polaroid’s Din Land – the chief 
scientific innovator behind Corona’s powerful cameras. Allied to promoting the 
benefits of space reconnaissance, the paper was scathing in its dismissal of 
space as a “future theatre of war”.61 Purcell’s text noted that there have been 
such suggestions as “satellite bombers and military bases on the moon”. 
However he noted: “...even the most sober proposals do not hold up well....most 
of these schemes...appear to be clumsy and ineffective ways of doing a job.”62 In 
just a few sentences, the PSAC panel entirely undermined much of the 
reasoning for the armed forces/DoD taking control of the proposed new 
organisation for the management of the civilian outer space programme.  
Killian, Purcell and Herb York, the Berkeley Physicist who became 
ARPA’s first Chief Scientist, took the Cabinet through their ‘Introduction to 
Outer Space’ Paper on March 14 1958 63 In his memoir, Killian noted that 
“Eisenhower read it with enthusiasm and decided to use it to kick off a press 
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conference.”64 At the press conference, the President asked the media to give the 
report the widest possible distribution. It gained wide and positive global 
coverage because, as Killian put it, “It was both a policy statement for the US 
government and an absorbing essay to read.”65 The latter point is down to both 
good planning and good crafting. Purcell and Land combined to draft the paper. 
Francis Bello, a journalist who had worked on Fortune magazine gave it 
journalistic flow and impact. Killian added authority with the introduction and 
conclusion. But the real clincher was an added statement from Eisenhower 
which prefaced the printed edition. He wrote: “This is not science fiction. This is 
a sober, realistic presentation prepared by leading scientists.”66 It is easy to 
detect the implied criticism of Wernher Von Braun, the Army Ballistic Missile 
Agency’s chief engineer who had been lobbying hard, not least through a series 
of TV specials produced by Walt Disney, to win the new space agency for the 
Army.67  
Chapter one made reference to the concept of Groupthink – Janis’ idea of 
a desire for consensus among groups working on a project resulting in the 
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delivery of an irrational or dysfunctional – definitely sub-optimal – solution.68 
Yet here was the opposite. Eisenhower initially favoured a military solution; his 
expert scientific advisers came up with a proposition that maintained the high 
priority for military programmes, yet placed the scientific exploration elements 
of the US space programme in civilian hands. Eisenhower was convinced of the 
validity and moved his position accordingly while actually gaining greater 
control of the non-military programme as an arms-length Executive agency, and 
continuing to manage the missile and reconnaissance satellite programmes 
within the set boundaries of his New Look policy. 
 
From the NACA to NASA – drafting the legislation 
Once the Killian/Purcell Introduction to Outer Space paper had been discussed 
in the NSC and the PSAC team had presented their recommendation on the 
best way to organise such a programme, the NACA emerged as the clear 
favourite to take on the management of the new civilian space programme. This 
would require budgetary support; the agreement of the NACA’s management; 
approval from the competing factions of the DoD and finally, approval by the 
President. This was an area where Killian thrived. He was not a scientist. He 
worked with scientists in both his academic role and throughout his succession 
of government appointments. But his true strength was as a shrewd 
administrator and master logistician.  His skill lay in knowing who to win over 
for any decision, how to get to them and how to win them over. The trail of his 
meetings in February and early March show him mimicking a prime 
Eisenhower tactic – getting to the key players in any decision making process 
first on a one-to-one basis before any major decision-making meetings took 
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place.  Killian met with both McElroy and Quarles in DoD, bringing them on 
board (though his memoir notes that they did not seem to fully realise how 
much operational responsibility would be devolved to NASA).69  He also stayed 
close to the Bureau of the Budget (BoB) which would be responsible for the 
formal proposal reconstituting the NACA. Paul Johnston’s proposal to widen the 
NACA’s remit appeared to chime particularly well with the BoB since its remit 
was to restrict the growing complexity of government. Prior to PSAC working 
with BoB to draft a memorandum for the President’s approval, Killian also met 
the prime movers in the Committee on Government Organisation. This could, 
potentially, have been a tricky meeting since Rockefeller had previously spoken 
publically, not least in Johnson’s Hearings, of his wish for the entire space 
programme to come under the auspices of the military – a view he had held 
since the initial discussions on the IGY back in 1955.70 However, faced with the 
wealth of evidence provided by Johnston, Purcell and the rest of Killian’s PSAC 
team, Rockefeller was won over to the NACA proposal and jointly signed the 
Memorandum to the President with the BoB’s Head, Percival Brundage.  Still 
though, Killian was keen to ensure no surprises. Before formally presenting the 
Memorandum for approval, he met Eisenhower privately one to one to take him 
through the detail of the key recommendations. Then, on March 5, at the 
request of Rockefeller and Brundage, Killian formally presented the 
Memorandum to the president. The ‘no surprises’ strategy paid off, and 
Eisenhower requested Brundage, with Killian’s assistance, to proceed formally 
in drafting a bill for Congress.71  
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Racing Congress 
Killian recollected that Eisenhower wanted to get the space bill put before 
Congress before the Easter recess.72 That required a draft to be ready for 
circulation by March 27 (Eisenhower had approved the drafting of a bill only on 
March 5), and for Departments to turn round their comments by the following 
Monday. For a bill with significant potential impact on the DoD, this gave very 
little time for comment or room to manoeuvre. Indeed, during the Senate 
Hearings on the bill, Lyndon Johnson somewhat acidly stated that the draft had 
been “whizzed through the Pentagon on a motorcycle”73.  This comment rather 
revealed Johnson’s ambiguous status. Far from being the driver of the 
legislation as claimed by orthodox scholars such as Dallek for instance, his 
function was rather closer to being a messenger.  Certainly, this was a bill 
unlike many others. It was born not in Congress, but in the Administration. 
And, as a significant rarity, it had initially been crafted by scientists. It is 
apparent that the process of drafting the bill had been underway for some time 
– based on the assumption that the proposal to expand the role of the NACA 
would be accepted. In fact, just how the idea behind the bill became the 
instrument placed before Congress provides a significant insight into the 
workings of Washington law-makers at the time.  
Much of that insight comes from Paul Dembling, general counsel for the 
NACA in the post-Sputnik period. He recalled the competition between the 
Army, Air Force, Atomic Energy Commission and the NACA as to which 
organization would be designated to lead the US efforts in space. The 
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recollection came on NASA’s 50th anniversary, and thus the source lacks the 
verifiable edge of primary resources. However, the line he took was somewhat at 
odds with a traditional reading of the progress of the draft legislation, and thus 
helps prove this alternative interpretation of the creation of NASA.  
By the start of 1958, the NACA was lobbying hard and one of its tools 
was, recalled Dembling, to “draft a piece of legislation that we would be satisfied 
with if we got the choice of being the agency to handle the space program.”74 
Hugh Dryden, director of the NACA gave Dembling the space to work on the 
legislation, while Dryden’s number two, John Victory gave him the insight that: 
“Washington operates on the first draft it gets.....in the Congress, in the 
agencies, in various agency meetings, at the White House ...the person who 
shows up with the first draft seemed to be the one who would lead the others 
there.” Dembling was clearly determined to make the most of that practice and 
establish that lead. He recalled working late every night through January and 
February and often through the night, as well as at weekends, scouring previous 
General Accounting Office decisions to find a form of words for legislation 
covering an entirely new area that would satisfy the BoB. But showing the 
connections and inner working that ensured legislation would be taken on board 
as intended, Dembling did explain that he was part of the BoB’s Board 
reviewing and approving the draft legislation. There seemed to be no apparent 
conflict of interest in drafting the legislation and then being a part of its process 
of approval. Having a draft bill ready as soon as the president approved Killian’s 
suggested way forward in establishing NASA was prescient – but it did not head 
off all the potential problems likely to arise from interested departments prior to 
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the draft legislation reaching Congress. Dembling noted that two less than 
entirely transparent additions were made to the bill in the very brief time that 
both the DoD and Department of State had to review his draft. Responding to a 
question on whether there was a real desire to establish NASA as a purely 
civilian organisation, in the 50th anniversary interview, Dembling said:  
I am very pleased that the Congress placed the act under the 
general welfare clause of the Constitution, and it stated that the 
aeronautical and space activities shall be the responsibility of, 
and shall be directed by, a civilian agency. The wording says 
‘except the activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the 
development of weapons systems, military operations or the 
defense of the US shall be the responsibility and directed by DoD’. 
DoD fought hard getting that provision into the bill. The 
Department of Defense said it would not cooperate unless it had 
that provision in the bill.75 
 
There is no evidence that Eisenhower was troubled by this explicit 
coupling of NASA and the DoD in the Act – in fact, it could be argued that the 
language used provided the level of separation but joint endeavour that he 
wished to foster in both the nation’s public and political mind. There is an 
oblique reference to the DoD’s role in the notes Bryce Harlow prepared for the 
president’s meeting with Johnson on July 7 when he discussed how to overcome 
the differences between the House and Senate’s Bills, especially on the make-up 
of the proposed Space Council. The notes stated:   
There is real concern in Congress about protecting the proper role 
of the military in our space activities. There is no essential 
difference in the stated purposes of House and Senate sponsors 
regarding the military. However, the actual language differs,   We 
have taken the position (concurred in by Defense) that we prefer 
the Senate language, Insofar as it relates to military 
participation, the Senate language properly protects the 
responsibilities of the Defense Department.76 
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  According to Dembling though, he did express some reservation around 
wording that the State Department insisted on adding to the original draft of 
the bill:  
The original bill provided that the administration could engage in 
a program of international cooperation. The State Department 
opposed that language and insisted that it had had to be under 
the foreign policy guidance of the president......When the 
president signed the legislation he took a reservation and said 
something along the line that it is clearly understood that the 
international activities of NASA will be done under the foreign 
policy guidance of the president and the State Department. 
 
Two words may seem irrelevant but they are further evidence of the way in 
which Eisenhower’s mind worked. While he was happy to share the acclaim 
when matters of policy worked out well – and indeed, was generous in his praise 
for those who contributed to the success - he was a canny president, who liked to 
have avenues of deflection in case things went awry. Thus, State had to be seen 
to have a joint responsibility for any prospective NASA international activities.   
Indeed, the idea of international cooperation which finally found its way 
into the Bill as it passed into law had not come from the White House as Glen 
Wilson explained in his oral history given to NASA. He noted that both the 
Senate committee under Johnson and the House Select Committee on 
Astronautics and Space Exploration under House Leader John McCormack 
worked to stamp their authority on the Administration’s initial proposal. Wilson 
recalled that both the House and the Senate made significant amendments to 
what had been passed over to them by the White House. He said: “Numerous 
modifications were made from the original proposal, including broadening and 
clarifying the scope of the space agency, changing its name to Administration 
instead of Agency and giving greater authority to the Administrator (instead of 
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Director).” 77 Yet, that neither sounds nor feels like significant change, and in no 
way altered the thrust of the legislation. The House bill, introduced only on May 
20 had cleared the House by May 24. Similarly, the Senate reported out their 
bill on June 11 and it was passed on June 16. In terms of Johnson’s key 
contribution, Wilson says: “The Senate version broadened and clarified the 
scope of the agency, established a powerful Space Policy Board with a staff, 
authorised a program of international cooperation and retained the Joint 
Committee on Aeronautics and Space.”78 This is supported by Harlow’s 
memorandum of the meeting between Eisenhower and Johnson on July 7, 
although the Space Policy Board was less powerful than the Senate had 
intended and Harlow noted that the version proposed by the Senate could “deny 
presidential flexibility”.79  
It is important to be clear on Johnson’s role in the spring and early 
summer of 1958 in relation to the Space Act. After a quiet period when his focus 
was on domestic affairs, Johnson had resurfaced as ‘Mr Space’ during the 
Senate’s perusal of the proposed space legislation at committee stage. On May 6 
1958, Johnson’s new committee, the Senate Special Committee on Space and 
Astronautics convened in Room 457 of the Senate Office Building to consider the 
NASA Bill. Unsurprisingly, Johnson chaired the committee, and was joined by 
Senators Green, McLellan, Anderson, Symington, Bridges, Wiley, Hickenlooper, 
Saltonstall and Bricker. Hickenlooper was a Republican, but an arch 
conservative. However, he had co-authored Eisenhower’s Atomic Energy Act of 
1954, and was seen as loyal to the President’s wishes. The other Republicans 
were Saltonstall, who had overseen the Crossroads nuclear tests for Truman in 
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194680, Wiley, who had previously chaired the Foreign Relations Committee81, 
and Bricker, whose ‘Bricker Amendment’ motion in Congress in 1954, 
attempting to limit Presidential power over treaty making, had incurred 
Eisenhower’s distinct displeasure.82 Outnumbered five to four by Democrats 
anyway, the Committee looked unlikely to be wholly favourable to the 
Administration’s ideas. The Senators were supported by a committee staff 
personally selected by Johnson. Glen Wilson and Eilene Galloway had worked 
on the Armed Services Preparedness Sub-Committee hearings; Gerald Siegel, de 
facto staff director, had been Special Counsel to the Democratic Policy 
Committee and Solis Horwitz, was another of LBJ’s Washington lawyers. The 
House committee had already reported out on the Administration’s bill, and the 
Senators had the Dembling/NACA version and the House’s amendments to work 
with in drafting their own version of the legislation. The Committee conducted 
six days of hearings, interviewing 20 witnesses and compiling a two-volume, 413 
page collected testimony83. Johnson, as ever, was visible and voluble. He began 
by saying:  
I believe it is entirely fair to say that seldom, if ever, has a 
Congress and an administration faced a more challenging task. 
We are dealing with a dimension, not a force. We are dealing with 
the unknown – not the known. While the present is urgent, the 
real imperative is the future. What we do now may very well 
decide, in a large sense, what our Nation is to be 20 years and 50 
years and 100 years from now – and of no lesser importance, our 
decisions today can have the greatest influence upon whether the 
world moves towards a millennium of peace or plunges recklessly 
towards Armageddon...The challenge of the space age, at the 
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beginning now, is to open a new frontier and permits its use for 
peace.84 
 
Johnson’s somewhat polemical opening suggested he wished to give the 
impression that the future of the United States’ journey into space lay in his 
hands and those of the assembled senators around him. Yet the actual debate 
through the hearings was far more concerned with the operation of the new 
agency as defined by Dembling, under the auspices of PSAC. As such, they 
actually gave Johnson considerable scope to demonstrate his bi-partisan 
credentials as, indeed, he chose to do in his opening statement.  
It is appropriate and heartening, I think, that we begin this work 
now on a base of unity and broad agreement, rather than on a 
base of disagreement and contention. I see no reason why this 
spirit cannot be maintained. The primary legislation before the 
Committee is legislation drafted by the advisers to the Chief 
Executive...I know, on the part of the sponsors and I believe on 
the part of the authors, there is full expectation that public 
examination and discussion of the terms of the legislation can 
contribute many strengthening recommendations...this committee 
wishes to confine its deliberations to the issues which are most 
pertinent...more than six months ago a committee of this Senate 
undertook an extensive and exhaustive study...No substantial 
purpose would be served by devoting further time to repetition of 
such testimony. Furthermore...the House...is holding hearings in 
this same field. We are not here to duplicate those hearings but to 
act in accordance with the facts that are presented to us...What is 
before us now is not a question of whether we should begin the 
orderly exploration of space but, rather, the question of how such 
exploration may best be directed and initiated.85 
 
Here was Johnson not so much working for the President (although he 
was, in effect, carrying out his wishes), but for the good of the country. He could 
be seen to be the Master of the Senate, magnanimous in his management of the 
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‘broad agreement’, but in reality, he had no intention of shifting gears and not 
supporting the President – and nor did he have any position of strength from 
which to oppose the Executive-driven legislative thrust. Purcell’s March 
document had created a strategy and organisation that was difficult to argue 
with. The Hearings gained a certain sense of urgency on their last day, May 15, 
when the Soviets announced their successful launch of Sputnik 3, weighing in at 
2,900lbs and nearly 12 feet in length.86 However, there was none of the initial 
shock of Sputnik 1, and the Committee rapidly returned to its assigned task. 
While Johnson could, and did, apply the checks and balances of Senatorial 
oversight, his committee and the subsequent Senate Bill really only challenged 
Eisenhower and PSAC in one area – with the Space Policy board – soon to be 
renamed as the Space Council.  
Eilene Galloway had been a National Defence Analyst, and during this 
time had published a report called Guided Missiles in Foreign Countries for both 
the House and Senate Armed Forces Committees. 87 This had brought her to 
Johnson’s attention. Three days after Sputnik 1 launched, Senator Johnson 
telephoned  saying : “Eilene, I want to make me a record in outer space and I 
want you to help me.”88 Galloway’s first contribution was in naming NASA – 
and was made not through her work with Johnson, but when John McCormack, 
the Leader of the House called her asking for advice on whether he should set 
up a House Committee to look at the legislation. Galloway urged yes, and also 
urged him to change the ‘A’ in NASA from ‘Agency’ to ‘Administration’. Without 
demur, McCormack instructed an aide to make the change which carried over 
into the Senate and the final Act. During Galloway’s attendance at the House 
                                                          
86 Hall and Shayler, The Rocket Men, p. 67.  
87 Drawn from Eilene Galloways’s individual discussion with John Logsdon at the symposium ‘The 
Legislative Origins of the US Space Program’.  
88 Ibid p. 31. 
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hearings, which included long and detailed testimony from NACA Chairman 
Doolittle and his deputy, the NACA Director Hugh Dryden, she became 
convinced that the proposed 17-strong internal advisory board, built on NACA’s 
previous structure would be insufficient to have “any clout at all over other 
agencies in Washington.”89 She communicated this to Johnson who was looking 
for ways to strengthen the bill, and, one might surmise, create an ongoing role 
for him related to space. While it was clear that the new NASA was set to 
emerge as a civilian agency, Galloway was concerned that what was needed was 
a top-level policy co-ordinating board for the total United States space 
programme, both military and civilian. She noted that she had no “clout with 
McCormack with regard to the Space Council”, it was “fertile soil” in the Senate 
because of their emphasis on national defence. As already stated, the initial idea 
for the Space Council did not find favour with Eisenhower. Mieczkowski wrote 
that he: “feared that it would add more bureaucracy, slow down policy 
formulation and wrongfully assume powers that should remain with the 
president.”90  Clearly, Mieczkowski is drawing directly on Harlow’s 
Memorandum of the July 7 Eisenhower/Johnson meeting here, and this almost 
directly repeats Harlow’s notes for the President.91 As ever, Eisenhower had no 
wish to confront Johnson with views that might cause an argument. Killian was 
dispatched to express the President’s opinion, but Johnson was adamant that a 
Space Council, modelled on the NSC, was both necessary and a cornerstone to 
any legislation that might be passed. The President and the Senate Majority 
Leader settled their differences on Sunday July 7 at the White House. The new 
Space Council would be chaired by the President and would comprise the NASA 
                                                          
89 Ibid p. 33.  
90 Mieczkowski, Sputnik Moment, p. 172. 
91 Harlow, Establishing a Federal Space Agency. 
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Administrator, the AEC Chair, the Secretaries of State and Defence and four 
further members. Yet Eisenhower hardly convened the Council during the rest 
of his presidential term and recommended its abolition as he left office. 
However, the July 7 compromise ensured both of the big political beasts of 
Washington had achieved what they wanted on the road to the United States’ 
first space legislation and, indeed, organisation. Eisenhower signed the Act into 
law as Public Law 85-568 on July 29th, 1958.  
It is striking how similar the final Act sounded in comparison to Purcell’s 
four reasons why the United States should explore outer space. While 
Congressional intervention had amplified the original four purposes into eight 
clauses, their meaning had not changed greatly.  The Act first stated: 
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United 
States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful 
purposes for the benefit of all mankind. 
It went on to say that: 
The aeronautical and space activities of the United States shall be 
conducted so as to contribute materially to one or more of the 
following objectives: 
(1) The expansion of human knowledge of phenomena in the 
atmosphere and space;  
(2) The improvement of the usefulness, performance, speed, 
safety, and efficiency of aeronautical and space vehicles;  
(3) The development and operation of vehicles capable of carrying 
instruments, equipment, supplies and living organisms through 
space;  
(4) The establishment of long-range studies of the potential 
benefits to be gained from, the opportunities for, and the problems 
involved in the utilization of aeronautical and space activities for 
peaceful and scientific purposes.  
(5) The preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in 
aeronautical and space science and technology and in the 
application thereof to the conduct of peaceful activities within and 
outside the atmosphere.  
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(6) The making available to agencies directly concerned with 
national defenses of discoveries that have military value or 
significance, and the furnishing by such agencies, to the civilian 
agency established to direct and control non military aeronautical 
and space activities, of information as to discoveries which have 
value or significance to that agency;  
(7) Cooperation by the United States with other nations and 
groups of nations in work done pursuant to this Act and in the 
peaceful application of the results, thereof; and  
(8) The most effective utilization of the scientific and engineering 
resources of the United States, with close cooperation among all 
interested agencies of the United States in order to avoid 
unnecessary duplication of effort, facilities, and equipment.92 
This is the point where most discussion of Eisenhower and Space tends 
to finish. While there are many narratives of the Mercury man in space 
programme, the first reconnaissance, meteorology and communication satellites 
and Wernher Von Braun’s emergence as NASA’s premier rocket engineer, little 
attention has previously been given to the Executive’s role in managing these 
building blocks of NASA’s future programmes. This gap will be addressed in the 
following chapter.  
 
Conclusion 
First, it is important to conclude this chapter by reflecting on the rather more 
active role that Eisenhower played not in responding to Sputnik, but in charting 
a course for the US space programme beyond the end of the IGY. Eisenhower’s 
response was not perfect, but nor was it the passive passenger ride suggested by 
the first generation of post-Eisenhower scholars leaning towards Kennedy in 
their appraisal of early US space policy. As this and the chapter before it have 
shown, Eisenhower was pursuing a parallel track in defining the civilian 
                                                          
92 ‘National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958’, Public Law #85-568, 72 Stat., 426. Signed by the 
President on July 29, 1958, Record Group 255, National Archives and Records Administration, 
Washington, D.C.  
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journey for the United States into space, closely aligned to a series of military 
missile programmes that were gaining considerable success by 1958. While he 
had a genuine interest in scientific discovery, his primary driver was national 
security, but security gained and maintained by balancing resources against the 
reality of the Soviet threat. He had no interest whatsoever in weaponising space 
nor in engaging in a fatuous race that seemed set only to define outer space as a 
proxy Cold War battlefield.  In facing down the military establishment and 
heading off the Gaither apocalysts, he showed true leadership. In turning to the 
scientists of PSAC, and especially Jim Killian, he displayed the Eisenhower flair 
for masterful logistics: harnessing scientific goodwill, managed by a non-
political, respected administrator to deliver a legislative outcome that promised 
to deliver a rational scientific space programme bounded by sensible budget 
restrictions. Throughout the period, Eisenhower maintained the intelligence 
lead the United States had over the Soviets by not revealing his hand in terms 
of the knowledge he had of the fact that much of Khrushchev’s sabre rattling 
was bluff. The Soviet leader had an effective heavy-duty booster, but nothing 
else technologically that was going to challenge the US militarily or in any other 
aspect of its hegemony.  
He had recovered much of the ground lost due to the media-misstep by 
November, but was then hit by his stroke. Coinciding with the beginning of 
Johnson’s Preparedness Sub-Committee’s hearings, this could have been fatal in 
policy terms. However, the decision to empower Killian at the start of November 
with the task of charting the necessary policy and organisation for scientific 
space exploration ensured that Eisenhower’s illness did not impinge on his 
goals. What emerged, through the likes of Killian, Purcell and Dembling – 
aided, not always consciously, by Johnson and his acolytes, was a direction for 
224 
 
involvement in space and an organisation to deliver it, that probably surpassed 
Eisenhower’s aims for it as the thought of what to do post-IGY began to coalesce 
in his mind. Eisenhower was not passive. He may have been slightly wounded 
by the post-Sputnik hubbub, but emerged stronger and with a very clearly-
defined structure for progress.  
One must understand too that this structure for progress was not set to 
deliver anything that was not anticipated as early as 1955 when the TCP 
reported. Eisenhower was able to ignore the hysteria created by other people’s 
agenda setting. U-2 overflights continued to operate on his express orders; 
Bissell’s Corona team were progressing the development of the first spy 
satellites; rocket development was on track and the US had its first satellites in 
space. None of these was a reaction to Sputnik.
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Chapter 5: From Strategy to Implementation  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the outcomes of the strategy enabled 
by the 1958 Space Act in delivering Eisenhower’s parallel track for military 
missile development and civilian space exploration and to understand the 
importance of the legacy left by Eisenhower with regards to space.  Taken 
together, the issues discussed in this chapter complete the circle for this thesis. 
Each space policy issue that will be analysed is important in itself, and helps us 
reach a revised understanding of the development of US space policy. But there 
are wider considerations too. Using space policy as a case study contributes to 
our overall understanding of the late-period Eisenhower presidency and directly 
challenges the ‘complacency’ described by Brogan and others.    
Relatively little has been written about Eisenhower’s interventions on space 
policy after NASA became operational, and there remains a sense that by the 
summer of 1958, Eisenhower was a ‘lame duck’ president coasting towards 
retirement.1 This chapter re-examines that interpretation looking at several key 
issues where Eisenhower did intervene in the application of his defined policy 
direction to ensure his national security-led and fiscally-conservative policy 
remained balanced. Equally, in reading the early space canon as discussed in 
chapter one, it is easy to believe that there was no Executive action on space 
until Kennedy addressed Congress in May 1961 and made his pledge to send a 
man to the moon. Again, this is simply not true. What is true is that space policy 
was not of the foremost importance to Eisenhower over the final two and a half 
                                                          
1 In the specific works written on Sputnik, Divine’s Sputnik Challenge concludes in 1958. Dickson’s 
Sputnik The Shock of the Century does cover the remainder of Eisenhower’s presidency, but he relies 
solely on second-hand source material and uses Eisenhower only as a poor comparison to the 
activism Kennedy would bring to the ‘space race’. Mieczkowski, using more detailed interview 
transcripts and primary source material actually takes a similar line in Eisenhower’s Sputnik Moment, 
and the focus of the last third of his research is not on Eisenhower, but on the presidential election 
race of 1960 and Kennedy’s space strategy.  
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years of his presidency. He was, however, determined to leave a legacy that 
reflected his presidential principles: moderate, conservative, balanced and 
focused on waging peace. Actions including his appointment of NASA’s first 
administrator and key decisions both to civilianise the development of the first 
US super booster and to assign the man in space programme to NASA all 
demonstrate his ongoing strategic imperative to separate the civilian and 
military programmes and also keep control of the implementation of the 
Administration’s new space policy. Meanwhile they also reflect his ability to 
make tactical changes within his overall strategy that demonstrated not an 
inflexible dogmatist, but true Executive leadership, ultimately accountable for 
the strategic direction and key decisions, but equally willing to back the 
evidenced opinion of his expert ‘helping hands’ in finding the best ways to 
implement that strategy.  
The key decisions that this chapter will investigate are: 
 The appointment of T Keith Glennan as NASA’s first administrator; 
 Awarding the Mercury manned space programme to NASA; 
 Civilianising key military assets, especially the Army Ballistic Missile 
Agency; and 
 The change in the PSAC Chairmanship: from Killian to Kistiakowsky  
The chapter will then analyse Eisenhower’s final budgeting process with its 
implication for Eisenhower’s legacy in space.   
 
Taking charge 
Once NASA was established, Eisenhower’s focus in terms of space policy was to 
ensure he had the right operational officers in place to deliver his strategy and 
the right operating structures to ensure both the scientific civilian programme 
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and the reconnaissance-led national security programme could proceed 
effectively.  Eisenhower’s operational team, at cabinet and agency level had 
remained largely intact from when he entered the White House in 1953, through 
to 1957. However, his second term saw a number of significant changes. The 
resignation and subsequent death of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on 
May 24, 1959 was the most significant in terms of national security policy, and 
his death was a personal blow to Eisenhower. In a statement issued from his 
Gettysburg home on Dulles’ death, Eisenhower said: 
[We] grieve at the passing of one of the truly great men of our 
time. Throughout his life, and particularly though his eventful six 
years as Secretary of State, his courage, his wisdom and his 
friendly understanding were devoted to bettering relations among 
nations. He was a foe only to tyranny…We have lost a dear and 
close friend.2 
 
Dulles was the latest in a succession of key personnel to leave the White House 
in the second term, following Herb Brownell who retired as Attorney General 
after seeing the 1957 Civil Rights Act onto the statutes; Sherman Adams who 
had been forced to resign over the vicuna coat affair and George Humphrey, the 
Treasury Secretary who had resigned from office in 1957. Each had been a 
member of Eisenhower’s White House inner circle of political influencers, either, 
as in the case of Humphrey, like-minded men with exceptional capability in 
turning Eisenhower’s policy ideals into workable solutions, or, like Dulles, 
useful ideologues, capable of sparking strategic thought from Eisenhower or, on 
occasion, of being useful front men when the President needed to express strong 
opinions across the Iron Curtain.3 With a gradually shrinking inner circle, 
Eisenhower turned ever more to those advisors beyond the political realm that 
                                                          
2 Public statement of DDE on the death of John Foster Dulles, released from Gettysburg, PA on May 
24, 1959. Sourced from ‘Dwight D Eisenhower, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States’, 
Office of the Federal Registrar, National Archives and Records Services, (Washington DC, 1959)  
p. 117.  
3 MA Guhin, John Foster Dulles, A Statesman and his Times (New York, 1972) pp. 221-242. 
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he trusted most. PSAC was one group that, through the work of the TCP and 
through the scoping of NASA and subsequent legislative drafting, had proved its 
worth and earned the trust of the president.  
 Keith Glennan, who became NASA’s first Administrator, was a PSAC 
recommendation. He came out of the mould already inhabited by Jim Killian 
and approved by Eisenhower. He was a college administrator with Washington 
governmental experience and had served as an Atomic Energy Commissioner. 
Yet he was not the first choice to be NASA’s first Administrator. The initial 
preferred candidate was General Jimmy Doolittle. On July 17, 1958, Killian met 
the President to inform him that the Space Bill had “passed the Congress in 
what seemed to be an acceptable form”4  They then discussed who the first 
‘Director’ [Administrator] of the new NASA should be, and Killian suggested 
Doolittle. The memorandum, drafted by Goodpaster, noted: “The President 
strongly agreed, commenting that General Doolittle has the kind of force and 
energy required. If he is not available, Dr. Dryden, now the head of NACA, 
should be considered.”5 It is striking that Eisenhower continued the 
conversation on the clear assumption that Doolittle should take on the role and 
the President, showing military keenness to “develop an initial plan of 
operations”, expected Doolittle “participating in its preparation.” This made 
sense. Doolittle was the Chairman of the NACA, a decorated war hero, who had 
been commanding general of the 12th Air Force in North Africa during the 
Eisenhower-led Operation Torch in 1942, and had followed him across the 
Mediterranean, taking command of the 15th Air Force. From January 1944 to 
September 1945 he commanded the 8th Air Force in Europe and the Pacific. He 
                                                          
4 A Goodpaster, ‘Memorandum of conference with the President’, July 17, 1958. Present: Killian, 
Goodpaster and DDE, Box 35, Staff Memos 1958, DDE Diary Series, DDE Library. The Bill became law 
just 12 days later.    
5 Ibid. 
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was one of Eisenhower’s key operational commanders, and with a post-war 
career as a business executive with Shell Oils, he appeared to be a natural fit for 
Eisenhower’s preferred way of working, in so far as he was used to the military 
chain of command both as a commander and an operational officer, but had 
added significant business management skills during his time at Shell. 6  
Yet Doolittle’s time at the NACA had not been without controversy. 
Under Truman, he had been appointed a special assistant to the Air Force chief 
of staff, serving as a civilian in scientific matters which led to Air Force ballistic 
missile and space programmes. After Korea, where he returned to active service,  
he retained his Air Force rank and was perceived at the NACA to be partisan in 
favour of  the Air Force over the other services, while also pushing the agenda of 
major business interests (not least through his Shell connection). This did not 
sit well in an organization that had, by tradition, been led by academics and had 
fought particularly hard to remain independent and above bias. According to 
NASA’s own history of the NACA: “If Doolittle was anything, he was an 
academic last; first or second he was a businessman, second or first military 
officer. He was the personification of what Eisenhower was soon to label the 
military industrial complex.”7 However, one could suggest equal negative bias 
on the behalf of the NACA. For the ‘pure’ academics, the appointment of 
someone with commercial skills and a military drive was undoubtedly a threat 
to the clubbable, institutional atmosphere at the NACA’s Langley headquarters. 
Yet the NACA/NASA assessment of Doolittle underestimates him academically 
since he held a PhD in Physics from MIT.8 
                                                          
6 L. Thomas and E.Jablonski, Doolittle, A Biography (New York, 1976), p. 127. 
7 A Roland, SP-4103, Model Research Volume 1 (NASA History Office, Washington DC, 1985) p. 285. 
8 JR Hansen, Spaceflight Revolution: NASA Langley Research Center from Sputnik to Apollo, NASA 
History Series, (Washington DC, 1995), p. 12. 
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 Certainly, at this stage, Eisenhower did not see any risk in appointing 
Doolittle, despite the likely conflict of interest in a staunch Air Force supporter 
taking over a civilian agency. Indeed, this serves to point up one of the 
President’s blind spots. To him, Doolittle was a seasoned and proven 
subordinate, one who had already proved himself as a loyal and capable leader 
tactically implementing the strategy put in place by the then Supreme 
Commander. In expecting and anticipating the same kind of relationship more 
than a decade later, Eisenhower was showing the same kind of cold logic that he 
brought to most decision-making, while entirely failing to take account of the 
inter-service political strife that such an appointment would bring.  While Hugh 
Dryden, who had been director of the NACA was the second named potential 
NASA Administrator, he was never a serious candidate. In his memoir, Killian 
noted that Dryden was generally considered too low key, and that in an 
atmosphere where Congress felt “space would revolutionize everything”, he “did 
not have the exceptional qualities of enthusiastic leadership and drive” 
necessary to lead the space programme.9 
Meanwhile, on the role of NASA and what should be transferred out of 
the Department of Defense to the new agency, Eisenhower was unequivocal: 
“The President thought that anything not yet proved to technical feasibility 
should be the concern of this agency, and that non-military applications should 
also be the concern of this agency.”10 Essentially, the picture he had in his mind 
for NASA in mid-1958 was the first option for space and aeronautical R&D, and 
the home of all civilian projects. Following the conference, Killian’s role was to 
meet with Doolittle and encourage him to accept the NASA Administrator’s role. 
                                                          
9 Killian, Sputnik, p. 139. 
10 A Goodpaster, ‘Memorandum of conference with the President’, July 17, 1958. Present: Killian, 
Goodpaster and DDE, Box 35, Staff Memos 1958, DDE Diary Series, DDE Library. 
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Killian is coy on the rebuttal he got from Doolittle. At 60 years old, one might 
have expected him to jump at this chance to take on an office reporting directly 
to the President. Killian remarked: “I later reached the conclusion that Doolittle 
should not be pressed because of his sincere reluctance to be considered.”  
Doolittle’s attachment to the Air Force may have swayed his refusal to take on 
the role. But it is more likely that he was swayed by the new senior role he had 
just taken on with Shell that was both demanding, and very well paid. His 
biographers offer no insight into why he chose not to move from the NACA to 
NASA.11 There is also no explanation for his decision in the primary record. 
Doolittle was not lost to the development of space policy entirely. He became one 
of the three ‘civilians’ on the Space Council. In his diary, Glennan introduced 
him as “Lt. Gen [James H.] Doolittle, U.S.A.F. (ret)”, so one might question just 
how ‘civilian’ the civilian element of the council was! Hansen, in his history of 
Langley as the headquarters of the NACA and initially as NASA’s major 
research base notes Doolittle’s qualities and why Eisenhower was drawn to him 
for a position on the Space Council: 
Ike knew Doolittle…trusted his judgement; and wanted his 
moderate, reasonable and experienced voice on the newly formed 
space council.12  
 
Scholars of early US space policy generally agree that Glennan was the 
right man to lead the kind of agency that Eisenhower had envisaged. Once 
Doolittle had turned the opportunity down, Glennan’s name came to the fore in 
a number of conversations Killian had with his PSAC colleagues. The results of 
these suggestions were quickly relayed to the President.  Even Roger Launius, 
                                                          
11 Doolittle’s biographers, L. Thomas and E. Jablonski, note in Doolittle, A Biography (New York, 
1976) that he was a Director of the Shell Oil Company from 1946-67, and additionally became 
Chairman of the Board of Space Technology Laboratories Inc. in 1959. STL was a division of TRW, 
which developed the Atlas and Titan ICBMs.  
12 Hansen, Langley, p. 12. 
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usually critical of Eisenhower, recognised that Glennan had the attributes 
Eisenhower required. 
“He was a Republican with a fiscally conservative bent, an 
aggressive businessman with a keen sense of public duty and an 
opposition to Government intrusions in to the lives of Americans, 
and an administrator and an educator with a rich appreciation of 
the roles of science and technology in an international setting.”13  
 
Glennan was an engineer with experience on the Atomic Energy Commission. 
Like Killian, he was highly regarded in academic circles as a capable 
administrator. As ever, the President wanted to judge the man in a face-to-face 
meeting before deciding if he could work with him. He had first met Glennan at 
an AEC meeting in 1955, but arranged a meeting through Killian for August 8, 
1958. Glennan first knew of this the day before, and had little time to prepare 
for meeting the President.  When Eisenhower sensed the right personal 
chemistry, his decision making process was swift and easy and he offered 
Glennan the Administrator role at the end of a meeting that Glennan recalls as: 
“very brief and very much to the point.”14 Two days later he accepted, and, on 
August 19, was sworn in at the White House, with Hugh Dryden as his deputy. 
Eisenhower’s turn-around from looking to a decorated military leader to a 
career-bureaucrat to lead NASA reflected two things. First, his implicit trust in 
Killian’s judgement. In his diary, Glennan noted that Eisenhower appeared to 
lean heavily on Killian’s recommendations when they met.15 Second, it reflected 
the style of agency Eisenhower expected NASA to be, and the direction it should 
take in space exploration.  The programme Eisenhower described to Glennan 
would be “sensibly paced” and Glennan noted that the President “made no 
                                                          
13 Glennan, Edited Diary, p. xxi. 
14 Glennan, Edited Diary, p. 2. 
15 Ibid. 
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mention of concern over accomplishments of the Soviet Union.”16 Glennan was 
not being brought in to lead any crash programmes or speed ahead in any space 
race. Thus, capability and competence were the bywords for his appointment. 
On reflection, Eisenhower had once again taken the pragmatic route and 
recognised that there was no need for stars – particularly those with stars on 
their shoulders - for this particular appointment, although that pragmatism was 
made significantly easier by the fact Doolittle had rebuffed the offer in the first 
place.  
In accepting the NASA role, Glennan had insisted that he would only 
become Administrator if Dryden was to stay with the new NASA as his deputy. 
This proved an excellent decision bringing together Glennan’s strength in 
working the Washington beat to build and shape the new organisation, while 
Dryden, with his intimate knowledge both of the technical capabilities of the 
NACA and of the organisation’s people, brought a great strength in 
understanding the emerging science and engineering of space – and how best to 
channel and prioritise NASA’s resources.   
 
Man in Space 
With Glennan in post, Eisenhower followed his previous operational practice, 
stepping back from day to day involvement with NASA and enabling his chosen 
operational officer to manage the agency within the President’s mandate. 
Indeed, Glennan presided over a number of key NASA decisions, including 
defining the specific programme for the agency and the necessary capabilities to 
execute that programme. Some decisions, such as the move of the Army Ballistic 
Missile Agency to NASA were long, drawn-out and contentious. But seemingly, 
                                                          
16 Ibid.  
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one of the most important, the man-in-space programme, was handed to NASA 
without resistance even before Glennan took up his new role.  
In setting the remit for NASA as research and development relating to 
space and all non-military programmes, Eisenhower had ensured that man-in-
space was an obvious programme for the new agency and, indeed, the NACA 
had been working on an outline for manned space activities even before NASA 
was mooted. As early as March, the Air Force had begun planning a “manned 
satellite development”.17 The NACA was acting as consultant to the Air Force, 
and proceeded jointly to develop the Air Force Manned Military Space System 
Development Plan.18 This aimed to "achieve an early capability to land a man on 
the moon and return him safely to earth."19 The plan was split into four phases. 
The first – ‘Man-in-Space-Soonest’, focused on placing a ballistic capsule in 
orbit. The capsule would initially carry instruments, then apes, and finally a 
man.  By the time Eisenhower had signed the Aeronautics and Space Act into 
law, he had already decided that the manned space programme would be part of 
the civilian programme, and thus the Air Force’s work passed to NASA even 
before the agency became operational. Eisenhower’s rationale was that it was a 
proof of concept programme that would be run at minimal cost using, as far as 
possible, existing technology. After extensive discussions within ARPA and the 
Air Force’s Air Research and Development Centre, it had been decided that 
‘Man-in-Space-Soonest’ would use the existing Atlas booster as a launch vehicle. 
This played directly into that requirement for low-cost development and re-use 
of existing technology. Eisenhower’s directive that NASA take on the 
                                                          
17 NACA, Memo for files, Faget, Attendance at ARDC Briefing on 'Man in Space' Program, March 5, 
1958. See also memo to NACA, Soulé, Second Discussion of ARDC Briefing on 'Man in Space' 
Program, March 27, 1958. NASA Organization and Early History Collection, DDE Library.  
18 James M. Grimwood, Project Mercury: A Chronology (NASA SP-4001, Washington DC 1963), p. 17. 
19 US Air Force ‘Man in Space Program’, March 1958, Folder 18674, NASA Historical Collection, 
Washington DC. 
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programme was notable for one slight change in wording that reflected both his 
cautious nature and lack of sentiment towards prestige achievements. He 
removed the word ‘Soonest’ from the programme.  
Due to the extensive NACA involvement from March 1958 onwards, the 
transition of the programme into NASA was smooth. Only five days after NASA 
was established, the Space Task Group was formed within it to design and 
implement the first US manned satellite. The STG was led by Robert Gilruth, 
an NACA veteran, and was to be based at the NACA’s existing base, and the 
new NASA’s primary research base, Langley, about three hours south of 
Glennan’s base in Washington DC.  The project was named ‘Mercury’ since the 
symbolic associations of this name appealed to Abe Silverstein, NASA's Director 
of Space Flight Development, who suggested it in the autumn of 1958.20 
Glennan made the name public on December 17, 1958. The smooth transition of 
the programme was one thing, dealing with the ‘manned’ element turned out to 
be something quite different, and one of the most challenging aspects of NASA’s 
early development.  
However, in the autumn of 1958, the new agency had other matters to 
deal with. In addition to Project Mercury, NASA had inherited ARPA’s scientific 
earth satellite and lunar probe programmes and the IGY Vanguard satellite 
programme. Glennan’s new staff amounted to 8,000 engineers and support staff, 
most of whom were highly-skilled and highly qualified technicians, but the large 
majority had also been operating in a research backwater since the end of World 
War 2. Even if Glennan was to meet Eisenhower’s relatively modest and 
conservative goals for space, he needed some significantly increased engineering 
and scientific firepower – and at the end of 1958, virtually all of that was housed 
                                                          
20 HT Wells, ST Whitely and CE Karageanes, SP-4402 Origins of NASA Names, (NASA, Washington DC, 
1975), p. 105. 
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within the military. This would be a substantial test for Glennan and one that 
Eisenhower fully expected him to resolve. Eisenhower’s management style 
demanded that his subordinates brought him solutions rather than problems, 
and he chose only to get involved when the problems were so serious that they 
demanded Presidential-level action. After a visit to the Redstone Arsenal at 
Huntsville Alabama, where Wernher Von Braun’s ABMA team were based, 
Glennan became convinced that: “the nation’s space program would advance 
most rapidly if we had working within our framework the so-called Von Braun 
team at Huntsville, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) operated for the 
Army by Caltech.”21 Once he had come to this conclusion, Glennan soon realised 
that he faced strong opposition from the Army, which was loathe to give up its 
key space assets, and also that he had scant support from his new NASA staff, 
whose focus had for so long been on consultancy, theoretical planning and 
component testing. The former NACA had also long resisted getting into fights 
with any part of the DoD. Yet, with agreement from Killian and Eisenhower, 
Glennan took on the Army and soon saw at first hand the dysfunctionality of the 
DoD where one thing was said to the NASA’s Administrator’s face, while quite 
another thing happened in practice.22 
 
Fools rush in 
While the Mercury man-in-space programme was bound to be the aspect of 
NASA’s work that attracted the public’s attention, it was never going to become 
more than a proof of concept if it had to rely on the very limited booster power of 
the existing Redstone and Jupiter rockets and the soon-to-be-operational 
Atlases. Thus logic dictated that NASA should take control of the means to 
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produce a booster system capable not just of breaking out of the earth’s 
atmosphere, but out of the earth’s orbit, if manned space flight was ever to 
reach the levels of interplanetary exploration as envisaged in Purcell and York’s 
Introduction to Outer Space23. The political reorganisation of the space 
landscape through the Aeronautics and Space Act and the 1958 Defence 
Reorganization Act had placed research for civilian projects in NASA’s hands, 
while the militarized use of space was now firmly in the hands of the Air Force, 
at this time though its Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA).  Squeezed 
in the middle was the Army and its principal spacecraft, rocket and ballistic 
research and development and engineering and production facilities. These were 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, operated for the Army at the University of 
California  Institute of Technology – Caltech – and Von Braun’s Army Ballistic 
Missile Agency (ABMA) at the Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama.  
 Moving these facilities from military to civilian control was always going 
to be a problem, not least because the prospective moves came on the back of the 
1958 reorganisation of the Department of Defense. Eisenhower’s key legislative 
battle in the wake of Sputnik had not been the creation of NASA, but a battle to 
reorganise the defence establishment through “clear organization and central 
direction” that would deliver unity, efficiency and unchallenged civilian 
authority. 24 Having put in place the New Look defence strategy, based on 
massive nuclear deterrent delivered initially through SAC, and increasingly 
through ballistic missiles, Eisenhower’s next task was to make the machinery 
for delivering this strategy both more efficient and effective. That meant 
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overhauling the Pentagon: reducing the powers of each individual service; 
cutting duplication, removing gaps between the services and integrating those 
services under a more powerful Secretary of Defense to ensure that US forces 
could meet the challenges of the Cold War. In his News Conference of April 2 
1958, Eisenhower explained his rationale: 
In modern times there is no such thing as a separate ground, air, 
or sea war. The defense of the United States requires the 
planning for and if necessary the use of all of our defense forces as 
an integrated team. This places before a centralized authority, the 
Secretary of Defense, the task of making strategic plans. To 
conduct or to execute strategic plans, you have to have unified 
commands. We have those now. But those unified commands, if 
they are to be responsive completely to the decisions of the 
Secretary, must be organized by him, their missions must be 
given, he must determine their strength, the composition of the 
forces that will be capable of carrying on the defense of the areas 
or area that he may prescribe.25 
 
This was the message he took to Congress the following day in the midst of a 
battle both with the Services and with Congressional politicians. The Armed 
Services argued that reorganisation of the Pentagon was unnecessary and that 
Eisenhower was intruding in areas best left to the military (an irony, given that 
he was probably the most militarily-knowledgeable Commander in Chief in the 
history of the Union), while Congress felt that Eisenhower was manoeuvring to 
bypass Congress’ role in the defence of the nation by putting all military 
decision making (and primarily all decisions on appropriations) in the hands of 
the Secretary of Defense who reported not to Congress, but directly to the 
president.  
 In the wake of Sputnik, Eisenhower held the high ground on the defence 
capability argument. Modern warfare required speedy, integrated decision 
making. Under the Congressional/Joint Chiefs of staff system, that simply was 
                                                          
25 President’s News Conference, April 2, 1958, News Conferences File, DDE as President 1953-1961, 
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not possible. Throughout the Spring and early Summer, Eisenhower galvanised 
support for modernisation against such significant voices in Congress as Carl 
Vinson, Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Service and Richard 
Russell in the Senate. He met frequently with senior Pentagon and 
Congressional figures throughout the legislative campaign and organised letter-
writing campaigns to lobby Congress in support of the Executive’s views. 
Learning a lesson from his somewhat lack-lustre immediate response to 
Sputnik, he was also proactive in making his case with the media. He spoke on 
April 17, 1958 at a joint luncheon for the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors and International Press Institute and said:   
The Congress will keep, in every respect, its full constitutional 
authority over the appropriation of funds. But greater flexibility 
in defense spending will result in greater efficiency, more 
responsiveness to changing military requirements, and more 
economical management of major defense programs. 
Apprehensions such as these are at the least misconceptions. At 
the most they are misrepresentations. I repeat, there will be: 
-no single chief of staff; 
-no Prussian staff; 
-no czar; 
-no 40 billion dollar blank check; 
-no swallowing up of the traditional services; 
-no undermining of the constitutional powers of Congress. 
But this there will be, if the program which I so earnestly support 
and believe in is adopted by the Congress: there will be a stop to 
unworthy and sometimes costly bickering. There will be clear-cut 
civilian responsibility, unified strategic planning and direction, 
and completely unified combat commands. 
There will be a stop to inefficiencies and needless duplications 
encouraged by present law. 
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Thus we will meet our dual needs-safety and solvency. The 
Congress willing, we shall have maximum strength, with 
minimum cost, in our national defense.26 
His letters too, provide a fascinating insight into the corporate view of politics 
Eisenhower favoured. He argued that businesses operated on the basis of 
maximum efficiency and minimum cost, yet the Department of Defense, 
floundered in disarray. Eisenhower’s pro-forma letters set out a picture whereby 
the Pentagon would be structured along the same lines as a major industrial 
organisation, operating through a board of directors headed by a CEO who 
would lead the decision-making process within parameters agreed by the board. 
In this case, the Secretary of Defense would be that CEO. He concluded by 
saying:  
If this little comparison with corporate practices appeals to you as 
helpful in appreciating the crying need for defense modernization, 
I hope that you and others will find it useful in awakening the 
public to the grave seriousness of the matter27  
 
In McElroy, he had a ready-made CEO as he had been recruited to Washington 
from the presidency of Proctor and Gamble. Eisenhower’s policy of inducting 
expertise from the corporate world was also reflected in Glennan’s planning for 
NASA. Indeed, on taking up his duties as Administrator, one of his first actions 
was to send the management consultants of McKinsey & Co. into the NACA to 
look at its structure and working practices and to plan for its new operation as 
NASA.28 
 In driving through the Defense Reorganization Act, Eisenhower won the 
public relations battle. But the fight in Congress was tough and ended in 
compromise on both sides. Theoretically, the Act gave more power to the 
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Secretary of Defense, but Congress retained almost all of its powers of oversight. 
Meanwhile, actually implementing the new law in the services themselves 
would prove extremely challenging. It is notable that while the final Senate vote 
supported the Executive proposals by a margin of 80-0, there were 16 
abstentions. Among them was John F Kennedy, Senator for Massachusetts. 29 
Eisenhower’s pro-active stance showed that he was far from a ‘lame duck’ even 
so late in his second term and faced with a hostile Democratic Congress. Unlike 
in his first term in office when he still had an election to win, Eisenhower could 
fight harder and press his case more strongly.30  
 As in most of his major political battles, Eisenhower succeeded through 
the strength of his personality and his public appeal. Throughout the first half 
of 1958, he never wasted the chance to make his case for defence modernisation, 
and took as many opportunities as possible to explain his case either to key 
individuals in one-to-one meetings or to major audiences such as the United 
Republican dinner in the wake of the State of the Union.31  However, when his 
appointee Glennan approached the Army with regards to the JPL and ABMA, 
he was tactically less astute and significantly less successful. The New Look 
policy had been a blow to the Army, reducing its numbers and denting its 
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prestige. The Air Force, and particularly Strategic Air Command, was 
responsible for nuclear weapon development, while also taking control of 
ballistic missile development and military initiatives in space. In handing over 
Vanguard to NASA, the navy had relinquished its space technology 
development mission, though it would be involved in missile development, 
specifically in preparing a launch platform for the Polaris missile. While the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) was not integral to the Army’s mission, the ABMA 
was extremely high profile. With its Jupiter missile development and the launch 
vehicle for the Explorer satellite, all under its technical director, Von Braun, it 
was a successful operation that the Army was extremely loathe to lose. In one 
corner, Glennan faced negotiation with the Army which had lost autonomy 
within the Pentagon and authority to Eisenhower through the Defense 
Reorganization Act. In the other, his opponent was not Von Braun who was 
expedient in his response to authority and was only looking for a “rich uncle”, 
but his military boss, the martinet general, John Medaris.32 While Glennan’s 
visit to Huntsville had convinced him that Von Braun’s group would be useful to 
NASA and that with the JPL it would provide a framework to advance the 
nation’s space programme, he faced significant problems. Given that 
Eisenhower had decreed that NASA was to be a civilian agency, there was no 
way for Glennan to accommodate an Army-led rocket development team.  
Glennan described his own follow-up moves to prepare for the transfer of the 
JPL and Von Braun’s team from the ABMA to NASA as “naive” and “stubborn” 
but he did note that he spoke with both Killian and Eisenhower and gained 
their support before he approached the Department of Defense. 33  In hindsight, 
he should have spoken more about the tactics to use to win over the Secretary of 
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the Army. Surely Eisenhower and Killian would have been very good sounding 
boards, but they gave only tacit support, and rather left Glennan to blunder into 
confrontation with the Secretary of the Army.  
Simplistic accounts of the early space narrative tend to put the genesis of 
NASA at the highest national priority. But if one was to look at Eisenhower’s 
priorities in late 1958, and also at the many tasks assigned to PSAC, one would 
see that the decision on what to do with the Army’s space technology assets was 
just one of a large number of issues clamouring for attention.  The Middle East 
and Berlin dominated the president’s agenda, with the Cuban revolution and 
even the admittance of the new States of Hawaii and Alaska competing for 
attention. Equally, he had to deal with Khrushchev’s almost constant carping 
throughout 1958 for the US and UK to impose nuclear testing bans as the three 
nuclear powers inched towards a formal test ban treaty. Meanwhile, 
Kistiakowsky provided an insight into the PSAC agenda with his diary 
comment on the working groups established under its authority:  
PSAC had incorporated a number of working groups: antiballistic 
missiles, chaired by Wiesner, antisubmarine warfare under 
Harvey Brooks, arms limitation and control chaired by Killian, 
basic research and education under Glenn T. Seaborg, chemicals 
in food (Bronk), continental air defense (Emmanuael R. Piore), 
early warning (Wiesner), high-energy accelerator physics (Piore), 
life sciences (George W. Beadle), limited warfare, (H.P. 
Robertson), missiles (Hendrik W. Bode), science and foreign 
relations (Bronk), space sciences (Edward M. Purcell), an ad-hoc 
study of missiles under Donald P. Ling, and a panel to review 
military communications under William O. Baker.34 
 
NASA was competing in a crowded arena of scientific advance, and if Glennan 
thought he could have the two Army facilities transferred into NASA in the first 
months of the new agency, he was much mistaken.  
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Problems had started with Glennan’s first meeting with Wilber Brucker, 
the Secretary to the Army. Glennan, had followed the president’s normal 
practice by meeting first with the Secretary of Defense McElroy and his 
Assistant, Quarles to reach an informal agreement with them on the way 
forward and to gain their support. Both had appeared supportive of Glennan’s 
aim of building the nation’s space programme on the Huntsville/Caltech team. 
But the distinction should be drawn between McElroy and Quarles who sat at 
the top of the Pentagon pyramid above all the services, and Brucker who was 
responsible solely for the Army. Glennan noted that Brucker became “irate” at 
the suggestion to move the ABMA to NASA.35 Glennan remarked that he left 
that particular meeting “with my tail between my legs.”36 Brucker then took the 
initiative, leaking the story to the Baltimore Sun which ran a story the following 
day stating that NASA was intent on breaking up the Von Braun team.37 
Glennan had handed the Army the upper hand. The ABMA in total amounted to 
over 5,000 people, and the first NASA budget, agreed by Congress and approved 
by Eisenhower, would enable fewer than half the manpower to transfer.38 But 
Von Braun was a hero in the eyes of the public and Brucker’s leak (the 
Baltimore Sun story was picked up by other newspapers and ran around the 
country) ensured NASA was cast as the villain of the piece in threatening to 
destroy the team that had finally put America into space.39  
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However, it would seem that Glennan learned fast. He enlisted the 
support of Killian and Quarles, and both were effective into corralling the Army 
into line – at least in part.  By November 1958, the Army had agreed to give up 
the JPL to NASA, but was refusing to give up the ABMA. It did, however, enter 
into an agreement with NASA for the civilian agency to use its services. This 
was an incomplete and unsatisfactory solution.   
 The following nine months proved to be difficult, especially for Glennan. 
The relationship between the ABMA and NASA was a significant stumbling 
block for NASA in establishing itself as the sole agency tasked with managing 
the US’ civilian space programme. Von Braun would align his support with 
whoever provided him with the money and remit to continue his work. But 
General Medaris used every possible means to retain his hold on missile and 
rocket development. Glennan certainly had a sense through most of 1959 that 
NASA’s mission was in real jeopardy due to Medaris’ intransigence. It is 
surprising that the wrangling between the Army and NASA does not receive 
more coverage in the current histories. Even in Mieczkowski’s most recent work, 
it rates only a paragraph.40 However, it is important in understanding both the 
role Eisenhower played, and his expectations of those who were carrying out his 
orders. As with his time as an Army General, Eisenhower expected adherence to 
his orders, and for his operational officers to resolve any issues standing in the 
way of the execution of those orders. For the moment, the ABMA was Glennan’s 
problem.  
Glennan’s writing alludes to the struggle he faced in dealing with 
Medaris. One of the issues faced (which actually turned into an opportunity) 
that might have compounded the problem was the sudden death of Deputy 
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Secretary of Defense Don Quarles in May 1959. While the Secretary of Defense, 
Neil McElroy was rather remote and disconnected from the feuding between the 
services, Quarles had been an informed ally of Glennan and it appeared his 
sudden death of a heart attack would be a blow. However, he was succeeded by 
Tom Gates, former Secretary of the Navy, who had no particular love for the 
Army. While Brucker continued to promote the Army’s case for retaining the 
ABMA in Washington, Medaris pulled the forces of Army propaganda together 
to state the case for the Army’s continuing role in long range missile and space 
rocket development. In 1956, the American public had been introduced to the 
ABMA team for the first time through The Big Picture, a half-hour prime time 
TV series which was aired on ABC television. While ABC was still a struggling 
cousin to better-resourced NBC and CBS, this suited the Army since in return 
for a prime viewing slot, it provided a weekly ready-made 30 minute programme 
at no cost to the broadcaster. Syndicated across its network, the ABC broadcast 
would still have reached a very significant number of the 54,000,000 TV sets in 
use in 1958 in the US.41 Now, The Big Picture returned to Huntsville in 1958 in 
the wake of the successful Explorer 1 and Explorer 3 launches to present a very 
pro-Army view of the ABMA’s role in delivering the launch in 84 days.42 It 
provided excellent evidence for Medaris to use as he tried to ensure the Army’s 
place in NASA and the DoD’s plans for rocket and missile development.  
 However, Medaris was becoming isolated as support for the Army’s key 
rocket project – Saturn – waned within the DoD. At this time, the development 
of the Saturn booster was being handled by the ABMA, but the funding was 
coming from the ARPA which was facing resistance to the whole project from 
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the Air Force. The Air Force was moving ahead with its ICBM development and 
had no need for a million pound plus booster within its military space plans. 
Even the Army had only one planned use for the booster – to launch the 
communications satellite the Signals Corp was building for the DoD. There was 
a strong possibility that Saturn would be cancelled.43 Indeed, at this stage there 
were three super booster systems competing for adoption, and Eisenhower 
appeared to favour the alternative solid rocket booster, Nova, which had been 
presented to him by NASA in January 1959.44 Medaris still appeared to be 
fighting a rearguard PR battle when Glennan returned to Huntsville in 
September 1959. By now, the NASA Administrator had learned from his 
experience of dealing with the Army the previous year. He had talked to Gates 
and: “made it clear that I proposed to make a new deal [to secure the ABMA for 
NASA] only with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and that I expected 
Brucker to be told the results once it had been made.”45 That deal-making had 
been making progress, with robust intervention from Gates who essentially took 
over the lead role in dealing with the Army. However, it was clear that news 
had filtered to Brucker – and indeed made its way to both Medaris and Von 
Braun. Neufeld noted that once the news filtered through – and that news 
contained the likelihood that Saturn would be cancelled if the Army retained 
the ABMA or, indeed if the ABMA was taken over by the Air Force, several of 
the major figures in Von Braun’s team decided they would be better off allied to 
NASA. Glennan “had a real valid requirement for Saturn.”46 His purpose, on his 
September visit, was to inspect progress on the Saturn booster project and he 
still expected opposition from Medaris who acted, Glennan thought, “as if he 
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had little knowledge of what was going on.”47 However, Medaris was fully aware 
of the political machinations of dividing the space programme up between the 
Air Force, reporting to ARPA, and NASA, reporting direct to the President. 
Glennan recorded: 
During the course of our visit to several shops, I noticed that he 
was called away to the telephone on several occasions. Finally, he 
called me to one side and asked me to come to his office...Word 
had leaked that Saturn might be abandoned. Medaris revealed 
that he had some knowledge of the impending transfer and stated 
that if I would agree for Saturn to be retained, he would 
personally go to Washington and urge that transfer.48 
 
Medaris had been backed into a corner, but it is notable how the lure of a legacy 
can lead even the most extreme opponents of a new organisation to appear to 
turn 180 degrees in their views. But could Medaris have believed that his action 
would ultimately keep the ABMA as an Army asset, or was he simply acting 
petulantly in his delaying tactics? He may, indeed, have had a sense that the 
political tide had turned even further against Eisenhower – or particularly, the 
wider Republican movement, and especially those aiming for Congress.  
The 1958 Congressional elections had further cemented Democrat control 
of Congress, with a 15 seat gain in the Senate, taking their representation to 64 
Senators against the Republicans’ 34. In the House of Representatives, the 
Republican demise was just as startling as the Democrats gained 49 seats to 
hold a 283-153 majority.49  Medaris may well have felt emboldened to hold out 
against the Executive in the belief that Eisenhower would yield to the 
Congressional clamour for more spending on defence. If that was the case – and 
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there is no significant primary source evidence to either back or challenge such 
an assertion – he was severely misguided.  
A year after Glennan first attempted to move ABMA into NASA, 
Kistiakowsky, who had by then taken over from Killian as Chair of PSAC wrote 
in his diary: 
A meeting with the President...He flatly stated that ABMA should 
be put under the NASA, and on my warning conceded that he will 
have to defend Glennan publicly. He expressed highest confidence 
in Glennan and said he understood the pressures under which 
Glennan was operating.50 
 
Eisenhower’s policy priorities placed national security at the heart of his 
planning and he directly drove national security policy, even on its fringes 
where elements fell into NASA’s authority. Throughout the 1950s, national 
security was Executive-led, essentially through building on Roosevelt’s and 
Truman’s previous policies. The key relationship affecting the ABMA was not 
Congressional, but the interaction of the four actors of the White House, PSAC, 
NASA and Pentagon. While having Brucker’s support enabled Medaris to delay 
the inevitable, a Major General and the Secretary of the Army could not succeed 
in challenging the will of the Commander in Chief. Eisenhower, once again, was 
prepared to play the long game. On 20 October 1959, Glennan wrote formally to 
him regarding the transfer of the Operations Division of ABMA, couching the 
note in a discussion on budgetary figures. He wrote that such a transfer would: 
...tend to further concentrate responsibility for our program of 
scientific research and exploration in the civilian agency 
established in response to your request to the Congress in early 
1958. 
 
...I have long been concerned about the “rate and scale” of our 
non-military space effort...I now hold firmly the opinion that the 
United States cannot withdraw from the contest for significant 
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progress in scientific research in space and the exploration and 
exploitation of space for purposes beneficial to mankind. But I am 
equally certain that we must develop and adhere to our own 
vigorous program rather than compete on a shot-for-shot basis 
with the USSR. 
 
It seems clear additional levels of funding will be necessary...This 
is occasioned  by the fact that rocket booster systems necessary to 
carry out increasingly difficult experiments in space and to 
provide ultimately for manned exploration of outer space and the 
nearby celestial bodies are costly to develop. It will be our 
purpose, ultimately, to center in the group transferred from 
ABMA to NASA the bulk of the management responsibility for 
our effort in the space development field.”51 
 
The letter proceeded to detail the cost of the transfer, who would pay what, and 
reach a conclusion that despite the seeming increase in NASA’s budget, 
transferring the core ABMA team – in effect the Saturn booster team – to NASA 
“could effect savings of perhaps as much as 75 millions by consolidation of our 
work effort as a result of the proposed transfer.”52 After attempting to resolve 
the ABMA situation through negotiations at ABMA level, with the Secretary of 
the Army and at DoD level, Glennan had finally found the formula that would 
prompt Eisenhower to intervene on his behalf – a budget saving and a clear 
purpose for the Saturn booster within NASA. It probably took Glennan too long 
to get to this solution – but he had a wily opponent in Medaris.  
Eisenhower’s response shows a certain mastery in keeping above the 
debate while enabling Glennan to achieve the president’s aim. In a letter 
forwarded to the media to share with the public, he entirely avoided any notion 
of a contest and wrote: 
Dear Dr. Glennan: As we have agreed, it is essential to press 
forward vigorously to increase our capability in high-thrust space 
vehicles. You are hereby directed to make a study, to be completed 
at the earliest date practicable, of the possible need for additional 
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funds for the balance of FY1960 and for FY1961 to accelerate the 
super booster programme for which your agency was given 
technical and management responsibility.53 
 
This is classic Eisenhower. He focused on the budget. He did not make a final 
and binding decision, but asked for a study that would supply evidence for the 
need for such a decision. The orthodox reading of this would be to say he was 
indecisive. But that was not the case. He was asking for clear and tangible 
evidence to justify significant spending. Such evidence would be ammunition to 
use with the other actors involved in the ABMA/Super Booster discussions. But 
he also made it plain that NASA was responsible for the super booster program. 
The Army was not mentioned but the intent for NASA to manage the Saturn 
programme was clear.  
Eisenhower finally signed the Executive Order transferring the 
necessary elements of the ABMA to NASA once the ground had been cut 
completely from beneath Medaris’ feet. Before so doing, he met with Von Braun 
on October 21, 1959, and assured him of his support for the Saturn programme. 
The Order, and the transfer of the ABMA team to NASA came into effect on 
March 15, 1960. Brucker remained as Secretary of the Army until the end of 
Eisenhower’s second term, but the President was no doubt always aware that 
Wilbur Brucker had never risen above the rank of First Lieutenant while a 
serving officer in the Army.54 This was not a battle of equals. Medaris retired at 
the start of 1960 as the bulk of the ABMA was transferred to NASA by 
Executive Order.  
There was, for Eisenhower, a very apt conclusion to the ABMA transfer 
when, under Executive Order 10870, signed on March 15, 1960, he designated 
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the Facilities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration at 
Huntsville, Alabama, as the “George C. Marshall Space Flight Center.”55 
Marshall, who had died the previous October, had no impact on the US’s space 
effort and nor did he have any links to Huntsville. But he was an Army man 
through and through, and it was appropriate for his memory to live on adjacent 
to the Redstone Arsenal. The Marshall Space Center duly opened for business 
on July 1, 1960, and Eisenhower was there to perform the official opening. In 
the process, he directly aligned himself with Saturn’s designated mission: the 
human spaceflight programme.  
 Glennan’s experience with the Army during the first year of NASA’s 
operation might have been eased if he had sought Eisenhower’s intervention 
earlier. But after Eisenhower’s acknowledgement in December 1958 that the 
ABMA could remain within the Army for a further year, the task facing 
Glennan was to find a solution to the Von Braun/Medaris issue, not to land 
another problem on Eisenhower’s plate. That would have been an admission of 
failure. Without the benefit of hindsight, Glennan could not see at the end of 
1958 that the Medaris vision for the ABMA was doomed. Eisenhower had stated 
conclusively that manned space exploration would be a civilian activity. Manned 
flight was the only reason a Saturn-type super booster was needed and the 
ABMA made sense as an organisation only if it was the means to deliver that 
booster.  
Up until October 1959, Eisenhower remained aloof from the bureaucratic 
tussle. But that is not to say he was disengaged from the process or inactive. 
Glennan noted that he saw Eisenhower in his office “every four weeks and at 
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intervals at meetings of the cabinet and NSC.”56 He added pointedly that 
Eisenhower appeared particularly “on top of his job, more decisive when matters 
were brought to his attention,” once Sherman Adams had resigned from the 
White House.57 However, Glennan gave a telling insight into Eisenhower’s 
modus operandus in closing his thoughts on engagement with Eisenhower by 
saying: “I tended to work closely with his [Eisenhower’s] staff and particularly 
with Stans [Budget], Persons [Adams’ successor], Killian, and later George 
Kistiakowsky, his General Counsel, Gerald Morgan and certain members of the 
cabinet.”58 This was another reflection of the necessity of the supporting cast of 
operational officers to deliver the operational tactics directed by the President’s 
strategy. Eisenhower had replaced his battlefield commanders with White 
House equivalents. Yet what is key is that he was at the top of this pyramid 
structure, always guiding and always in control. The Whitman files 
demonstrate that he met with Persons on a daily basis, often several times a 
day and had very regular face to face meetings with each of the other named 
advisers, including Glennan.59 Eisenhower was constant in his management 
style. He intervened, but only when it was necessary so to do. In the case of the 
ABMA, he trusted Glennan to achieve as much as possible on his behalf up to 
the point where it was necessary for Eisenhower to take decisive action.   
 
Presidential impact on Mercury  
                                                          
56 Glennan, Edited Diary, p. 23. 
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58 Ibid. 
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The Mercury programme was assigned to NASA in the first week of its 
existence, and NASA had initially planned an open recruitment process to find 
its first group of astronauts. However, this plan was abandoned when 
Eisenhower agreed with Glennan, Dryden and the STG Director Gilruth, that 
the group should be drawn from the existing cadre of military test pilots.60  This 
was not because of any particular affinity to service pilots on the part of the 
president. As with many of Eisenhower’s decisions, it was more mundanely 
pragmatic and based, in part, on the successful experience of recruiting U-2 
pilots for the CIA over-flights of the Soviet Union.  A panel consisting of Stanley 
C. White, a senior medical practitioner in the US Air Force, Robert B. Voas, 
Assistant for Human Factors, Office of the Director, NASA Manned Spacecraft 
Centre, and William S. Augerson a senior medical practitioner in the US Army 
representing NASA and the military personnel bureaux in Washington screened 
508 test pilot records in January 1959 and 110 men met the minimum 
standards for astronaut selection. The process that whittled these 110 down to 
the seven presented in Washington three months later is the subject of almost 
every history of the early space age, but few recognise that the process was 
essentially the same as that used to select the first U-2 pilots. The direct link 
between the U-2 and Mercury selection processes was the Lovelace Clinic in 
Albuquerque, where both the U-2 recruits and prospective Mercury astronauts 
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undertook a week of intense medical evaluations.61  While Eisenhower’s U-2 
chief planner Dick Bissell had managed the development of the spy plane in 
conjunction with Lockheed under the auspices of the CIA, Curtis LeMay, Head 
of the Strategic Air Command, insisted the Air Force train the pilots, even 
though they were to fly as CIA and thus civilian operatives.62 However, the Air 
Force tests were not sufficiently stringent for final selection, and as a 
consequence, the prospective U-2 pilots were referred to Dr. William ‘Randy’ 
Lovelace, a World War II Army Air Corps colonel, who had continued to conduct 
research in private practice following his demobilisation, helping to improve 
aviation and aerospace medicine. The test regime established by Lovelace was 
deemed successful by the CIA and ensured he was at the forefront of NASA’s 
thinking in 1958 as the newly created space agency began to develop its man in 
space programme. Indeed Dryden asked him to chair its Special Advisory 
Committee on Life Sciences.63 The next year, a group of Lovelace Clinic aviation 
medicine experts under Dr. Lovelace's direction put 31 astronaut candidates 
through a week of clinical tests, in Albuquerque. On April 9, 1959, the best 
responders – the original Mercury Seven, were introduced to the media. 
Lovelace was on hand and described the rigorous testing undergone by the 
astronauts. The Astronauts described the Lovelace tests as the most rigorous 
and gruelling part of the selection procedure.64 The U-2 selection process had 
worked. While the helping hand mantle had passed from Bissell to Glennan, 
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there was no need to invent new practices. The lessons from U-2 were learned 
and applied to Mercury.65 
 
A change of focus: Killian to Kistiakowsky 
Jim Killian left his post as Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for Science and 
Technology on July 15, 1959. He was succeeded in the post by George 
Kistiakowsky, a noted Harvard chemist and leading member of Killian’s PSAC 
team. Killian returned to his previous role as President of MIT, a planned move 
that Eisenhower had known would happen and had understood since the 
beginning of Killian’s PSAC tenure in November, 1957. The succession marked 
a change of pace and emphasis for PSAC, and reflected an equal change in the 
status of the civilian space programme. Killian’s great skill, which had attracted 
Eisenhower to him, was his ability to bring the right people together to achieve 
great results. He was not particularly creative, nor was he a scientist. But, like 
the President, he was a master logistician. On Eisenhower’s behalf he had 
marshalled disparate strands of thought, disparate bursts of activity and the 
competing egos of a swathe of highly intelligent alpha males into concrete action 
on behalf of the President. First, he had put PSAC’s resources behind the 
formulation of the National Defense Education legislation. The claim that the 
Soviets were producing more engineers and scientists than the Americans had 
been levelled long before Sputnik 1 started orbiting the earth. But the Soviet 
success sharpened the crisis of confidence in US education. Killian’s significant 
success in feeding into the developing administrative programme for science 
education was to urge a drive for quality over quantity. As the college president 
who had introduced a Faculty of Arts into MIT, it should be no surprise that he 
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lobbied for investment in modern languages alongside science, technology, 
engineering and mathematics.66 His meetings with Eisenhower and the 
President’s brother Milton, a close advisor and another college president,67 
helped cement Eisenhower’s view that basic scientific research and education 
required greater funding (as opposed to applied technology for instance through 
the defence industry), and consequently introduced programmes, passed by 
Congress into law, to increase funding to the National Science Foundation.68 
Killian was also instrumental in creating a panel tasked with reopening 
negotiations with the Soviets on limiting nuclear tests. Its success was in 
presenting technical advice on the possibilities of measuring testing activity, 
and this led to the relatively successful Geneva Conference in 1958. Yet this was 
an area where PSAC was in danger of being mired in politics. It worked most 
effectively when operating as an apolitical advice group. With the competing 
cohorts the DoD, the Atomic Energy Commission and those elements of industry 
supporting both monoliths, PSAC became less useful to Eisenhower following 
the Geneva Conference when the issue of a ban on nuclear testing became more 
political than scientific.69  But Killian’s lasting success was the elegance and 
cool-headedness with which he steered the Administration from unstructured 
ideas coming from the missile programme, the demand for effective 
reconnaissance and the underfunded efforts of the IGY to a clear separation of 
military and civilian space programmes and the effective organisation for the 
non-military space programme through NASA.  
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 However, by July 1959, the balance between Killian’s input and the 
value he brought to the White House was shifting. As he said himself: “In early 
spring of 1959, I also became convinced that I had pretty well done the job that 
I, as a science administrator, had agreed to undertake. In the coming months 
ahead, a fully-fledged scientist could best help the president in coping with the 
kinds of problems that were to be on his agenda.” Given that this statement 
comes from Killian’s memoir, it could be a matter of retrofitting views to fit the 
circumstance. But there is an air of logic and self-understanding that makes 
this writer inclined to agree with Killian. Later in the year though, in his diary, 
Kistaikowsky, Killian’s successor wrote: 
During cocktails, Mrs. Lewis Strauss [wife of the Chairman of the 
Atomic Energy Commission] made strenuous inquiries as to the 
real reasons which induced Dr. Killian to resign. It was clear from 
her remarks that my statement, that it was his wife’s health and 
pressure from MIT was not adequate for her.70 
 
Actually, Killian’s official letter of resignation said:  
 Dear Mr. President 
 
For compelling personal reasons, about which you have been 
warmly understanding, and in order to return to the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, from which I have been on 
leave, I must regretfully resign my post as your Special Assistant 
for Science and Technology.71 
 
Eisenhower would not have hastened his return to MIT, but nor did he go to any 
great length to persuade him to stay – despite the fact that he enjoyed Killian’s 
company, his insight and his rare ability to translate the complex world of deep 
science and technology into clear, actionable language that Eisenhower could 
engage with.  Killian received the usual valedictory letter from Eisenhower 
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marking the departure of a subordinate, and reflecting his success with PSAC, 
the President released the letter to the press. In it he wrote: “Through your 
experience and clear judgement, brought to bear on many complex problems, 
you have been of inestimable help to me....The work of the Science Advisory 
Committee, in which I know you have played an effective part, has already 
produced results that should have lasting value to the nation.72 Just after 
Killian left Washington, Eisenhower wrote a rather more personal, off the 
record (in so far as Eisenhower’s writing was ever off the record) “Dear Jim” 
note. Eisenhower was never truly informal in his written correspondence, but 
there’s a sense of both friendship and gratitude in his writing. He wrote: 
No one did more than you, in those early days, to bring reason, 
fact and logic into our plans for space research and adventure. I 
shall never cease to be grateful for the patience with which you 
initiated me into the rudiments of this new science...More than all 
this, every contact with you has been, for me, interesting, 
informative and often inspiring.73 
 
This candid friendship and respect is echoed in two other letters Killian kept 
long after he had left Washington. One, signed “With warm regard, sincerely 
D.E” is an invitation to Killian to attend one of Eisenhower’s “occasional stag 
dinners”.74 This placed Killian very much within Eisenhower’s inner circle. The 
stag dinners were the President’s opportunity to talk informally about subjects 
of national importance with men whose opinion he valued. The second letter 
reflects that even the somewhat austere and aloof Eisenhower did make time to 
recognise the achievements of those he trusted to drive forward his agenda. On 
April 20 1959, in another “Dear Jim” letter, Eisenhower wrote: 
From the compliments that have reached me on this year’s 
conference for the Advertising Council and specifically on the 
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panel on science and education that you put together – I judge 
that this was the best received and therefore most useful to the 
Administration of any that we have held. I am especially grateful 
to you for your participation as I have learned that because of a 
cold and some night travel, it was at some considerable personal 
sacrifice that you did it.  
 
With warm regard, as ever, DE.75 
 
It is quite understandable why Eisenhower was so fulsome in his praise for his 
first science advisor. Killian had fulfilled all the expectations of a trusted 
lieutenant. He had taken clear instruction from Eisenhower on his appointment 
and had delivered on those instructions without fuss and without adding to the 
burden of the presidency. In short, he had been the perfect presidential helping 
hand.  
There is a significant and telling contrast between Eisenhower’s close 
association and the rather more stilted and formal letter Vice President Nixon 
wrote to Killian as the latter returned to MIT. While this too is a “Dear Jim” 
letter and signed “Dick Nixon”, there is considerably less sense of intimacy, 
perhaps reflecting Nixon’s position on the outer edge of presidential decision 
making. Nixon wrote: 
You answered an emergency summons to serve your country in an 
area which demanded the attention of the greatest minds of the 
scientific community. To an area dominated by public hysteria 
you brought the calm serenity of objective insight... The debt 
which this nation owes you will be determined by the future 
course of history, but you can be assured of the fact that you have 
rendered invaluable and outstanding service to your country.76 
 
One last service Killian provided for Eisenhower was to provide four 
recommendations as to who should succeed him. Kistiakowsky was at the top of 
the list which also included Brooks, Bacher and DuBridge, in descending order.  
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Robert Bacher and Lee DuBridge had worked with Killian since the Office of 
Defense Mobilization Science Advisory Committee days, while Harvey Brooks, 
who eventually joined PSAC in 1960, was the Dean of Engineering and Applied 
Physics at Harvard. Bacher, a former AEC Commissioner was a Professor at 
Caltech, while DuBridge was Caltech’s president, a trustee of the RAND 
Corporation and former member of the National Science Foundation.77 
Kistiakowsky, a leading chemist in the Manhattan project and former chair of 
Chemistry at Harvard was Killian’s first choice. He had already been an 
effective member of PSAC since its formation and was well-known to the 
President. Eisenhower agreed to Killian’s suggestion without question. 
 Kistiakowsky’s arrival almost coincided with the completion of NASA’s 
structure.  Glennan had control of the Mercury Programme, the Saturn booster 
project, the JPL and was soon to finally wrest the ABMA from the Army’s 
clutches. The focus now for NASA was on Eisenhower’s legacy: what sort of 
space programme was his Administration going to bequeath to the nation? That 
largely rested on budget negotiations for FY62, and, of course, on the 1960 
Presidential Election and who would succeed Eisenhower in the White House.  
 
The Final Year – leaving a legacy in space 
Eisenhower’s last year in office should have been valedictory. Had it gone to 
plan, he would have left the White House following a successful summit with 
the Soviets, a nuclear test ban agreement and a balanced budget. In the best 
scenario, the Republicans would have regained Congress and Richard Nixon 
would be succeeding him as President. Had those wishes been fulfilled, there is 
no doubt that Eisenhower’s history would have been written differently. Of 
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course, it was not to be. By the time the Administration was preparing its final 
budget and plans to hand on the winner of the 1960 Presidential Election, 
relations with the Soviets had soured over the U-2 incident and failed Paris 
summit. Hopes of a nuclear test ban treaty diminished by the day as the 
scientists’ initial hopes for a breakthrough were extinguished, and the treaty 
talks became mired in ideological posturing, much of it within the US’s own 
armed forces, AEC and Congressional political factions.78 The raised 
temperature of the Cold War, following Khrushchev’s storming from the Paris 
conference room, coupled with deteriorating relations with Cuba and the 
constant sniping of the Democrats on the supposed missile gap, led to a rather 
more fraught year than Eisenhower would have hoped for, and certainly not the 
kind of final victory lap a president would want to build a legacy on.  During his 
final months in office, the focus for his legacy became two-fold: leaving the 
nation at peace, and ensuring the new Administration inherited a balanced 
budget. For NASA’s civilian space programme, that meant an uneasy balance 
between ambitious space plans and limited funding with which to realise them. 
For a Republican candidate on the presidential trail, it meant the even less 
comfortable balancing act of supporting the current Administration while facing 
the challenges of a seemingly young, vigorous and radical opponent.  
 While Eisenhower supported the Mercury man-in-space programme, he 
was far less enamoured with the idea of sending a man to the moon. While he 
had supported extra funding for NASA to acquire the Saturn Booster project 
and the ABMA team that was developing it, the first the President knew of 
NASA’s active plans to send a man to the moon was when the programme was 
presented to him in January 1960. Kistiakowsky noted that at a January 8 1960 
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meeting, Eisenhower agreed to “resolve conflicts between DOD and NASA 
regarding booster development and similar issues.” It would seem that he was 
not expecting any internal rivalry issues, but was keenly aware of reports of 
continuing Soviet progress in missile development.79  The President had always 
acknowledged since the Sputnik launch that the one US deficiency in space was 
a powerful rocket booster. It had been unnecessary to develop such a booster 
earlier in the 1950s when the focus had been on developing workable ICBMS. 
But with the options for larger and more powerful satellites and both unmanned 
and manned scientific space stations, as laid out in Purcell’s 1958 Introduction 
to Outer Space report, the President was a strong advocate of prioritising the 
large booster programme. While Saturn appeared to offer little to the US’ 
ongoing military development, according to Kistiakowsky: “at the very end [of 
the meeting, Eisenhower] was rather favourably considering the idea of adding 
another $100 million to the Saturn project if that could speed it up.”80   
At the final Space Council meeting under Eisenhower’s presidency on 
January 12, which was attended by Nixon and his future running mate, Henry 
Cabot Lodge, as well as most regular National Security Committee attendees, 
Glennan presented the long-range plan for NASA. For the first time, this talked 
to an audience beyond NASA insiders about a follow-on man in space 
programme after Mercury, and offered a mission to the moon as part of the 
raison d’être for the Saturn super booster.  Kistiakowsky noted that this: “was 
followed by an emphatic statement by the President that maximum effort 
should go into super booster rockets. [Maurice] Stans [Director of the Bureau of 
the Budget] objected to the expenditure of so much money and was firmly 
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dressed down by the President.”81 At this stage, Eisenhower was not endorsing a 
moon landing programme. He saw far more benefit in unmanned over manned 
space exploration and did not equate the Saturn booster with a manned landing 
on the moon. Indeed, his August statement on US successes in space and his 
final discussions over the budget both pointed to a strong resistance to 
endorsing manned space efforts beyond the Mercury proof of concept. In one 
area of that August statement, there was no change at all. Eisenhower’s long 
game of satellite development based primarily on national security needs was 
not driven by the same propaganda agenda that drove Khrushchev, and nor was 
it a response to the provocative nature of the Soviets’ series of “spectacular first” 
efforts. Speaking about the satellite successes, he said:  
All these are the results of a well planned and determined attack 
on this new field-an attack that promises very real and useful 
results for all mankind. Each of these satellites is destined to play 
an important part in broadening man's understanding of the 
cosmos in which he lives. While no one of them has been 
undertaken solely in an effort to achieve a "spectacular first" in 
the eyes of the world, each has resulted in just such a "spectacular 
first" in support of the desires of mankind for greater knowledge 
and understanding.  
The United States leads the world in the activities in the space 
field that promise real benefits to mankind.82 
The “real benefits” were scientific – discoveries such as the Van Allen Belts; and 
technological – making strides in meteorology and communications. And, of 
course, Discoverer/Corona heralded the step away from the reliance on U-2 led 
reconnaissance to the new age of the space satellite. Man in space did not fit 
this pattern. Eisenhower saw the Saturn programme as giving NASA a good 
reason to draw in the talents of the ABMA team, and the resulting booster 
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would pragmatically fill the heavy booster gap that the Soviets had opened up in 
1957. There was no romance in funding Saturn; this was not a prestige project. 
It may simply be that he saw the Saturn booster as the launch vehicle for future 
space stations – a concept presented by NASA in 1959 following Purcell’s initial 
study – or that the pragmatist President saw a potential cross-over into military 
use further down the line in Saturn’s development. However, he did endorse 
NASA’s long range plan which was shared with Congress on January 26, 1960.  
At that stage NASA moon mission plans were quite vague, which probably made 
it easier for Eisenhower to endorse the overall 10 year strategy. A great believer 
in plans, he never expected them to transpire in quite the way they were laid 
out on paper. NASA introduced the moon mission concept by saying:  “In the 
long run, such activities [a broadly and soundly conceived program of research, 
development and operations in space] should make feasible the manned 
exploration of the moon and nearby planets and this exploration may this be 
taken as a long-term goal of NASA activities.”83 That was a long way from 
talking overtly about the cost and procedure of landing a man on the moon.  
While endorsing the plan at a high level, Eisenhower could constrain it 
while still in the White House, by limiting the funds NASA had to work with. 
And, as he entered his last round of budget negotiations, he showed no signs of 
loosening the reins on spending on what he perceived as spectacular rather than 
substantive space projects.  But that final round of budget planning was still 
some months off. What would dominate the domestic agenda for 1960 was not 
any ‘space race’ but the race for the White House and the election to succeed 
Eisenhower as President.  
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Nixon and space 
Richard Nixon had never been a key player in developing space policy. While his 
Vice President’s role had given him the Senate Chair and, theoretically, ensured 
he was Eisenhower’s link with Congress, the President had chosen to bypass 
Nixon and deal directly with Lyndon Johnson in the post-Sputnik period 
through to the passing of the Space Act. Nixon, through most of Eisenhower’s 
presidency was the outsider looking in. The U-2 incident on the eve of the Paris 
summit had initially damaged the Republicans, but counter-intuitively, 
Eisenhower had emerged stronger from it. After the weak cover stories that 
asserted that Francis Gary Powers’ plane was nothing more than a NASA 
weather flight had been shredded by a gleeful Khrushchev, the President had 
wrested the initiative by acknowledging the true nature of the flight, and 
refusing to apologise to the Soviets for the United States’ show of power in 
having an active four-year reconnaissance project that had already delivered 
powerful intelligence via the CIA’s U-2 flights. Again, Eisenhower showed he 
could change tack if the circumstances demanded. Previously, during the winter 
of 1958-59, Eisenhower had chosen to keep his counsel as Khrushchev provoked 
him over Berlin. The accusations from both the media and, particularly, from 
Democratic politicians was that Eisenhower was weak in the face of Soviet 
aggression.84 Eisenhower had surmised correctly that Khrushchev’s threat was 
bluff. With the U-2 incident, the tables were somewhat turned. Eisenhower 
demonstrated that the US was not inactive in the face of the Soviet threat but 
was – and had been for some time – actively countering the Soviets by means of 
cutting-edge reconnaissance. This had always been risky, but it was a risk 
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Eisenhower accepted. Deputy CIA Director Robert Amory had told Eisenhower 
from the outset that the U-2 had a limited life. “The Russian radar would 
improve, their fighters and intercepts and other things like their surface to air 
missiles would improve. And a precisely accurate prediction was made of about 
a four year life.”85 By standing up to Khrushchev, even in the uncomfortable 
light of the drawn-out humiliation the Soviet leader tried to impose, slightly 
perversely, Eisenhower regained the respect and support both of the US public 
and the wide free world. Indeed, in a Gallup poll taken in June 1960 after the 
furore around the incident subsided, 58% of Americans questions stated that the 
President had handled the U-2 incident well.86  
This really did not help Nixon as he prepared his run for the presidency. 
By the summer, as the president began a final world tour, Eisenhower’s stock 
was on the rise again. Immediately following the failed Paris summit, 
Eisenhower’s approval rating had fallen to 49 per cent. By September, it was 
back to 65 per cent.87 Running for the White House, Nixon faced a double 
challenge in attempting to appear distinct to the electorate. He was torn 
between his duty to support the exiting president’s insistence on leaving office 
with a balanced budget, and his own political desire to confront Kennedy with a 
more aggressive and perhaps more populist agenda. One area where he could 
take on Kennedy from a position of strength was on achievements in space. Yet 
he was limited in how far he could push his own agenda by having to appear 
continually supportive of both Eisenhower’s handling of the U-2 incident and 
the president’s insistence in avoiding a space race.   
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“Highlights in Space Exploration” was a briefing paper prepared for 
Nixon by John Hamlin who had left the White House staff to work for Nixon as 
a researcher and speechwriter.88  Hamlin’s two-page document recorded a 
succession of US satellite successes. Explorer 1-VII and Pioneer 1-V detailed a 
string of scientific successes. Vanguard revealed the earth was “pear shaped”.89 
Tiros 1 was the first “picture-taking weather satellite” while Transit 1B and 11A 
were the first time that two instrumental satellites were placed in orbit at the 
same time. Echo 1 was the largest artificial object in space, while the X-15 “set 
new records for speed (2196 miles per hour) and new record for altitude (136,500 
feet).90 Perhaps the most interesting reference was to Discoverer XIII and XIV. 
These were described thus: “Brings nearer the goal of manned space flights by 
successfully recovering satellite capsules ejected from orbiting satellites.”91 
What was most certainly not explained was that these were tests of the Corona 
spy satellites: ‘black’ projects hidden in plain sight under the ‘white’ banner of 
NASA scientific flights. What should have given Nixon the greatest satisfaction, 
and the most significant evidence that Eisenhower’s space policy was working, 
was the ‘Balance Sheet’ that closed the document. It read: 
      United States         Soviet Union 
Number of space vehicles successfully launch              26                             8 
Number still in space                                                      16                             3 
Number still sending back data                                      9                              1 
Number of space capsules recovered from orbit             2                              192 
 
However, Nixon had little opportunity to press the case that the US space policy 
was a success as the Democrats changed the focus of debate, mounting the 
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attack not on Eisenhower’s civilian space policy which was developed and 
executed in plain sight (with the exception of the hidden role of the 
Discoverer/Corona programme), but on the so-called missile gap. There was 
indeed a missile gap: probably 4-1 in favour of the US.93 But Eisenhower was 
unbending on his stance of never making public national security intelligence 
public. In being rigid on this policy, he undermined Nixon’s chances of winning 
the election. Eisenhower did make one statement on space policy during the 
campaign, although the comment on the success of US efforts in space released 
at his News Conference on August 17, 1960 sought to play down any inference 
that the US was interested in a race in space or in delivering ‘spectaculars’ 
along the lines of the Soviet Sputniks. For Eisenhower, space exploration could 
be exciting, but it was a means to an end. His policy was successful, but the 
meteorological, communication and navigation satellites it was delivering were 
functional rather than spectacular, and the Mercury manned programme was a 
proof-of-concept, rather than any kind of pioneering adventure.94 It did not offer 
Nixon an opportunity to outflank Kennedy.  
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 Of course, it was much more than small differences from Eisenhower in 
space policy that really stymied Nixon. The President had chosen to remain 
largely aloof from the campaign, especially in its early stages. And his sense 
that he was always the best person to deal with any significant policy decisions 
reflected badly – inadvertently or otherwise – on the public perception of how he 
viewed Nixon. This is not the place to reflect on Kennedy’s victory, but the fact 
that a Democrat would take over the White House in January 1961 did affect 
Eisenhower’s final actions in the winter of 1960-61.  
 
 
 
Recalibration 
Given that he had actively supported additional funding for the Saturn booster 
in 1959 in compiling the FY61 budget for NASA, it may be surprising that 
Eisenhower had rather lost confidence with NASA’s ability to implement his 
strategy a year later. Yet it should really come as no surprise. What Eisenhower 
could not support was NASA’s increasing concentration on follow-on man in 
space developments after the conclusion of the Mercury programme. It 
demonstrated an Executive agency deviating from the Executive strategy 
without any direct order to do so from the President. Eisenhower’s ambivalence 
bordering on hostility to man in space became clearer late in 1960 when NASA 
submitted its budget request for FY62 to the Bureau of the Budget. The 
application detailed, for the first time in public, NASA’s request for funding for 
a lunar landing programme. This was most certainly not what Eisenhower had 
envisaged. Meeting with the President in October, Glennan noted: 
At 3 o'clock, I met with the president. I found him [Eisenhower] 
tired and preoccupied. I simply brought him up-to-date on our 
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activities...and then indicated that we were going to require 
additional money in the way of a supplemental. He had no 
comment to make on this matter. I told him something of the 
costs that appear to be involved in Project Apollo, the follow on to 
Project Mercury. He expressed himself once more as having little 
interest in the manned aspects of space research. He was cordial 
enough but it was obvious that he was not at his best today.95 
 
Glennan clearly failed to get the measure of Eisenhower at the October meeting. 
While the President had been confident to let Glennan and NASA implement 
his strategy through the previous 18 months and therefore refrained from 
extensive personal involvement, there were now clear signs that the President’s 
view of the strategy and NASA’s interpretation were diverging. NASA was 
already planning to send a man to the moon, while Eisenhower did not view 
man in space beyond proof of concept as a priority for the nation. The 
consequence was that Eisenhower returned his active attention to NASA. He 
asked Kistiakowsky to study: “the goals, the missions and the costs” of NASA’s 
planned programme. Kistiakowsky set up a six man panel led by Donald Hornig 
of Brown University to conduct the study. They reported back on December 16, 
1960. The report opened quite portentously – not the usual PSAC style – as it 
stated: “We have been plunged into a race for the conquest of space....the most 
compelling reason for our effort has been the international political situation 
which demands that we demonstrate our technological capabilities if we are to 
maintain our position of leadership.”96 Such rhetoric never won favour with 
Eisenhower, and perhaps reflects a too-close relationship between Hornig’s team 
and NASA. Indeed, the report went on to praise NASA’s co-operation: “Officers 
of the NASA presented a very impressive description of their detailed plans for 
development, utilization and costs of the Saturn vehicle.” But over the 
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remainder of the report, the team reverted to a cool appraisal of NASA’s 
aspirations.  
This was the use of a technical PSAC panel in the way that Eisenhower 
preferred: essentially telling him what he suspected, but needed to be validated 
by scientific professionals. Project Mercury was described as a “marginal effort” 
which owed its continuation only to “the political desire either to be the first 
nation to send a man into orbit, or at least be a close second.”97 The Saturn C2 
program, as currently envisaged, would enter its test phase about 1965, and was 
“expected to lift about 40,000 lbs into low earth orbit and planned to utilize this 
capacity to send up an ‘orbiting laboratory’...It is our opinion that an orbiting 
laboratory of this size could produce considerably more scientific information if 
it were wholly instrumental rather than manned.”98 The report noted that the 
planned Saturn developments and Apollo spacecraft were not “capable of 
landing on the moon with sufficient auxiliary equipment to return the crew 
safely to the earth”99 and indicated that a new program much larger than 
Saturn would be needed. The Nova programme was discussed alongside a series 
of unmanned programmes. 100  The response of the scientists to the comparison 
was unemotional, but touched on the reasons for manned space exploration that 
Eisenhower’s cold rationality simply did not engage with. “Certainly among the 
major reasons for attending the manned exploration of space are emotional 
compulsions and national aspirations...It seems therefore to us that man-in-
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space cannot be justified on purely scientific grounds.”101 Finishing the report 
with the likely costs, manned earth orbit was estimated at $350m.  Manned 
circumnavigation of the moon was put at $8bn. A manned lunar landing ranged 
between $26bn to $38bn. Hornig’s team concluded: “The unmanned program is a 
necessary prerequisite to a manned program. Even if there were no manned 
program, the unmanned program might yield as much scientific knowledge and 
on the basis would be justified in its own right.”102 Four days later, Glennan 
recorded his attendance at an NSC meeting at which Project Apollo was 
discussed.  
I presented our budget and 10-year plan as revised while Hugh 
described in more detail the activities to be undertaken under the 
1962 budget, which is now set at $1.16 billion approximately. Of 
that amount, $50 million will be requested in a supplemental for 
the current fiscal year. After we had completed our story showing 
the NASA budget increasing to more than $2.5 billion annually by 
the end of the decade, Kistiakowsky talked about the manned 
space flight program beyond Project Mercury. Most of his 
information had been derived from presentations given by our 
people to a committee of the President's Science Advisory 
Committee. The total dollars estimated to be required for landing 
a man on the moon and returning him to earth are really quite 
staggering. One can support a figure anywhere from $10 billion to 
$35 billion and even then, not know whether or not he is in the 
right ballpark. 
 
 The president was prompt in his response: he couldn't care less 
whether a man ever reached the moon. There was desultory 
comment by others in the meeting who were concerned over the 
increasing cost of space research.... In some ways, the meeting 
was discouraging. However, I think that feeling might be 
considered a natural one under the circumstances.103 
 
Eisenhower was extremely dismissive of the NASA plans. NASA Associate 
Administrator Robert Seamans recalled the meeting saying: “Eisenhower ended 
this part of the meeting with a rhetorical question: “Can anybody tell me what 
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is the best space program for $1 billion?” Walking from the Cabinet room, I 
realized why Maury Stans was adamant that there would be no additions to 
NASA’s budget in FY 1962.”104 
 By January, Eisenhower’s view on the manned space programme had 
hardened to the extent that he wanted to speak out against it in public before 
leaving the presidency. Glennan recorded:  
Dryden and I visited Kistiakowsky to attempt to get a change 
made in the budget message of the president, which is to be 
delivered on 18 January. Apparently, following the National 
Security Council meeting on the 20th, a statement was prepared 
for inclusion in the message that would, in my opinion, be unwise. 
The president proposes to say that there is no scientific or defense 
need for man in space beyond Mercury. It is much better, if I am 
any judge of the political realities of the situation, to say that we 
need much more research and development before a definite 
decision can be made in this matter. Actually, such a statement 
would be in complete agreement with the facts as they will be 
presented in the budget message. After much telephoning, we 
were able to get this statement changed.105  
 
 The budget speech was delivered without the passage stating that there 
was no scientific or defence justification for continuing the man in space 
programme beyond Mercury, but in his final weeks in office, Eisenhower did 
instruct Goodpaster to circulate the Hornig Report of the Ad Hoc Panel on Man 
in Space report to Congressional leaders and anyone he thought might have an 
influence on future NASA policy.  
Nor was Eisenhower alone in raising objections to NASA’s manned lunar 
landing plan. Surprisingly, some of the criticism came from within NASA itself. 
As late as May 21 1961, Hugh Dryden, NASA’s Deputy Administrator, testified 
before the Senate Appropriations Committee. When asked what practical use 
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he saw in landing a man on the moon, he responded: “It certainly does not make 
any sense to me.”106 
 
The hand-over proposition 
As part of the transition to the new Administration, PSAC member Jerome 
Wiesner chaired an Ad Hoc Committee on Space producing a report for the 
President-Elect on January 10, 1961.107 Wiesner, soon to be appointed 
Kennedy’s Special Scientific Adviser, did not call on his predecessors Killian or 
Kistiakowsky to help compile the report, but did include Ed Purcell, author of 
the 1958 report that laid the foundations of NASA’s structure and operations, 
Trevor Gardner, the Air Force’s Special Assistant for Research and 
Development, Din Land, the Polaroid President and mastermind behind the 
camera technology on both the U-2 and Corona programmes, and Donald 
Hornig, a member of the National Academy of Science and Wiesner’s successor 
as the Presidential Science Adviser. Wiesner, a registered Democrat, had 
worked with the Democratic Party throughout the 1960 presidential election 
campaign, a point that had not gone unnoticed in the White House. As early as 
July 12, 1960, Kistiakowsky recorded a meeting of PSAC with the president at 
Newport, and a follow-up conversation with Wiesner who was also present at 
the meeting. Kistiakowsky noted he told Wiesner he: “should influence his 
friends, who in turn influence Kennedy, to have the latter pick out a special 
assistant for science and technology early enough so that as soon as the election 
is over, the man can start getting acquainted with our work.” Wiesner indicated 
he had already been told he was Kennedy’s choice. One should note that 
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Kistiakowsky was absolutely not conceding the election this far out, but was 
being realistic that the next Administration could be Democratic. He also 
recorded a private conversation with Killian urging him to work for Nixon 
during the campaign “as a counterweight to the influence of Teller”. 108 On 
August 22, White House Counsel David Kendall contacted Kistiakowsky 
suggesting: “that in view of Wiesner’s involvement in the Kennedy campaign, he 
should be excluded from PSAC activities until after the election.”109 
Kistiakowsky responded to Kendall that PSAC was non-partisan and that half 
its members were Democrats – and was able to convince Kendall that Wiesner 
should stay an active member “providing Wiesner’s political activities are non-
public.”110 A month later, Wiesner himself called Kistiakowsky to inform him 
that he [Wiesner] was “getting more and more alarmed by some of the things 
Kennedy is saying, obviously under the influence of the advisors around him, 
like Symington, Murray etc.”111 He asked what the White House reaction would 
be if he “joined Kennedy’s party for a while”. Kistiakowsky told him to follow his 
conscience but noted: “I recall speaking about Wiesner’s activities with the 
president and his agreement, after some hesitation, that Jerry remain on the 
PSAC so long as he does not publicly criticize the Eisenhower 
administration.”112 Wiesner was finally appointed as Special Assistant to 
President Kennedy for Science and Technology and, simultaneously, as 
chairman of the President's Science Advisory Committee, following the 
inauguration. Thus his report to Kennedy on space came before he was officially 
in role.  
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Having been critical of Eisenhower’s passive and active defence policies 
through the Gaither Panel, of which he was technical director, one might have 
expected Wiesner’s transition report on space to be highly critical of 
Eisenhower’s 1958-1960 space policy. Yet that is not the case. While the report 
is critical of NASA’s management and makes a recommendation to “Establish a 
single responsibility within the military establishments for managing the 
military portion of the space program”113, the focus of the report is on improving 
organisation and integration to build on the previous two years’ experience. This 
was not a radical report. It was not the rallying cry for a crash man-to-the-moon 
programme that one might expect given Kennedy’s pledge to send a man to the 
moon addressed to Congress just five months later. Far from it. The most 
pressing recommendation, hand-amended by Wiesner was as follows: 
Review the national space program and redefine the objectives in 
view of the experience gained during the past two years. 
Particular attention should be given to the booster program, 
manned space flight, the military uses of space and the 
application of space technology to the civilian activities of the 
country. 
 
This was not significantly different from Nixon’s platform and much more a 
continuation of the Eisenhower strategy than what actually followed under 
Kennedy. It differed from Eisenhower in that there was a drawing together of 
military and civilian activities, but shared the conclusions of Eisenhower’s own 
commissioned report in questioning the value of manned space flight. In fact, 
Wiesner’s report was rather dismissive of manned flight. While it is given its 
own section, ‘Man in space’ is actually the seventh topic discussed, coming after 
a general review and then sections on Ballistic Missiles, Organization and 
Management, The Booster Program, the Military Space Program and Science in 
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space. While Wiesner recognised that “We are rapidly approaching the time 
when technology will make it possible for man to go out into space. It is sure 
that as soon as this possibility exists, man will be compelled to make use of 
it.”114 Yet the report regarded military and scientific missions as only “dimly 
perceived”115, while an underlined comment noted: “It is very unlikely that we 
shall be the first in placing a man in orbit around the earth.”116 There was 
almost a grudging note when the report, which had devoted twice as much 
coverage on space exploration to unmanned rather than manned missions 
states: “While the successful orbiting of a man about the earth … will provide a 
necessary stepping stone toward the establishment of a space station and for the 
eventual manned exploration of the moon and the planets…a crash program 
aimed at placing a man into orbit at the earliest possible time cannot be 
justified solely on scientific and technological grounds. Indeed, it may hinder the 
development of our scientific and technical program and even the future 
manned space program by diverting manpower, vehicles and funds.”117 Thus, 
Wiesner’s report prepared to enable the new president to hit the ground running 
is not a new Democratic strategy setting sail on the oceans of space towards a 
new frontier as Kennedy would talk about at Rice University in 1962. This is a 
far more pragmatic request to improve organisation and prioritisation to make 
incremental improvements to a strategy borne out of the twin developments of 
missile R&D and the scientific investigations initiated under the IGY. As such, 
the planned Wiesner programme as outlined in the report is far closer to the 
Eisenhower legacy than one might expect from a Democrat.  
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 Given the significant shift in support for the man in space programme 
that was to take place under Kennedy, it may be surprising that Wiesner was so 
lacking in support for manned space exploration. But the explanation is simple. 
Although he was a Democrat, Wiesner was first and foremost a part of PSAC’s 
inner core. PSAC was non-partisan and had been created to give the president 
unbiased scientific expertise: advice based on scientific knowledge, not political 
considerations. By 1960, it had reached its political apogee.  But one must 
question whether it was quite as unbiased as it seemed. Eisenhower had 
identified Killian, initially through his work with the TCP, as someone who 
shared his general values and political outlook. Killian was driven by these 
values in selecting PSAC scientists, thus rejecting those such as Teller and Von 
Braun who sought to further their own agendas rather than that of the 
president. Therefore, the PSAC panels became collegiate entities grouped 
around Eisenhower’s basic philosophies. It is pushing the analogy too far to say 
there was any kind of ‘groupthink’ as envisaged by Janis at work in their 
decision making.118 However, they knew the principles of the president and had 
rather a tendency, on space especially, to deliver verdicts in line with those 
principles. The lack of success of the Gaither Panel in 1958 in changing the 
president’s perspective on national defence gave a clear message to PSAC on 
what the president’s expectations were from the team he called “my scientists”.   
Killian captured the bond between the president and PSAC well in his memoir 
recording his final meeting with Eisenhower shortly before the former president 
died.  
The general seemed to welcome the opportunity to talk, and the 
visit lasted for nearly an hour…At one point, he asked about “my 
scientists” and specifically mentioned several by name. Then he 
made a comment that I shall always cherish: “You know Jim, this 
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bunch of scientists was one of the few groups that I encountered 
in Washington who seemed to be there to help the country and not 
themselves.” His statement was true.119 
 
 Don Hornig, another Democrat, who became Johnson’s Scientific 
Adviser, was questioned about PSAC’s relationship with Eisenhower in an oral 
history interview conducted in 1968. 
The Science Advisory Committee covers everything from health to 
military intelligence. On any specific problem the approach has 
been to set up a panel or task force. The notion is that a group 
works on a major problem, works intensively for a year and works 
as part of the Presidential family. They are outsiders, but in fact 
they are given very high security clearances, made reasonably 
privy, to the internal pullings and haulings of the government, at 
least in the areas with which they are concerned. They have 
brought in objectivity from the outside, but they have also been 
insiders in the sense that they have been part of the White House 
family.120 
 
Being part of the ‘White House family’, as Hornig explained, was important for 
building the symbiotic relationship developed between Eisenhower and PSAC. 
Equally important was the mode of working through panels and task forces.  
Starting with the pattern that Killian set, the kind of task forces 
we've had in our office have been enormously useful... from the 
beginning we didn't identify publicly the existence of taskforces; 
we refused to divulge publicly the membership of task forces, 
panels of the President's Science Advisory Committee. The reason 
was just to give people a chance to work on problems without 
being exposed to political pressures personally. For instance, the 
members of the President's Science Advisory Committee, I figure, 
on the average spend thirty-five or forty days a year working for 
him. Considering that they are all top-notch people, this derives 
from the fact that they think they are effective and they think it is 
worthwhile.121 
 
                                                          
119 Killian, Sputnik, p. 241. 
120 Transcript, Donald F. Hornig Oral History Interview I, 12/4/68, by David G. McComb, 
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/Hornig-D/hornig1.PDF, LBJ 
Library, p14. Accessed August 30, 2014.  
121 Ibid, p. 13. 
281 
 
What was most effective and most worthwhile for Eisenhower was that 
these panels and taskforces were not subjected to political interference, and nor 
were they running the gauntlet of lobbyists from the ‘Military Industrial 
Complex’. They could assess the evidence coolly and come to viewpoints less 
affected by political influence. Therefore, to a greater degree, the advice 
Eisenhower received from PSAC was ‘pure’. Additionally, this was not a one-
way street. As one saw in the months after Sputnik, Eisenhower did not force 
his opinion on how the civilianised aspect of the US space programme should be 
managed. While his initial intention was for it to come under military control, 
he was persuaded by Killian’s PSAC experts that the best route was a civilian 
agency. Thus it is wrong to see the Eisenhower/PSAC relationship as one of 
command/deliver. While it was framed by the strategic principles of the 
president, notably economic conservatism, national security and avoiding 
conflict, it was a relationship of mutual respect although it exhibited slight 
deference to the president. As with that inadvertent slip at the August Press 
Conference that gave the Democrats their “If you give me a week” ammunition, 
it was always clear that Eisenhower would make the final decisions on issues 
raised and researched with PSAC. Their role was to advise. His was to lead. 
Speaking at MIT in October 1973, James Killian summed up the success of the 
relationship: 
The importance of PSAC goes far beyond the specific outcomes of 
its studies and recommendations because of the relationships of 
confidence and free discussion that PSAC enjoyed with the 
President and the President’s associates. These meetings, in 
which there was free-for-all discussion, were memorable events 
for PSAC itself. They made it possible for a group of scientists to 
come to understand the President’s problems, views and goals and 
to learn how to make themselves useful in the light of this 
understanding. So it was that the committee found many ways to 
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express its belief in the values of a free society not only for the 
advancement of science, but for the good of mankind.122 
  
The stance taken by PSAC squared firmly with Eisenhower’s own sense of duty 
to the country which elevated his attitude towards Executive decision making 
above partisan politics. Kennedy was to use the space programme to make 
political capital at the expense of a long-term strategy. In so doing, he largely 
abandoned the fledgling but logical foundation that Eisenhower had set for the 
scientific exploration of space.  
 
Conclusion:  The Eisenhower Space Legacy 
Ken Collier coined the term ‘Autopilot Presidency’ to describe Eisenhower’s 
relations with Congress, where he defined Eisenhower as a leader who stepped 
in only when it was necessary to deal with turbulence.123 However, to apply that 
same analogy to the way the president led on space policy once NASA was 
operational is not quite accurate. The analogy is close, but it needs to be built 
on. To extend the flight analogy, Eisenhower picked the destination and set the 
course. He flew the plane to its cruising height, and then handed over the 
operational flying to his First Officer. When any difficult course changes were 
necessary – and when it came to landing the plane, Eisenhower took control 
once again. He dealt with more than just turbulence.   
On leaving the White House in January 1961, Eisenhower could be proud 
of the edifices he had created and relationships he had built in support of the 
implementation of the US’ first space policy. In 27 months, he had formally 
created and mandated a science advisory committee that put objective science 
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into the heart of Executive decision making. Although PSAC’s remit was far 
wider than space, and was heavily focused on nuclear test ban talks, basic 
science in education, missile development, chemicals in food and high energy 
particle accelerators among other projects, arguably its finest achievement was 
to shape the Space Act in 1958. 124  This Act enabled the creation and operation 
of NASA, a civilian agency reporting directly to the president. The very creation 
of an arms-length agency reporting to the president headed off the rivalry 
between the armed services in the pursuit of primacy in the US space 
programme. Of course, this rivalry bubbled in the early years of NASA’s 
existence, never more so than in 1958 where Medaris and, to an extent, 
Wernher Von Braun, fought a rearguard battle to preserve the ABMA’s 
independence within the Army, beyond the grasp of NASA control. Equally, the 
Air Force’s backing for military space spectacular projects such as Boeing X-20 
Dynasoar which ran from 1957 to 1963 caused friction with its civilian peer and 
drained significant funds (over $660million in the case of Dynsasoar) at the 
precise time that NASA was designing follow-on projects for the proof-of-concept 
man-in-space Mercury programme.  
 Part of Eisenhower’s legacy is that he placed the Mercury programme in 
the hands of NASA. But, by 1960 with the relative success of US satellite 
launches in comparison to the Soviets; the rapid advance in the development of 
the US IRBM and ICBM packages; and the first payload returns of the Corona 
spy satellite; his enthusiasm for man in space – if it had ever existed – had 
waned. It is hardly surprising since the likelihood still was that the Soviets 
would launch the first man in space, and Eisenhower had repeatedly made it 
clear, not least in his space speech of August 1960, that he did not believe in the 
                                                          
124 Kistiakowsky, Scientist in the White House, p. lv1.  
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merit of space spectaculars. This was not what he had created NASA for. This 
was the scientific arm of space discovery, running in parallel with the military 
space programme and not the platform for a Cold War battle. The NASA he left 
behind was drawing together the best engineering minds in the country through 
its network of internal personnel and rapidly-growing engineering technology 
partners. But it was also growing a sense of self-importance that placed its 
ambitions and goals beyond the limited role the President saw for it.   
 In allying with Killian and Kistiakowsky, Purcell and York and with first 
NASA Administrator Keith Glennan, Eisenhower had stuck by his principles of 
believing in small government and in acting in the best interest of the nation, as 
far as possible, outside the scope of partisan pressure. But, as his farewell 
address showed, he was concerned that his legacy was in danger of becoming 
both uneconomically unhealthy, and militarily dangerous.   
 With a planned programme of communications, navigation, science 
discovery and meteorology satellite launches, planetary probes and proof-of-
concept man in space work in the pipeline, Eisenhower’s space programme was 
modest, but economically sound and set for growth towards space stations and 
longer-range exploration through the Saturn booster, which Eisenhower also 
supported. It was a conservative programme, restrained, logical and coolly 
scientific. This was not a legacy of hyperbole and, as such, was a perfect 
reflection of the President.   
Eisenhower’s legacy was not lost through Kennedy’s moon pledge speech. 
It took the new President’s assassination and a wave of emotional endeavour, 
championed by Johnson, to see Kennedy’s moon pledge brought to reality. By 
that time, Eisenhower himself was dead. He died just three months before Neil 
Armstrong stepped onto the moon’s surface, never having changed his position 
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on the folly of a manned mission to the moon. There is a certain irony that the 
man on the end of a telephone making a long-distance call to the moon was 
another new president: Nixon.  
It is impossible to judge whether Eisenhower’s slow but steady, moderate 
approach to civilianised space exploration would have achieved as much or more 
than the approach taken by his successors. However, at least one man who 
benefitted from Kennedy’s push for the Apollo programme has questioned 
whether it was the right thing to do. In 2009, I sat drinking a beer with Charlie 
Duke, Capcom to Apollo 11 and the Lunar module pilot on Apollo 16. I asked the 
tenth man to walk on the moon if NASA had got things right. “Hell no,” he 
responded. “We did things all in the wrong order. We should have built the 
shuttle first; then assembled a space station. That would have given us a great 
jumping off point to the moon and far beyond. Kennedy killed those plans and 
put us back decades.”125
                                                          
125
 Charles Duke in conversation with the author, Birmingham Hilton Metropole Hotel, 24 April 2009.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion: Ike revisited on space 
For too long, scholars have observed Eisenhower’s moves to develop a first space 
policy for the United States as a reaction to Sputnik. This has been part of an 
overall view of Eisenhower’s second term as the epitome of ‘lame duck’ 
presidency – little achieved, and meandering to a close. As this research has 
shown, that is wrong in both cases. Eisenhower’s space policy owed much more 
to decisions taken following the work of the TCP in 1955 than to any Sputnik 
effect. While he was determined to avoid a ‘space race’, he did put in place a 
coherent space policy – a fact that is at odds with the assumptions scholars still 
make.  
This focus on Eisenhower’s space policy reveals the opposite of a ‘lame 
duck’ presidency. We get, as shown in this thesis, a picture of rational actions 
backed by sound judgement on the part of Eisenhower.  It showed how 
Eisenhower, from his inheritance of competing armed forces rocket programmes, 
through his appreciation of ‘missile power’ following the 1954 Castle series of H-
Bomb tests to the opportunities presented by the International Geophysical 
Year’s satellite development, via the national security need for global 
reconnaissance, set in motion a process that enabled the creation of an agency 
that could deliver an effective space programme. It showed how that programme 
had the tools and impetus to open space in its widest sense to the American 
spirit of exploration, while simultaneously advancing the national security 
agenda. Imperative to this, it charted how Eisenhower played his strategic, ‘long 
game’, marshalling the forces at his disposal to reach sound outcomes without 
causing national or international alarm – and all the while, working towards a 
balanced budget. It analysed the President’s role in key decision making, 
balanced against the influence of a small number of advisers both on the ‘big 
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ideas’ for Eisenhower’s space policy and, indeed, the series of small decisions 
that cemented the fine detail of the policy and how that policy played out once 
NASA was operational. It analysed the contribution of previously under-
recognised players in policy development: Killian, Hagerty, Purcell and Bissell 
among others. The thesis also re-evaluated the contribution of Keith Glennan 
while assessing the contribution made by Washington politics’ original ‘Mr 
Space’, Lyndon Johnson. In each case, it explained why these figures were 
chosen by Eisenhower above others – in political, military and science circles – 
when there may have been other voices to the fore that may have seemed more 
obvious choices to advance the Executive agenda. It showed how Eisenhower 
was able to use each of them to advance his strategy – whether that was helping 
him to refine that strategy into something operationally-achievable or, more 
often, to implement it.  
This research adds evidence to David Nichols’ claim, made in New York 
in 2013 that research on Eisenhower is “in mid-stream”.1 He noted that 
historians were finally moving away from the popular perception of the first 
generation of scholars to explore the Eisenhower presidency: “Ike is not the 
fictional war hero who came home, assumed the presidency and morphed into a 
bumbling, smiling, over-the-hill grandfather more interested in playing golf 
than being a president.....We still have colleagues who resist the conclusion that 
Ike was a demonstrably competent, even extraordinary president. No more. Our 
obligation now is to write the history of the Eisenhower presidency with 
rigorous accuracy, not political pay-off.” 
 This research adds to the ongoing revision of Eisenhower. In addressing 
a commonplace assumption about his presidency – the role Sputnik played - it 
                                                          
1 D Nichols, closing remarks to Ike Reconsidered conference, March 8, 2013, Roosevelt House, 
Hunter College, CUNY.  
288 
 
demonstrates his calm handling of an incendiary situation, where his 
consistency did not descend into dogmatism.  President Eisenhower played a 
long-game strategic hand in developing the United States’ first space policy. He 
rejected spectaculars, but encouraged the best scientific brains of the nation to 
enable his Administration to pursue a parallel track: outside the partisan 
political process and adjacent to, but never fully within, the Military-Industrial 
complex. That parallel track may not have been delivered with the rhetorical 
flourish of his successors, but it was a formidable achievement from a 
formidable president who used the best brains to achieve a powerful result.    
By examining the evidence, it becomes clear that Eisenhower was a more 
complex president than often suggested. He was not the amiable, golf-club 
swinging, dissembler as caricatured by the first wave of historians to take 
interest in him. But he did present such a face to the public when it suited him. 
Nor was he the all-seeing, all-knowing behind-the-scenes manipulator as 
portrayed by Greenstein and the more extreme revisionists. What emerges from 
a close study of primary sources on this discrete topic, and the reflections of 
those intimates around him, is a president who operated with a degree of 
confidence rare even in the White House. He was well-read, on top of his brief, 
and driven by an overriding desire for small government, peaceful foreign 
relations and economic growth fuelled by business success. Unlike the 
interpretation of him given in the first wave of revisionism, this research has 
shown he was not always right. However, he had a sufficient streak of vanity to 
believe that he should be. He favoured a military structure and approach to 
running Executive government, but aimed to deliver this through modern 
business methods – and that meant installing senior business figures in key 
governmental roles. He was stubborn, but not unbending; a cold rationalist, but 
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one who maintained warm relations with those who met his expectations in 
delivering solutions. He had a massive sense of duty to do the right thing for the 
nation, and believed he understood better than anyone else what that ‘right 
thing’ really was. He was an ardent anti-communist, but not driven by the 
insidious fear that riddled the nation in the wake of McCarthy.  Most of all, he 
was a calm strategist, prepared to meet the external threats to the United 
States with just enough show of force to deter that threat from ever becoming a 
reality. 
Chapter two delivered two important findings: first, that Eisenhower had 
all the elements for an effective space policy in place as early as 1955, two years 
before the Sputnik satellites. Using the special study process he favoured, led by 
Jim Killian who was to prove such a useful presiding officer in the development 
of space-related policy, he was able to define effective means both to discern the 
real threat the Soviet Union posed to the United States, and to prioritise the 
missile development that was to be at the heart of his New Look defence policy. 
Second, it showed how the implementation of the post-TCP policy delivered high 
quality intelligence gathered by the CIA on Soviet missiles and bomber 
deployment via numerous U-2 over flights since the summer of 1956 that 
demonstrated clearly that the Soviets did not pose a strategic nuclear threat. 
Based on this evidence, Chapter three showed that Eisenhower had no need to 
develop new strategies in response to Sputnik and therefore did not do so. He 
already had a plan in place both to develop and deploy US ICBMs and IRBMs 
and, quite separately, to enable a non-military programme for the exploration of 
outer space and use of satellite technology for beneficial activities such as 
communication, navigation and meteorology. He was well-attuned too to the 
benefits of operations in the ‘black’ area where the programmes intersected, and 
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enabled the development of an effective secret reconnaissance system, Corona, 
hidden in plain sight as Discoverer. Sputnik did not present the challenge that 
virtually all the standard accounts of Eisenhower suggest it did. Eisenhower 
continued along a parallel track, refining his military space programme to focus 
it on the Air Force, and creating the civilianised NASA as a logical next step 
from the initial scientific efforts in space first detailed in 1955 during the 
planning for the 1957-58 International Geophysical Year.  
In moving on from the prevailing revisionism of Greenstein, chapters 
three and four demonstrated that Eisenhower operated not so much as a 
‘Hidden Hand’ but by  drawing on the expertise of actors from all political 
spheres, whether elected politicians such as Johnson, political insiders, such as 
Hagerty, and those on the edge or outside the traditions of Washington politics 
such as Killian, York, Johnston and Dembling who were crucial in aiding his 
understanding of what was both possible and desirable in space and how it 
could be both organised and enabled.  
 As chapter five in particular showed, Eisenhower was active and 
interventionist when he needed to be, but also had high expectations that his 
appointees would deliver his required strategy with little need for intervention. 
His priorities in space were always led by the abiding priority he gave to 
national security, and supported by a core tenet of fiscal conservatism. First and 
foremost, rockets were intended to enable the United States’ defence as a 
fundamental element of the New Look Defence Strategy. But this was a 
President who admired scientists and their achievements and had faith the 
process of moving the nation forward through scientific advance. Thus there was 
a place for scientific discovery, not least, in the newly-reached realms of outer 
space. But this discovery would be an incremental effort, largely conducted by 
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unmanned probes, which would benefit from the same family of technological 
advances that would spawn communications, reconnaissance, navigation and 
meteorology satellites. Such development would be managed by the best and 
brightest scientific and engineering minds that would create prestige for the US 
not through the ‘smoke and mirrors’ of Khrushchev-style propaganda stunts, 
but through tangible scientific discoveries that would advance the knowledge of 
the nation. Eisenhower simply did not believe in stunts or spectaculars.  
 Sputnik was just such a stunt, and to react would have plunged a 
president committed to waging peace into an arena of waging a proxy Cold War 
battle in space. Eisenhower, the rather cold, slightly insular, pragmatic General 
saw no virtue in such a battle. While a short-lived furore lit up sections of the 
media and offered a platform for political beasts circling the next presidential 
election campaign, this thesis has shown decisively that the actual impact of 
Sputnik on the United States was shorter-lived and considerably less deep than 
conventional interpretations by both scholars of Eisenhower and writers on the 
space programme have conceded.  
 As chapter five also demonstrated, Eisenhower set a clear direction for 
US policy in space. He gave the country NASA; the Mercury man in space 
programme; a large satellite lead over the Soviets, interplanetary probes, and 
the Saturn super-booster. He organised a workable split between the military 
satellite programmes, ICBM development and deployment and civilianised 
activities – and he managed to do so while balancing the national budget. In 
order to achieve this, he drew in a circle of remarkable ‘presiding officers’ from 
Killian through Kistiakowsky, Glennan, Purcell, Land and Bissell while being 
supported by unexpected advisers, most especially Hagerty. His actions were 
not perfect, but understandable. He should have been more decisive between 
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1955 and 1958 in directing ICBM/IRBM development, and he should have been 
more visible and reassuring in the immediate aftermath of Sputnik. Here, his 
failing was not one of reaction, but of failing to grab the media high ground. 
Equally, he should have stayed more closely in touch with NASA’s planning in 
1959/60 as the new agency began to stretch and flex away from the President’s 
initial intent. But the fundamental finding of this study is that Eisenhower’s 
actions on space from 1954 to the end of his presidency are undervalued.  The 
building blocks he put in space deserved much more than a space programme 
that reached the moon, but has been falling earthwards ever since.  
 It is time to reconsider the chronology of the so-called ‘space race’ where 
the norm is to bound it by Sputnik as a warning shot, to regard Kennedy’s 
‘Second State of the Union’ in 1961 as the call to action, and to view Armstrong 
and Aldrin’s moon landing as the satisfactory conclusion. It is evident that 
historians should look considerably earlier than Sputnik for the genesis of the 
United States’ participation in space. It is more appropriate to consider the 
decision to launch an earth-satellite as America’s contribution to the IGY as the 
true catalyst, a decision derived from the work of the TCP that also led to work 
on the U-2 and Corona reconnaissance programmes while leading to top 
prioritisation for the development of ICBMs and IRBMs. In the work of the TCP 
and the later PSAC, and their relationship with the President, we see fully the 
drawing together of the three intersecting strands of literature that underpin 
this research. It is time to reconsider Eisenhower’s presidency; his pragmatic 
contribution to reconnaissance technology development and definitely time to 
reappraise his position in US space history. 
 It is time too to reconsider the orthodox view of Eisenhower as a ‘lame-
duck’ president from 1957 onwards, powerless to confront a hostile Congress. 
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This study has shown that from the outset, national security was foremost 
among Eisenhower’s priorities. Yet that was balanced by the fundamental 
principle of achieving that security without spending a cent more than was 
necessary. In practice, this was not always achieved. But Eisenhower’s prime 
means to achieve it was by keeping control of the issue. To do this, Eisenhower 
created new bureaucracies or changed the purpose of bureaucratic functions to 
achieve his ends. The TCP gave him the control he needed to define and enable 
the core elements of his New Look Defence Policy. Developing the U-2, A-12 and 
Corona through the CIA enabled him to circumvent the armed services to 
deliver these projects on time and at a far lower financial cost to the country 
while maintaining Executive control. Finally, in entrusting the drafting of an 
Executive-sponsored Bill for the creation of NASA to an expert team led by 
Killian, he ensured that the legislative Act that emerged delivered an agency 
under presidential rather than Congressional control.   
There is a belief that if we hear a story often enough it becomes true. The 
orthodox reading of Sputnik as a prelude to the race to the moon is not true. The 
challenging of a ‘lame duck’ presidency must continue. It is important that in 
recognising Eisenhower’s parallel track that scholars reframe the US space 
narrative. It is time we gave due credit to Dwight D Eisenhower.    
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